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Abstract
Foreign exchange carry trades involve buying high yielding currencies while selling low
yielding currencies. Contrary to the implications of the uncovered interest parity con-
dition, carry trades have generated consistent profits in the past decades. As foreign
exchange has gained increased relevance as an asset class in its own, the carry trade
emerged as a major driver of foreign exchange market turnover. Given the widespread
use and ease of implementation of carry strategies, active currency managers should
be evaluated relative to a benchmark which incorporates a proxy for carry trade returns.
Within this thesis we study the profitability of various carry portfolio strategies on
a very recent data set ranging from the 1st of January 1999 to the 5th of March 2010.
Within three distinct empirical chapters we analyse whether diﬀerent asset allocation,
market-timing and money management methodologies have the potential to improve
the performance of a simple carry portfolio, such as the one implemented by the Cur-
rency Harvest exchange traded fund by Deutsche Bank.
Three main findings emerge from our investigation on carry trade portfolios.
First, we find that a simple carry trade proxy is diﬃcult to outperform with asset
allocation and market-timing techniques. Nevertheless, we would not conclude that
professional currency managers should cease to implement carry strategies, since they
can add value to the investment process by successfully addressing the issue of optimal
leveraging for carry trades.
Second, we find that the portfolio flows of carry traders do uncover pockets of
predictability in the FX market. Strategies which aim at front-running the trades of
carry strategies, do generate positive returns with low correlations to traditional carry
trade strategies and therefore oﬀer good diversification vehicles for carry portfolios.
Lastly, we find that while profitable market-timing seems feasible on historical back-
tests, the results are strongly dependent on the correctly timing the credit crisis. Thus,
we note that our results are aﬀected by a lookback bias. We posit that before the
credit crisis, portfolio managers would not have had the foresight to select the correct
market-timing indicators. We thus advocate a broad diversification of risk indicators
for carry trade timing.
xiv
Chapter 1
Introduction
The foreign exchange (FX) market runs 24 hours a day and with a daily turnover
in excess of USD 3trn it constitutes the largest financial market in the world
(see Borio et al. [2007]). The main financial instruments for trading currencies
are swaps, spot transactions, forwards and options. Currencies are traded in an
interbank exchange system by market making currency traders. The main par-
ticipants in the FX market are central banks, commercial banks, institutional
investors, traders, hedge funds, commercial companies and retail investors. The
objectives pursued by these participants in the FX market range from pure profit
generation (hegde funds, financial institutions) to hedging cash flows from busi-
ness core activities (corporations) to implementing macroeconomic and monetary
policy objectives (central banks).
According to Borio et al. [2007], the foreign exchange transaction volume more
than doubled between April 2004 and April 2007. This increase of trading activity
is attributed mainly to the growing importance of FX as an asset class. Pojarliev
and Levich [2008] found that the bulk of managed FX returns can be explained
by the returns to the four FX investment-styles carry, momentum, valuation and
volatility. Since these investment-styles can be implemented systematically or
even through the purchase of special exchange traded funds (ETFs), the genera-
tion of returns associated to these known factors does not require any particular
skill. Pojarliev and Levich [2008] concluded that the returns inherent to these
trading-styles should replace the riskless interest rate as the benchmark for pro-
fessional FX managers, since simple replication of these popular return factors
should not entitle to an extraordinary remuneration.
Within this thesis we will focus on the FX carry investment-style, which -
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given its profitability over the past two decades, the thorough media coverage and
the rising amount of academic publications - arguably denotes the most popular
strategy for trading currencies. An FX carry trade involves buying a high yielding
currency while selling a low yielding currency. The uncovered interest parity
condition (UIP) states that exchange rate fluctuations should oﬀset the interest
rate diﬀerential earned on a cross currency position. Thus, the profitability of FX
carry trades has been facilitated by the empirical failure of the uncovered interest
rate parity condition.
Within our empirical research we will investigate on how diﬀerent asset allo-
cation, market-timing and money management methodologies aﬀect the perfor-
mance of currency portfolios implementing the carry investment-style. Thereby,
we explore whether a simple proxy for carry trade returns can be outperformed
by the application of such methodologies, thus justifying the deployment of ad-
vanced FX carry trade strategies by professional FX managers. We believe that
our analyses of FX carry trade strategies from a portfolio managers perspec-
tive are essential to better understand current FX market dynamics, since the
FX carry trade has been recognised a major driver of FX market turnover (see
Galati et al. [2007a]).
In Chapter 4 of this thesis we will focus on testing diﬀerent asset allocation
techniques for FX carry portfolios. We will test the performance of three sets
of currency portfolios related to the FX carry theme. With the first set of cur-
rency portfolios we compare the performance of simple equally weighted asset
allocation algorithms versus mean-variance optimised asset allocation algorithms
for setting up FX carry portfolios. Second, we will allocate capital to currencies
based on diﬀerent yield maturities in order to test whether the maturity of yields
has a significant impact on carry trade returns. The third set of currency port-
folios analysed in Chapter 4 will allocate capital to currencies according to how
their attractiveness from an FX carry trading perspective has changed. Thus,
this third set of currency portfolios mimics the likely portfolio flows generated by
carry traders. We find that the portfolio positions to these ’carry-flows’ currency
portfolios point out to pockets of predictability in foreign exchange rates fluctu-
ations.
Recent literature on the carry trade has found significant relationships be-
tween FX carry trade returns and proxies for global volatility and liquidity (see
2
Section 3.3.4). Dunis and Miao [2007] analysed volatility-based trading filters
for timing FX carry trades and found that they delivered improved risk adjusted
performances over a long-only FX carry trade benchmark. Based on these find-
ings, in Chapter 5 we develop and test several trading filters for market-timing
FX carry portfolios. The market-timing signals are based on proxies for global
volatility, liquidity and interest rate diﬀerentials. The aim of this research is to
analyse the profitability of the carry trade during periods of global risk aversion
or -appetite. Our findings suggest that market-timing the carry trade might be
feasible using aggregated risk indicators for the generation of market-timing sig-
nals. Further, we detect a lookback bias in our analyses: Some market-timing
signals which improve the carry trade performance by correctly timing the credit
crisis, would not have been chosen before the credit crisis.
Carry trades are typically executed with leverage. We expand on research by
Darvas [2009] who found that at high levels of leverage the risk-adjusted perfor-
mance metrics to FX carry trading deteriorate significantly. We do so by testing
a time-varying leverage algorithm based on the Kelly criterion. Moreover, we
introduce a novel performance evaluation measure which allows for an evaluation
of trading strategies with respect to capital growth and security. We find that
conditional, time-varying, leverage models outperform optimal constant leverage
levels for trading FX carry portfolios. Further, we demonstrate how the Sharpe
ratio can lead to erroneous conclusions about the real-world profitability of lever-
aged trading strategies.
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. First, we provide an
introduction into the foreign exchange market (Chapter 2). Second, we present
current research on currency speculation and expand on the FX carry trading-
style whose profitability is facilitated by the empirical failure of uncovered interest
rate parity (Chapter 3). Third, we perform empirical research on asset allocation
methodologies for setting up FX carry portfolios (Chapter 4). Fourth, we test
market-timing indicators for trading FX carry portfolios (Chapter 5). Fifth,
we analyse novel models for determining optimal leverage levels for FX carry
portfolios (Chapter 6). Lastly, we summarise our main findings and draw a
conclusion (Chapter 7).
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Chapter 2
The Foreign Exchange Market
The foreign exchange market, or FX market, is the market where currencies are
exchanged against each other. The FX market has some very unique character-
istics which can be summarised as follows:
Market Size The FX market is by far the most liquid market in the world.
This high liquidity has pushed transactions costs to very low levels.
Market Structure Exchange rates are traded around the clock in an in-
terbank market. Customers do not have access to this market and have to refer
to specialised dealers for quotes.
Market Participants A very heterogeneous set of actors participates in
the FX market. Market participants often do not share the same interests when
trading currencies.
After defining how the term exchange rate is applied throughout the research,
these characteristics will be outlined in the following sections.
2.1 What is an Exchange Rate?
An exchange rate represents the number of units of one currency that can be
exchanged for a unit of another. There are two ways to express an exchange rate
between two currencies (e.g., the US Dollar USD and the Euro EUR). One can
either write USDEUR or
EUR
USD . These are reciprocals of each other, if the exchange
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rate S is the price for one EUR in USD (S = USDEUR) and the exchange rate S
￿
is
the price for one USD in EUR (S
￿
= EURUSD ), then S =
1
S￿ must hold.
Throughout this thesis an exchange rate S will denote the domestic currency
price for one unit of foreign currency. If the EUR is regarded as domestic currency
and the USD is regarded as foreign currency the exchange rate will be S = EURUSD .
2.2 The G10 Currency Universe
Throughout this thesis, we focus on the G10 currency universe. The G10 currency
universe consists of 9 out of the 10 most traded currencies, and the New Zealand
Dollar, which is the eleventh currency when focusing on market turnover (see
Borio et al. [2007]). The currencies of the G10 basket and their respective ISO−
4217 currency codes are summarised in the Table below.
Country Currency Currency Code Market Share in %
United States Dollar USD 88.70
Euro-area Euro EUR 37.20
Japan Yen JPY 20.30
Great Britain Pound Sterling GBP 16.90
Switzerland Franc CHF 6.10
Australia Dollar AUD 5.50
Canada Dollar CAD 4.20
Sweden Krona SEK 2.30
Norway Krone NOK 1.90
New Zealand Dollar NZD 1.40
Table 2.1: The G10 Currency Universe
Note that volume percentages in Table 2.1 would add up to 200% when con-
sidering all currencies: 100% for all the sellers and 100% for all the buyers.
2.3 Market Size
The foreign exchange market is the largest international financial market with an
estimated daily turnover of USD 3.21 trillion (see Borio et al. [2007]). According
to Borio et al. [2007] the foreign exchange transaction volume between foreign
exchange dealers and both financial- and non-financial institutions more than
doubled between April 2004 and April 2007. The increase of trading activity
from these institutions is attributed to increased speculation by investors, who will
have profited from the recent period of trending exchange rates and low market
volatility (see Borio et al. [2007]), and to the growing importance of FX as an asset
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class (see Section 3.1.1). Another cause for the surge in foreign exchange trading
is the tendency of institutional investors to hold more internationally diversified
portfolios, which involves buying and therefore usually hedging foreign currency
in order to be able to enter into transactions abroad (see Borio et al. [2007]).
2.4 The Interbank Market
The FX market is a decentralised market with multiple dealers in many locations
quoting and trading currencies simultaneously. The main trading centres are
in London, New York, Tokyo, and Singapore, but banks throughout the world
participate in the market. Currency trading happens around the globe for 24
hours a day and 5 days a week. As the Asian trading session ends, the European
session begins, followed by the North American session and then back to the Asian
session. Figure 2.2 depicts the largest providers of FX liquidity, as of May 2007.
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange
(PHLX) are centralised exchanges that oﬀer standardised derivative products on
currencies.
Trading in the FX market can be divided into customer trading and interbank
trading, which can be direct or brokered. Dealers provide liquidity by continually
putting both bid (buy) and ask (sell) prices into the market. The bid/ask spread
is the diﬀerence between the price at which a bank or market maker will sell (ask)
and the price at which a market-maker will buy (bid) from a customer. The high
amount of competition has caused bid/ask spreads to narrow drastically (see
Lyons [2006]).
Electronic dealing platforms such as EBS or Reuters Dealing are currently
established brokers. Borio et al. [2007] attributed the increase in global foreign
exchange market turnover partly to the spread of such electronic trading platforms
which enabled large financial institutions to set up automated trading systems,
and provided better trading facilities to retail investors.
2.5 Traded Financial Instruments
The FX market oﬀers a variety of financial instruments related to exchange rates.
These are:
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Spot This trade represents a direct exchange between two currencies at the
spot exchange rate S. A spot transaction is a two-day delivery transaction and
involves cash rather than a contract.
Forwards One way to deal with foreign exchange risk is to engage in a
forward transaction. In this transaction, the parties agree on a spot transaction
at a fixed exchange rate on some future date. Currency Forwards are over-the-
counter (OTC) instruments and thus very flexible with regards to the duration
and size of the contract.
Futures Foreign currency futures are forward transactions with standard-
ised contract sizes and maturity dates (maturities are usually at 3-month in-
tervals). Currency futures are traded on centralised exchanges like the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, the Bolsa de Mercadorias e Futuros, the Budapest Stock
Exchange, the Tokyo International Financial Futures Exchange, Euronext Lon-
don and the New York Board of Trade (see Galati et al. [2007b]).
Swaps In a foreign currency swap transaction, two parties exchange curren-
cies and reverse the transaction after an agreed period of time. FX swaps are not
standardised contracts and are traded on the OTC market.
Options A foreign exchange option is a derivative where the owner has the
right but not the obligation to exchange money denominated in one currency into
another currency at an agreed exchange rate on a specified date. FX options are
usually traded on the OTC market, although the Philadelphia Stock Exchange
oﬀers options with standardised strike prices and expiration dates to clients.
Figure 2.1 depicts the distribution of the traditional (over-the-counter) global
foreign exchange market turnover over the available financial instruments.
2.6 Market Participants
The participating market actors in the FX market can have very diﬀerent mo-
tivations for trading foreign exchange rates. In the following the main market
participants, and their main interests will be described.
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Swaps (53.5%)
Spot (31.3%)
Forwards (11.1%)
Gaps in Reporting (4%)
Figure 2.1: Over-the-counter FX Market Turnover Share of the main Financial
Instruments (Source: Borio et al. [2007]).
Deutsche Bank (19.3%)
UBS AG (14.8%)
Citi (9%)
RBS (8.9%)Barclays Capital (8.8%)
Bank of America (5.3%)
HSBC (4.4%)
Goldman Sachs (4.1%)
JPMorgan (3.3%)
Morgan Stanley (2.9%)
Other (19.2%)
Figure 2.2: Market Share of the Largest Currency Dealing Institutions (Source:
ECB [2007]).
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Corporations Corporations buy and sell foreign currency in order to pay
for goods or services or to hedge future revenues in foreign currency. Multinational
companies can have an unpredictable impact on exchange rates when very large
amounts are traded due to reasons that are not widely known by other market
participants (e.g., mergers or acquisitions).
Banks The top-tier interbank market accounts for 53% of all transactions
in the FX market (see Borio et al. [2007]). The investment banks act as liquidity
providers for customers and also take part in speculative trading.
Central Banks National central banks often have oﬃcial or unoﬃcial target
rates for their currencies. They can use their often substantial foreign exchange
reserves to stabilise the market. It is worth mentioning that considering the size of
the FX market, direct intervention by central banks may not be eﬀective. Central
banks can however use their trades to signal their intentions to the market and
attempt to arrest or reinforce a trend.
Mutual- and Pension Funds Mutual- and pension funds use the foreign
exchange market mainly to perform transactions in foreign securities. An invest-
ment manager with an international equity portfolio will need to buy and sell
foreign currencies in the spot market in order to pay for purchases of foreign
equities. Since the FX transactions are often secondary to the actual investment
decision, they are not seen as speculative or aimed at profit-maximisation. Some
investment management firms also have more speculative specialised currency
overlay programmes, which aim to limit the risks of the currency exposure of the
fund, and eventually generate additional excess returns. This attitude of fund
managers towards the FX market has shifted in recent years, as non-traditional
asset classes are looked to by investment professionals in a search for sources
of returns which are uncorrelated to traditional asset classes (see Galati et al.
[2007a]).
Hedge funds Hedge funds have gained a reputation for aggressive currency
speculation since 1992, when large foreign currency speculation by hedge funds
forced the Pound Sterling to depreciate substantially in a short period of time.
Galati and Melvin [2004] noted that Hedge funds participating in the FX market
grew markedly over the period from 2001 to 2004 both in terms of number and
9
overall size.
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Chapter 3
The Carry Trade
In this thesis we focus on the foreign exchange carry trade which denotes one of
the main known strategies for currency speculation. In Section 3.1 we will give
an overview on the practice of currency speculation. Investment strategies for
currencies and insights into the trading techniques adopted by FX hedge-funds
are discussed. In this section, the carry trade will emerge as a main driver behind
the profits of a whole industry. Section 3.2 will focus on the forward rate bias
(FRB), a major puzzle in financial economics which constitutes the theoretical
basis behind the profitability of carry trading. Finally, in Section 3.3 we will
discuss literature dealing directly with the phenomenon of the carry trade, its
profitability, trading strategies and drivers.
3.1 Currency Speculation
Professional investment managers constantly search for alternative sources of in-
come and diversification for their portfolios and the financial industry is keen to
provide the market with innovative products and investable indices also for the
realm of currency trading. Important developments and research results concern-
ing these topics will be discussed in the following sections.
3.1.1 Foreign Exchange as an Asset Class
Over the last 20 years professional currency speculators have been able to gener-
ate positive returns. Indices which track the performance of professional currency
managers exhibited good risk adjusted returns over this period. E.g., the Bar-
clays Currency Traders Index, a benchmark which measures the returns of global
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currency managers, reveals healthy returns of 7.73% percent p.a. since 1987. 1
A possible explanation for the ability of certain fund managers to generate posi-
tive returns by trading currencies might be the existence of profit opportunities
generated by the activity of non-profit maximising actors in the FX market (e.g.,
central banks and corporations).
It has been shown that the returns to currency speculation exhibited very low,
sometimes negative, correlations to more traditional asset classes like equities
and bonds (see Pojarliev and Levich [2008] and DB [2009]). It is therefore not
surprising that an increasing number of real money managers and hedge funds are
treating FX as an asset class in its own, since it promises to act as a good vehicle
for diversifying portfolios of traditional assets. An indication for this increased
interest in FX as an asset class is given by the fact that the number of funds in
the Barclays Currency Traders has grown from 44 in 1993 to 106 in 2006 (see
Pojarliev and Levich [2008]). Galati and Melvin [2004] even attributed a part of
the recent increased FX market turnover to the growing relevance of FX as an
asset class.
Despite the increased popularity of currency trading, the sources of returns
from professional currency speculation were not revealed to the public. Recent
research into foreign exchange trading strategies and currency hedge funds helps
to gain a better understanding of the mechanics of the industry of currency spec-
ulation and the drivers behind foreign exchange managers returns.
3.1.2 Popular FX Trading Strategies
Throughout the literature we find a set of recurring investment approaches when
it comes to profitable currency speculation. The most widespread approaches
are:
• Momentum strategies,
• Carry strategies,
• Valuation strategies,
• Volatility strategies.
1Information retrieved from http://www.barclayhedge.com/research/indices/cta/sub/curr.html
in April 2010.
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There is evidence that these trading strategies or investment-styles could rep-
resent important tools in the investment processes of FX managers with a total
return mandate (see Galati and Melvin [2004] and James [2005]). In the follow-
ing paragraphs the rationale behind these investment strategies will be briefly
discussed.
Carry The so-called carry trade denotes a very popular investment-style
for currencies. In an FX carry trade, an investor borrows funds in a low interest
rate currency and invests them in a higher interest rate currency. In doing so,
the carry trader is betting that the exchange rate will not oﬀset the positive
interest rate diﬀerential that he is earning on the carry trade. Carry trading
has produced good risk-adjusted returns in the past decades (see James [2005],
Rosenberg [2003] or Vesilind [2006]).
Carry trading returns can be proxied by the G10 Currency Harvest Index by
Deutsche Bank. The index tracks a portfolio which buys the 3 G10 currencies with
the highest yields, while selling the 3 G10 currencies with the lowest yields. In-
vestors can participate to the returns associated by such carry strategies, through
a set of available products on the market, e.g., the DBV ETF2.
Momentum or Trend Another popular strategy for currency speculation
is momentum trading. Investors trading this investment strategy would buy cur-
rencies which exhibited a recent period of appreciation while selling currencies
which exhibited a recent period of depreciation. Momentum trading in the FX
market has produced positive returns in the past decades, as reported by James
[2005], Lequeux and Acar [1998] or DB [2009].
As a proxy for FX momentum trading returns, the AFX Currency Manage-
ment Index can be used. The AFX Currency Management Index is based on a set
of trend-following moving average rules with diﬀerent window lengths (32, 61 and
117 days). Lequeux and Acar [1998] showed that the AFX Index exhibited a high
correlation with the returns of managed FX funds, indicating that professional
currency managers might use trend following strategies.
Valuation A somewhat less popular, but academically very sound invest-
ment principle in the FX market is valuation investing. After determining a
2An exchange traded fund by Invesco Powershares which tracks the DB Currency Harvest
Index (see Invesco [2010]).
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fair-value 3 for the currencies in the individual currency universe, the speculator
would buy undervalued currencies and sell overvalued currencies. This trading
rules can be motivated by empirical evidence which suggests that currencies of-
ten overshoot their fair values in the short run, and show a tendency to revert
back toward their fair values in the longer run (see Pojarliev and Levich [2008]).
Valuation trading strategies have generated positive returns in the past 20 years
(see DB [2009]).
Investors can gain exposure to a valuation-based portfolio strategy through the
DB Currency Valuation Index by Deutsche Bank (see DB [2007] and Figure 3.1)4
Volatility Volatility trading is perhaps the least implemented investment-
style by professional currency managers, since it involves trading options, an
activity practiced by about 10 percent of currency funds with a total return
mandate (see James [2005]). A simple approach of profitably trading options in
the FX market has been presented by James [2005]. The strategy, which sells
short-dated straddles when the implied volatility is exceptionally high, was able
to produce a Sharpe ratio of 0.607 in a backtest during the period betwen 1992
and 2005 (see James [2005]). James [2005] noted that - as the returns to volatil-
ity trading in the FX market are negatively correlated to carry- and momentum
trading - the interest in such strategies is growing rapidly. Foreign exchange im-
plied volatility can also be traded through specialised indices, e.g., the Deutsche
Bank Currency Volatility Index (CVIX) which tracks 3-month implied volatility
of a broad currency basket, weighted by market turnover (see DB [2007]).
A good overview of the returns to most of these FX investment-styles is pro-
vided by the Deutsche Bank Currency Return Indices, which are specifically
designed to track the returns associated with these investment-styles (see DB
[2007]). Figure 3.1 depicts the cumulative returns to momentum, carry and valu-
ation investing, as well as a portfolio consisting out of the carry, momentum and
valuation investment approaches (the DB Currency Returns Index ). Figure 3.1
3Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in one of its many variants is a commonly used methodology
to determine the long-run fair value of a currency.
The idea behind PPP is that a unit of currency should buy the same basket of goods in one
country as the equivalent amount of foreign currency, at the actual exchange rate, can buy
in that foreign country. If that relationship would not hold, then arbitrage possibilities could
arise.
4 The valuation index is constructed by Deutsche Bank and is based on the OECD Pur-
chasing Power Parity figures (see EUROSTAT-OECD [2006] for the methodology behind the
OECD PPP model.)
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illustrates how the three single strategies have produced attractive returns during
the last 2 decades, and how a portfolio of the diﬀerent investment-styles produces
a smoother cumulative return curve, due to positive diversification eﬀects.
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Figure 3.1: Historical Performance of Indices Tracking popular Foreign Exchange
Trading Styles. Source: Bloomberg, Deutsche Bank
3.1.3 Benchmarks for Professional Currency Managers
At a first glance, currency speculation does not lend itself to traditional bench-
marking. Unlike in the equity market, there is no natural market portfolio to
track since each FX trade has the character of a long-short position. De facto,
positive returns from currency speculation were traditionally termed as pure al-
pha returns (see James [2005]), since they were not correlated with traditional
benchmarks such as equity market indices and lacked an own benchmark.
Recent literature on hedge funds performance evaluation opens up a diﬀerent
perspective on the evaluation of currency trading returns. In their seminal pa-
per Fung and Hsieh [1997] showed that a vast part of hedge fund returns could
be explained by easily replicable risk premia in the market. These replicable
risk premia could not be attributed to individual manager skill and are termed
alternative beta’s by this line of hedge-fund research. Further research on the
investment-styles adopted by hedge-funds has been performed amongst others by
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Hasanhodzic and Lo [2006], Jaeger [2005], Briand et al. [2009] or Anson [2008].
However, these studies have examined a general universe of hedge funds using
mainly equity market and bond market factors as alternative beta’s. In a recent
paper by Pojarliev and Levich [2008] these analyses have been extended to the
industry of currency hedge-funds.
Pojarliev and Levich [2008] examined the relationship between a data set of
FX hedge-fund returns from the Barclays Currency Traders Index with proxies
for the popular FX investment-styles momentum, carry, valuation and volatility.
The aim of Pojarliev and Levich [2008] was to estimate what portion of currency
trading profits by professional FX managers is due to exposure to these specific
trading style or risk factors, and what portion is due to genuine manager skill
(i.e. alpha).
The main findings of the study by Pojarliev and Levich [2008] were:
• A substantial part of the returns generated by FX hedge-funds can be ex-
plained by systematic exposure to known investment strategies.
• On average, professional FX managers do not exhibit significant ability to
generate positive returns uncorrelated with the four investment-styles.
• Some FX funds show the ability to generate genuine alpha. This outperfor-
mance of traditional investment-styles seems to be the result of successful
market-timing in some of the FX investment-styles.
The conclusion that Pojarliev and Levich [2008] drew from these results are
that the definition and measurement of alpha returns in professional currency
speculation should be changed. From their point of view, only those returns which
are not associated to known and transparent currency trading strategies should
be termed as alpha returns. Thus, following Pojarliev and Levich [2008], an
aggregate of the main investment strategies for FX trading should constitute the
new benchmark for professional currency managers. This notion is also advocated
by Deutsche Bank in the prospectus for the Deutsche Bank Currency Return
Index (see DB [2009]), which is marketed as the new benchmark for currency
managers.
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3.2 The Forward Rate Bias and the Carry Trade
The forward rate bias (FRB) is a major puzzle in financial economics. Since
the hypothesis that the forward rate constitutes an unbiased estimator of future
spot rates has been violated in empirical datasets, profit opportunities emerged
for speculators willing to engage in risky foreign exchange trades. Such trades
attempting to exploit the FRB puzzle are called carry trades. In the following
sections we will discuss the theoretical construct leading to the formulation that
the forward rate should be an unbiased predictor of exchange rates and present
empirical findings in literature on the validity of this relationship. Subsequently,
the concept of carry trading as a means to exploit the FRB is introduced.
3.2.1 Foreign Exchange Market Eﬃciency
The Eﬃcient Market Hypothesis (EMH) states that financial markets are in-
formationally eﬃcient, i.e. prices fully reflect information available to market
participants and therefore are unbiased in the sense that they reflect the beliefs
of all investors about future developments of the assets (see Fama [1970]). There-
fore, if the EMH holds, there should be no opportunities for market participants
to earn excess profits from speculative activities.
The Rational Expectations Theory (RE) provides the basis for the EMH to
hold. If investors have rational expectations, the outcomes that are being fore-
cast ex-ante are assumed not to diﬀer systematically from the ex-post realised
outcomes, i.e. investors do not make systematic errors when predicting the future
market prices.
Tests for the eﬃciency of the foreign exchange market have to take into ac-
count all the factors which influence the total return of an exchange rate position.
When trading exchange rates, the total return of a speculative position which is
opened at time t and closed at t+k is dependent on three diﬀerent factors. These
factors are: the change in the spot exchange rate St+kSt , the earned interest rate in
the home country it,k, and the earned interest rate in the foreign country with a
similar maturity i∗t,k. Equation 3.1 illustrates the calculation of the total return
TR of a foreign exchange spot position:
TRt,t+k =
St+k
St
(1 + i∗t,k)− (1 + it,k) (3.1)
In order to consider the FX market eﬃcient, there should be no opportunity to
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achieve systematic positive total returns from speculative activity in the foreign
exchange market. A vast number of studies have investigated foreign exchange
market eﬃciency by testing the validity of the following necessary conditions:
• The forward discount has to be equal to the interest diﬀerential (this no-
arbitrage condition implies that covered interest rate parity (CIP) holds).
• The opportunity costs of holding a foreign exchange position, i.e. the in-
terest rate diﬀerential, has to be oﬀset by the shifts in exchange rates. The
expected total return of an exchange rate position is thus zero (this uncov-
ered interest rate parity (UIP) condition implies speculative eﬃciency of
the FX market).
• The forward discount is a good predictor of the change in the future spot
rate (implying CIP, UIP and RE).
Figure 3.2 presents the general relationship between interest rate diﬀerentials,
the forward discount and expected exchange rate changes under eﬃcient markets
and rational expectations. Foreign exchange interest rate parity conditions de-
termine how inflation diﬀerentials, interest rate diﬀerentials, forward exchange
rates, and expected changes in exchange rates should be linked internationally
in eﬃcient markets. These international parity conditions would dictate that
high inflation countries should see their currencies depreciate, whereas low infla-
tion countries should see their currencies appreciate. They also indicate that the
forward rate should act as an unbiased estimator of future spot exchange rates.
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Figure 3.2: General Relationships in the FX Market under EMH and RE
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In the following sections the CIP, UIP and the forward rate unbiasedness hy-
pothesis (FRUH) will be briefly presented and the findings in academic literature
about their empirical validity will be discussed.
3.2.2 Covered Interest Rate Parity
Theory In the absence of market frictions an investment in foreign cur-
rency that is fully hedged against foreign exchange rate risk should yield exactly
the same return as a comparable domestic currency investment (see Rosenberg
[2003]). The left hand side of Equation 3.2 illustrates the return an investor
would earn when investing a unit of currency in the home country for k periods
in a fixed-income security with interest rate it. The right hand side of Equa-
tion 3.2 represents the hedged return of investing the same amount abroad. This
operation involves an exchange rate transaction, an investment in a foreign fixed
income security with the interest i∗t,k and forward selling of the foreign currency at
time k through a currency forward F kt . The no-arbitrage principle should ensure
that both sides of the equation are equal. If this is not the case, arbitrageurs will
exploit this risk free profit opportunity until the market prices are at equilibrium
again.
1 + it,k = (1 + i
∗
t,k)
F kt
St
(3.2)
Hence, the forward rate of a currency forward has to equal the actual exchange
rate adjusted by the interest rate payments on the spot position:
F kt =
1 + it,k
1 + i∗t,k
St (3.3)
Equation 3.3 can be reformulated and approximated by Equation 3.4, which
constitutes the CIP condition:
FD = fkt − st = it,k − i∗t,k (3.4)
Where FD is the forward discount rate, fkt is the logarithm of the forward
exchange rate at time t for k periods ahead and st is the logarithm of the spot
exchange rate at time t. If the relation in Equation 3.4 holds, there will be no
advantage to investing in an exchange rate of a specific country while hedging the
foreign exchange risk on the forward market. Equation 3.4 can be reformulated
to an econometric regression equation, generally applied to test for the empirical
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validity of CIP (see Sarno and Taylor [2002]):
FD = α+ β(it,k − i∗t,k) + ￿t (3.5)
For CIP to hold empirically, the regression estimation should produce an α pa-
rameter diﬀering insignificantly from zero, a β parameter diﬀering insignificantly
from unity and non serially correlated regression errors ￿t.
Empirical Evidence Studies on the validity of CIP have often been based
on regression analysis, generally performing regressions based on Equation 3.5.
Frenkel and Levich [1975] performed early tests on CIP. Using weekly observations
from January 1962 to November 1967, they found that covered interest parity held
for three-month horizons after accounting for transactions costs. Later Frenkel
and Levich [1977] extended their study into three periods (1962-67, 1968-69,
and 1973-1975) in order to diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent foreign exchange rate
regimes. This confirmed their previous findings: CIP still holds during these
periods even when the eﬀect of transaction costs is taken into account. Subsequent
studies supporting the absence of arbitrage opportunities in the foreign exchange
market include Rhee and Chang [1992], Fletcher and Taylor [1994] and Juhl et al.
[2006].
The main conclusion that can be drawn by this line of research is that CIP
holds. Some tests exhibit alpha values which are significantly diﬀerent from zero,
but market features as taxes, illiquidity, political risk and transaction costs are
then held responsible for these results (see Taylor [1987]).
Taylor [1987] questioned previous studies reporting evidence of deviations
from CIP, since they were not based on contemporaneous high frequency data
from currency and interest rate markets, and thus produced results that could not
be implemented realistically in a trading situation. Taylor tested for the validity
of CIP using a high-frequency data set composed of interest rate and exchange
rate data points at about one minute intervals during the most active trading
hours in London over three days in 1985. Taylor found strong support for CIP,
since he did not find any profitable arbitrage opportunity within the data set,
thus confirming the results from previous studies.
3.2.3 Uncovered Interest Rate Parity and the Forward
Rate Bias
20
Theory In a fully eﬃcient market, actual prices should incorporate all infor-
mation which is available to market participants (see Sarno and Taylor [2002]).
According to the eﬃcient markets hypothesis, it should not be possible for an
investor to earn excess returns from speculation, since all potentially relevant fu-
ture information would have been already discounted into the market price (see
Fama [1984]). Therefore the expected total return from holding a certain cur-
rency rather than another, should be zero. Since the total return of an exchange
rate position is made up of a risky exchange rate component as well as a risk-free
interest rate component, the former is expected to be oﬀset by the latter. By
extension therefore, the expectations of spot rate changes should be explained by
Equation 3.6:
∆ks
e
t+k = it,k − i∗t,k (3.6)
Where st is the logarithm of the spot exchange rate S at time t, it,k and i∗t,k are
the nominal interest rates on similar domestic and foreign securities respectively
(with k periods to maturity),∆kset+k denotes the market expectation of the change
in the exchange rate from t to t+ k based on information at time t.
A second necessary condition, besides the validity of the eﬃcient market hy-
pothesis for deriving the UIP relationship is the rational expectations hypothesis,
which states that market participants behave rationally and thus the deviation
between their market forecasts and realised spot exchange rate changes should
be unpredictable and zero on average. If investors have rational expectations,
Equation 3.7 must hold.
set+k = st+k + ut+k (3.7)
The term ut+k represents an error term, with a mean equal to zero, set+k and
st+k are respectively the logarithms of the expected exchange rate in t for k
periods ahead and the logarithm of the realised exchange rate k periods ahead.
By substituting Equation 3.7 into Equation 3.6 we obtain Equation 3.8, which
describes the uncovered interest rate parity UIP condition when investors are
rational and markets eﬃcient:
∆kst+k = it,k − i∗t,k + vt+k (3.8)
Where vt+k is an error term with mean zero and no serial correlation. Equa-
tion 3.8 states that the returns from the spot exchange rates should be directly
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oﬀset, on average, by the relevant interest rate diﬀerential of that currency po-
sition. Reformulating Equation 3.8 by using the relationship for the covered
interest rate parity (see Equation 3.4), the uncovered interest rate parity can be
interpreted as the hypothesis that the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the
future spot rate, i.e. that the forward discount accurately predicts the changes
in spot exchange rates:
∆kst+k = f
k
t − st + ut+k (3.9)
According to UIP, the interest rate diﬀerential should be oﬀset by the ap-
preciation of the low yielding currency and the depreciation of the high yielding
currency. The condition expressed by Equation 3.8 can be tested through the
Fama-regression Equation 3.10:
∆kst+k = α+ β(it,k − i∗t,k) + ￿t+k (3.10)
Where ∆kst+k is the change in the spot rate from time t to k, it,k is the
interest rate for the home currency at time t, i∗t,k represents the interest rate for
the foreign currency at time t and ￿t+k are the regression residuals with a mean
equal to zero.
By substituting Equation 3.4 into the econometric regression Equation 3.10
for testing the uncovered interest rate parity, the typical regression for testing for
the unbiasedness of the forward rate as a predictor for the future spot exchange
rate can be obtained (Equation 3.11). The forward rate unbiasedness hypothesis
(FRUH) states that the forward rate should correctly predict future spot exchange
rates.
∆kst+k = α+ β(f
k
t − st) + ξt+k (3.11)
Where ξt+k is a disturbance term. If agents are risk-neutral and have rational
expectations, as in the UIP regression, we should expect the slope parameter β
to be equal to unity and the disturbance term ξt+k - the rational expectations
forecast error - to be uncorrelated with information available at t. This property
of the disturbance term follows from a standard property of rational expecta-
tions forecast errors that E[ξt+k|Ωt] = 0, where E[.|Ωt] denotes the mathematical
expectation conditioned on the information set available at time t, Ωt.
Since CIP has been shown to hold in practice, tests for UIP and FRUH should
produce very similar results. The literature review is therefore congruent for both
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hypotheses.
Empirical Evidence Interestingly, the vast majority of literature states
that the UIP does not hold empirically. Meese and Rogoﬀ [1983a] and Meese and
Rogoﬀ [1983b] found that a random walk model consistently forecasts future spot
rates better than the any alternative structural models, including the forward rate
model at horizons under two years. Empirical studies based on the estimation
of Equation 3.10 and Equation 3.11, generally report results that contradict the
UIP and FRUH hypotheses, thus disproving the eﬃcient markets hypothesis un-
der risk neutrality. The estimated β coeﬃcients can be shown to be statistically
diﬀerent from unity in the majority of cases. Often the estimated β coeﬃcient
even assumes negative values, implying that the forward premium systematically
predicts changes in the spot exchange rate in the wrong direction. Froot and
Thaler [1990] reported that the average beta coeﬃcient across 75 published es-
timates is −0.88. This empirical finding of the misprediction of the direction of
exchange rates by the forward premium has been called the forward rate bias
FRB.
Conversely, studies which examined very long data sets claim that UIP holds
in the very long run, but can deviate for extended periods of time due to slow ad-
justment of expectations to actual regime changes or to peso-eﬀects (see Lothian
and Simaan [1998] and Lothian and Wu [2003]).
The level of economic development of countries and the length of the yield
maturities seem to have an influence on the strength of the departures from UIP.
Bansal and Dahlquist [2000] and Frankel and Poonawala [2006] compared the
forward rate bias in major currencies with emerging market currencies and have
found that the bias is weaker in the emerging market currencies, since the beta
coeﬃcient there is, on average, slightly above zero. Also, UIP is more likely to be
violated for short maturity bonds, than on longer horizons. Alexius [2001] and
Chinn and Meredith [2005] have shown that the negative β coeﬃcient does not
arise when using long maturity bonds, even in the major currencies.
3.2.4 Explanations for Empirical Failure of UIP
Meredith and Ma [2002] note that the FRB puzzle must be caused by the failure
of one or both parts of the joint hypothesis of eﬃcient markets and risk neutrality.
Eﬃcient markets make sure that the expectations of future variables, including
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the foreign exchange rate, embody all information available at the time when the
expecations are formed. Risk neutrality implies that the forward rate equals the
market expectation of the future spot rate. Combining these postulates in the
risk-neutral eﬃcient-markets hypothesis implies that the deviation between the
forward rate and the realisation of the future spot rate is a white-noise error term
not correleted with past information. The Fama-regressions (see Equation 3.10)
should then yield a beta coeﬃcient of unity.
Thus, since UIP has been shown to fail empirically, possible explanations
include irrationality in investors expectations formation or risk-averse speculators.
Moreover, we have identified two additional categories which provide of potential
explanations for the FRB puzzle, namely in-sample bias and regime shifts and
heterogeneous beliefs. In the following paragraphs we will provide an overview of
the literature analysing explanations behind the failure of UIP.
Irrationality
Explanations based on irrationality assume that the failure of UIP stems from
irrational traders whose predictions about future prices are systematically biased.
This scenario conflicts with the rational expectations hypothesis.
A variety of studies have examined the relationship between the errors of price
forecasts in surveys and predictable elements of excess returns (see e.g. Froot and
Frankel [1989], Chinn and Frankel [1994], Cavaglia et al. [1993], Bacchetta and
Wincoop [2005]). These studies consistently found that the measures of forecast
errors had a strong relationship with the excess returns. Thus, Froot and Frankel
[1989] concluded that the forward rate bias is due to errors in forecasts by market
participants and does not arise as a compensation for risk.
A possible explanation for the emergence of such forecast errors has been
provided by Lewis [1989] who demonstrates that they can be caused by changes in
the markets that are not fully understood by market participants. The reasoning
behind this is that market participants will gradually update their beliefs that a
new regime is in place, generating systematic forecast errors during the transition.
A similar explanation is given by Froot and Thaler [1990] who noticed that the
FRB might be caused by investors which are either slow in adapting to interest
rate changes, or are unable to do so because of regulatory restrictions. The slow-
mover hypothesis of Froot and Thaler [1990] provides an explanation why high
interest yielding currencies continue to appreciate, whereas low yielding currencies
continue to devalue over prolonged periods.
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In-Sample Bias
Engel [1996] argued that tests for uncovered interest rate parity could suﬀer from
an in-sample bias. Such an in-sample bias arises when the information set of the
researcher diﬀers from that of the market. When that happens, regressions could
erroneously reject or accept the eﬃciency hypothesis (see e.g. Krasker [1980]).
Incongruency in information sets can be caused by peso eﬀects or learning eﬀects.
Peso eﬀects are characterised when low probability events such as a currency
crisis occur in the data and models are unable to describe such extreme events
appropriately 5.
By contrast, learning eﬀects denote a situation where the market participants
are not sure if a change in regime has taken place or not, or they do not fully
understand all the relevant information for the exchange rates contained in a
policy change.
By analising FX options data, Bates [1996] showed that expected exchange
rate distributions vary considerably over time, especially with regards to skewness
and kurtosis. Although peso eﬀects emerge, he rejects that they were the cause
for the empirical deviation from UIP between the USD and DEM (German Mark)
during the 1980s.
Lewis [1989] indicates that the general underprediction of the US Dollar
strength in the first half of the 1980s can be attributed to learning eﬀects. She
provides evidence that the money demand in the United States experienced a
sensible increase during those years. She argues that the increase in demand
was not oﬀset by an appropriate increase in the supply of money. This led to
a steady appreciation of the USD. Since markets did not adapt immedeately to
the accelerating demand for money, exchange rate expectations and forward rates
persistently underestimated the appreciation of the USD.
The problem with accepting peso problems, bubbles or learning as explana-
tions for the forward bias is that the large number of econometric studies encom-
passing a large range of exchange rates and sample periods, have found that the
direction of the bias is the same under each scenario (see e.g. Lewis [1989]). This
is not in line with the learning explanation since agents cannot forever be learning
about a unique regime shift. Similarly, the peso problem and speculative bubbles
are essentially a small-sample phenomenon which cannot explain the fact that
estimates of the beta parameter in the Fama-regressions are generally negative.
5see e.g. the Peso crisis 1994, when there was a sudden devaluation of the Mexican Peso
that caused other currencies in the region to decline
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Regime Shifts and Heterogeneous Beliefs
The in-sample bias literature is closely related to literature which attributes the
FRB to regime shifts and heterogeneous beliefs. These theories account for sys-
tematic deviation from UIP and for long-lasting trends of exchange rate appreci-
ation and depreciation.
Engel and Hamilton [1990] study the phases of USD strength (early 1980’s)
and weakness (1985 to 1988) and find that forward rates systematically under-
predicted these trends in the USD. They argue that exchange rates incur long
trending periods which lead currencies to have long periods of appreciation and
depreciation. Engel and Hamilton [1990] proposed a model where exchange rates
follow two normal distributions. More specifically, they set up a segmented trends
model with an appreciating and a depreciating regime. In the model, the param-
eters of both distributions and whether they are in regime one or regime two
are known to investors. On the other hand, they do not know at which point in
time the regimes switch. Since the investors are assumed to be risk-neutral, the
forward rate is given by a probability-weighted average of their regime predic-
tions. Such predictions lead to a misalignment between forward and future spot
exchange rates. The resulting bias is an increasing function of the probability of
a regime shift and of the expected magnitude of the exchange rate movement in
case of a regime shift. Whereas this specification of Engel and Hamilton [1990]
failed empirically, an extension of the model by Kaminsky [1993] generated more
favorable results. Kaminsky [1993] assumes that investors try to predict a regime
shift by evaluating information from announcements of the Federal Reserve Board
(FED). Another succesful model has been proposed by Evans and Lewis [1995]
postulating exchange rate jumps when regimes switch. The models by Engel
and Hamilton [1990], Kaminsky [1993] and Evans and Lewis [1995] are primar-
ily descriptive since they do not aspire to explain the reasons for changes in FX
regimes.
Despite extensive research, there does not exist a structural model delivering
reliable predictions for short-term exchange rate fluctuations (see e.g. Rosenberg
[2003]). Thus, it is no surprise that expectations are very varied amongst survey
respondents. That is what has been found by Tagaki [1990] by analysing diﬀer-
ent surveys on exchange rate predictions. Rogoﬀ [1996] and Rogoﬀ [2002] found
that long-term exchange rates are influenced by inflation diﬀerentials. Taylor
and Allen [1992] evaluated results from a quastionnaire survey and found that
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long-term predictions are formed based on fundamentals, while in the short run
investors base their decisions strongly on technical analysis. This is confirmed by
Frankel and Froot [1990]. Using data from various surveys, Frankel and Froot
[1990] study how exchange rate expectations are formed by investors. They dis-
tinguish between technical speculators, who extrapolate their forecasts from cur-
rent exchange rate trends, and fundamental investors, who assume that exchange
rates converge to some long-term equilibrium. Based on these findings, Ahrens
and Reitz [2005] propose a model where investors are considering both the views
of technical traders and fundamental investors. In the technical regime exchange
rate changes are predicted on the basis of a simple momentum strategy. In the
fundamental regime exchange rate changes are formed based on deviations from
purchasing power parity. Investors form their expectations by a weighted average
of the fundamental and the technical views. Ahrens and Reitz [2005] demonstrate
how exogeneous shocks can cause departures from the fair value which explain
not only UIP, but also long term exchange rate trends.
Risk Premia
The theories presented in the above points assume risk neutrality. This means
that investors exploit all available opportunities for profit in the markets irre-
specitively of the risks involved. Since real-world investors do exhibit aversion
to risk, these theories are based on unrealistic assumptions (see Kohler [2008]).
A risk-averse investor will carefully balance his profit opportunities against the
risks of the specific investment. Thus, the risk premia literature examines whether
deviations from UIP arise as a compensation for currency risk exposure.
Studies relating the FRB puzzle to risk utilise diﬀerent methodologies which
range from CAPM and conditional CAPM settings to portfolio-balance and gen-
eral equilibrium models (see e.g. Kohler [2008])
Bansal and Dahlquist [2000] tested for currency risk premia in a CAPM frame-
work. They calculated deviation from UIP for 27 currencies against the USD.
As a benchmark portfolio they chose the aggregate performance of U.S. equities.
In their regressions, the equity risk factor failed to explain the cross sectional
variation in currency risk premia. Bansal and Dahlquist [2000]’s estimation is
based on a constant beta specification and cannot capture time-variation in risk
premia. Mark [1988] additionally incorporated time variation in the beta coeﬃ-
cient of the CAPM model. He used a weighted average of the US, German, Swiss,
Japanese and British stock market as the market portfolio. Mark [1988] found
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that his model could not be rejected by the data, and interpreted his findings as
providing evidence for currency risk premia being driven by international equity
markets. Unfortunately, he does not provide any goodness-of-fit statistics so that
the explanatory power of the model can not be accurately assessed. Lustig and
Verdelhan [2005] obtained good results when estimating a CAPM model by using
interest rate diﬀerentials as explanatory variables. Lustig and Verdelhan [2005]
find R-squared measures of up to 36%, i.e. their model could capture about a
third of the total variation in currency risk premia.
If the negative beta coeﬃcients in the Fama-regression were due to the omis-
sion of a time-varying risk premium, the vast majority of studies, which are
estimated using ordinary least squares, would yield biased and inconsistent esti-
mates of β due to the presence of an omitted risk premium in the Fama-regression
(see Fama [1984] and Liu and Maddala [1992]). Fama [1984] and Hodrick and
Srivastava [1986] found that the forward rate bias bias can be explained by a non-
zero risk premium. Conversely, Froot and Frankel [1989] later inferred from their
studies that the systematic portion of forward discount prediction errors does
not capture a time-varying risk premium. The results of Frankel and Poonawala
[2006], which showed that the forward rate bias is larger in currencies of developed
countries than in emerging market currencies also contrasts with the suggestion
that the phenomenon of the forward rate bias can be attributed to a risk pre-
mium. If that were truly the case, the FRB would be greater for emerging market
currencies, since they bear more risks, than in developed market currencies.
3.2.5 Exploiting the Forward Rate Bias through Carry
Trading
The phenomenon of the forward rate bias creates the possibility of implementing
trades in the foreign exchange market that generate profits by exploiting this
market ineﬃciency. These trades involve buying high yielding currencies and at
the same time selling low yielding currencies. Since high yielding currencies have
tended to depreciate less - and low yielding currencies have tended to appreciate
less than suggested by financial theory, this style of trading is expected to produce
positive excess returns. Betting on the FRB in the foreign exchange market is
also called carry trading (see Rosenberg [2003]), since if the spot exchange rate
does not change over time the investor earns interest by carrying the FX position.
Carry strategies can be implemented as a dynamic borrowing and lending
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strategy in two currencies or through a simple long or short speculation in the
forward market. The implementation of carry trades with currency forwards is
the most frequently applied of the two alternatives. At time t the investor will
buy a currency forward which sells at a discount, i.e. he will agree to buy the
high yielding currency against the low yielding currency on a specified date in the
future. When the forward contract reaches maturity the trader will be able to buy
the currency at a lower price than the actual market price and make an immediate
profit, as long as the exchange rate have did not oﬀset the earned interest. When
implementing a carry trade through a forward contract, the return of the carry
trade rcarryt,t+k can be computed as:
rcarryt,t+k =

fkt − st+k, if it,k < i∗t,k
st+k − fkt , if it,k > i∗t,k
0, if it,k = i∗t,k
(3.12)
An atypical approach to implementing carry trades involves currency options
trading. Since options are priced through a replication argument including the
eventually biased forward rate, they are also mispriced in the case where the
forward rate bias continues to exist. For an example of such an implementation
we refer to Hochradl and Wagner [2010].
3.3 The Carry Trade in Literature
In Section 3.2 we reviewed the literature on the forward rate bias puzzle, which
focuses implicitly on the mean return of the carry trade. Motivated by the im-
portant profits and practical implications of the carry trades, a good number of
research publications have focused directly on the carry trade in recent academic
literature.
Research on the carry trade can be divided into research concerning the for-
mulation and refinement of profitable carry trading strategies, and into empirical
research which examines the drivers behind the returns to carry trading. Fur-
thermore, since activity of speculators in the interbank FX market is relatively
opaque, we will look at empirical evidence for carry trading activity by large in-
stitutional investors. In the following section these branches of research on the
FX carry trade will be discussed.
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3.3.1 The Profitability of the Carry Trade
Simulations of carry strategies have been performed in literature amongst oth-
ers by Rosenberg [2003], Hochradl and Wagner [2010] and Vesilind [2006]. Al-
though the algorithms and currency baskets used for the strategy simulations
diﬀer slightly, the carry strategies were always able to produce substantial excess
returns. Many investment banks also simulate the performance of carry strategies
applying similar methodologies and getting similar results as the models analysed
in academic literature (see Gyntelberg and Remolona [2007]).
The reported profitability of carry trading strategies is in line with the conclu-
sions of academic research, which reports the existence of a forward rate bias in
foreign exchange forward rates (see Section 3.2.3). Since historically high (low)
yielding currencies have tended to depreciate (appreciate) less than suggested
by financial theory, it is obvious that carry trade strategies which assume long
(short) positions in high (low) yielding currencies, have generated profits.
The reasons for the existence of these carry trade profits over the examined
data sets are not clear. Possible reasons for the profitability of carry trading are
the same as those evaluated by researchers in attempting to explain the empirical
failure of uncovered interest rate parity, e.g., risk-premia, forecast errors and
rational bubbles. As in the case of the failure of UIP, there is no generally
accepted theory which explains the profitability of the carry trade.
A possible explanation for the enduring profitability of the carry trade has
been given by Lyons [2006], with the limits to speculation hypothesis (LSH).
The LSH states that large financial institutions will not allocate risk capital to
trading strategies with Sharpe ratios under a certain threshold. Lyons [2006],
reported that major financial institutions show little interest in allocating capital
to trading strategies with Sharpe ratios below 0.4. Following this assumption, if
returns from carry trading yield insuﬃcient risk-adjusted profits they will not be
exploited by large speculators, thus leaving the opportunity for investors willing
to take the risks associated with this strategy to generate returns from carry
trading.
Hochradl and Wagner [2010] specifically addressed the question whether the
LSH has relevance in the case of the carry trade. By simulating carry trading
strategies and showing that the performance measures of the carry strategies
easily exceed the Sharpe ratio threshold of 0.4, they strongly questioned the
validity of the LSH as an explanation for enduring carry trade profits.
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Similarly, Burnside et al. [2006] questioned the practical relevance of the carry
trade, noting that carry trading strategies typically generated low absolute re-
turns which would make it necessary to wager large amounts of money to achieve
acceptable levels of return. Trading such large amounts would create market
frictions like price pressure, i.e. worse execution prices than actual market prices
(i.e. slippage) and wider bid-ask spreads. Burnside et al. [2006] noted that the
existence of such market frictions may erode the profits inherent to the carry
trade.
3.3.2 Evidence for Carry Trading Activity
The carry trade is an investment strategy which is widely used by practitioners
(see Burnside et al. [2006]). Galati and Melvin [2004] even attributed the surge
in trading activity in the foreign exchange markets, which emerged in the 2004
BIS Triennial Survey (see Galati et al. [2007a]), to a large extent to the growing
volume of FX carry trade positions held by market participants, especially large
financial institutions such as hedge funds and CTA’s. The magnitude of the
international exposure to the carry trade is very diﬃcult to quantify through
publicly available information however, since individual transaction data is not
available. Moreover, the distinction of carry trade positions from trades initiated
for other reasons is problematic, also because of a lack of consensus about how a
carry trade should be defined (see McGuire and Upper [2007]).
Due to these reasons, one has to rely on a set of potential indicators to detect
carry trade activities in the foreign exchange markets. These indicators include
balance sheets of investment banks, positioning data from the OTC market and
futures exchanges, correlation of transaction volume data with measures of carry
attractiveness and statistical analysis of hedge fund returns.
Analysis of the balance sheets of investment banks could provide some evi-
dence for the existence of carry trades. Banks serve as market intermediaries pro-
viding loans and taking deposits in the currencies used by carry trade investors,
as well as holding carry positions for proprietary speculative reasons. This would
generate higher liabilities denominated in the carry trade funding currencies and
higher assets denominated in the target currencies on the banks balance sheet
(see Galati et al. [2007b]). Since carry trades often involve derivative instru-
ments, especially forwards, which do not appear on the banks balance-sheet, this
type of data can only be useful in detecting carry trade activity executed in the
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cash market. Also, it is not clear from the balance sheets whether the positions
are actually caused by carry trade activity or by lending and borrowing related to
diﬀerent activities. These reasons make the establishment of direct links between
balance-sheet data and the existence of carry trades in the market very diﬃcult.
Galati et al. [2007b] reported evidence of a rising role of the Japanese Yen JPY
and the Swiss Franc CHF as funding currencies, since claims in these currencies
on balance sheets of banks have been rising in absolute terms in the recent years.
Since both these currencies have exhibited very low yields throughout the last
years, this might be an indication for rising carry trade activity.
Data from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange on open currency futures posi-
tions has been analysed by McGuire and Upper [2007]. They noted that the rise in
speculative short positions in Japanese Yen JPY futures grew as the JPY depre-
ciated from mid-2006 to February 2007. A quantitative study of such correlations
between measures of carry trade attractiveness like interest rate diﬀerentials and
carry-to-risk ratios has been conducted by Galati and Melvin [2004] and Galati
et al. [2007b]. Correlation analysis between carry-to-risk ratios6 and foreign ex-
change market turnover is reported to be varying but high enough to suggest a
relationship between the market turnover and carry trade activity. The highest
correlations existed for the Norwegian Krone NOK (0.79), the Australian Dollar
AUD (0.53), the South African Rand ZAR (0.36), the Mexican Peso MXN (0.28)
and the New Zealand Dollar NZD (0.24). Galati and Melvin [2004] tested the
impact of interest rate diﬀerentials and trends in exchange rates on the change
in OTC market turnover of the exchange rate using BIS survey data from 1992
to 2004 . They conclude that turnover growth is positively related to increases
in interest rate diﬀerentials and past exchange rate price changes. These results
would seem to indicate that increased market activity in an exchange rate is
triggered both by carry trading and by trend following behaviour of speculators.
A further indication for the practical relevance of the carry trade comes from
the analysis of hedge fund returns. McGuire and Upper [2007] performed style
analysis regressions on hedge fund returns and proxies for returns related to carry
trading. They conclude that carry trading returns are statistically significant
determinants of hedge fund performance. This result has been confirmed also by
Jylha and Suominen [2009] and Pojarliev and Levich [2008] (see Section 3.1.3).
6Galati et al. [2007b] computed carry-to-risk ratios as a measure of the attractiveness of
a currency for carry trading. The carry-to-risk ratios were calculated through dividing the
interest rate diﬀerential by the historical volatility of the currency.
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The fact that investment banks are oﬀering research and tradeable indices
which target specifically the carry trade in foreign exchange, provides an addi-
tional qualitative confirmation for the practical relevance of carry trading found
in the statistical regressions.
Although it seems diﬃcult to detect evidence for carry trading from publicly
available data, the aggregation of the above mentioned indications makes it pos-
sible to draw the conclusion that carry trading constitutes an important reality
in foreign exchange trading.
3.3.3 Risks Associated with Carry Trading
Despite having produced good risk adjusted returns in the last two decades,
there are considerable risks associated to carry trading strategies. The most
relevant being the large potential drawdowns associated with periods of collective
unwinding of carry positions, and the meltdown of diversification benefits during
phases of financial market turmoil.
Collective Unwinding of Carry Positions A major property of FX carry
trade returns is their exposure to currency and stock market crashes. Galati et al.
[2007b] suggested that the reason behind the profitability of carry strategies comes
from the positive feedback caused by the build-up of large carry positions. Active
carry trading from the investment community would have the eﬀect of further
strengthening high yielding currencies and weakening low yielding currencies,
and thus lead to an ever increasing profitability of the carry trade.
If liquidated collectively, these large carry trade positions in the portfolios
of institutional investors can trigger huge volatility increases in exchange rates,
causing high yielding currencies to depreciate, and low yielding currencies to ap-
preciate substantially in short periods of time (see Gagnon and Chaboud [2007]).
According to Galati et al. [2007b], the sudden and sharp appreciation of the
Japanese Yen JPY during October 1998 provides a good example for the dras-
tic eﬀects a global unwinding of carry trade positions can have on the involved
currencies.
This intuition is confirmed by Brunnermeier et al. [2008] who showed that
carry trade returns are negatively skewed and that therefore carry trading exposes
the speculator to so called crash risk. This negative skew is attributed to the
sudden unwinding of large carry trade positions by large investors described by
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Galati et al. [2007b]. Further, Brunnermeier et al. [2008] documented that such
carry trade unwinding tends to occur in periods of stock market or currency
crises, in which risk appetite and funding liquidity typically decrease.
Meltdown of Diversification Benefits A further important property of
carry trade returns is the low correlation to more traditional asset classes like
equities and bonds. This property has been reported by e.g. Jylha and Suomi-
nen [2009] or DB [2009]. Recent research by Kohler [2007] analysed correlation
dynamics between returns on a global equity index and returns of carry trades.
Kohler [2007] showed that the correlation between stocks and carry strategies sig-
nificantly increases during periods of financial turmoil. Carry traders which set
up carry trades to enhance their portfolio diversification will therefore experience
a severe diversification meltdown in times of global stock market crises.
3.3.4 Carry Trade Dynamics and Risk Premia
An important line of research concerning the dynamics behind the carry trade is
the analysis of factors which could explain the risk-premium associated to carry
trading profits.
Several authors have expressed the idea that constructing indices which track
the general risk-appetite in the markets could be useful for timing FX carry trades
(see Rosenberg [2003] and Vesilind [2006]). Risk factors used by the industry to
measure global risk-appetite include the US Treasury Yield Error7, the 10-year
Swap Spread, the Emerging Markets Bond Index spread, the US High Yield 8
spread and FX market volatility (see Vesilind [2006]).
Academic research in this field has been conducted by Burnside et al. [2006]
by performing regressions of the returns to carry strategies on a variety of risk
factors. The risk factors include U.S. per capita consumption growth, the returns
to the S&P500, the Fama-French stock market factors9, the slope of the yield
curve computed as the yield on 10-year U.S. treasury bills minus the 3-month
U.S. treasury-bill rate, the luxury retail sales series constructed by T-Sahalia
et al. [2004], U.S. industrial production, the return to the FTSE 100, and per-
7i.e. the diﬀerence between on-the-run and oﬀ-the-run government bond interest rates
8i.e. yield on non-investment grade debt
9Fama-French factors are Rm-Rf, SMB and HML, respectively (see Fama and French [1992]
for details)
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capita UK consumption growth. However other than two notable exceptions, i.e.
the Fama-French HML factor and real UK consumption growth, no risk factor
is found to be significantly correlated with the returns from a set of diﬀerent
carry strategies. Burnside et.al. therefore conclude that risk factors do not oﬀer
an empirically plausible explanation for the returns to carry trading in foreign
exchange.
Burnside et al. [2006] also examined the relationship between monetary vari-
ables and the returns to the carry trade. The carry trade returns are regressed on
the Federal Funds rate, the rate of inflation, and the growth rates of four diﬀerent
measures of money supply. Burnside et al. [2006] found significant relationships
between carry strategy returns and inflation and the Fed funds rate. They con-
sider their results as supportive of theories that suggest a link between monetary
policy and the empirical failure of UIP.
More recent research found interesting relationships between risk-factors and
carry trade returns. Wagner [2009] showed that the carry trade strategy entails
a time-varying risk premium. Menkhoﬀ et al. [2009] found a significant negative
return return co-movement of high interest rate currencies with global volatility,
whereas low interest rate currencies provided a hedge against volatility shocks.
Christiansen et al. [2009] followed a similar line of research. By estimating factor
models for carry trade strategies where regression coeﬃcients are dependent on
market volatility and liquidity, they show that the carry trade exhibits a higher
exposure to the stock market in volatile periods. These results are in line with the
findings of Kohler [2007]. By looking at the behaviour of carry trade strategies
during the credit crisis from 2007 to 2010, Vistesen [2009] reached very similar
conclusions. By estimating a factor model which relates FX carry trade returns
to equity returns and market volatility Vistesen [2009] showed that low yielding
currencies such as the JPY and the CHF can be modelled as a negative function
of equity returns and positive function of market volatility.
Dunis and Miao [2007] examined the behaviour of carry trade returns during
diﬀerent regimes of FX market volatility, proxied by the RiskMetrics volatility of
a portfolio of currencies weighted by their market turnover. They find that the
returns to carry trading are higher during periods of low FX market volatility
than during periods of high FX market volatility.
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Chapter 4
Carry Trade Asset Allocation
4.1 Introduction
Setting up carry trade positions, which involve buying a high yielding currency
and selling a low yielding currency, has produced positive excess returns in the
past decades. Higher risk-adjusted returns can be achieved by creating more
diversified portfolios which take long positions in a set of high yielding currencies
and short positions in a set of low yielding currencies (see Rosenberg [2003]).
Rosenberg [2003] proposed a portfolio approach to carry trading which com-
putes the portfolio positions by ranking the G10 currencies according to the value
of the 1-month deposit interest rates. Cross-currency positions are initiated with
1-month forward contracts by buying the three highest yielding currencies and
selling the three lowest yielding currencies. The backtesting results of this FX
carry portfolio strategy generated a Sharpe ratio of 0.73 during the period from
1986 to 2003 (see Rosenberg [2003]). This carry trade strategy is also popular
in the investment community. E.g., the Deutsche Bank G10 Currency Harvest
Index replicates the performance of this strategy. The returns to the Deutsche
Bank G10 Currency Harvest Index are tracked by an Exchange Traded Fund and
thus tradeable by a wide range of investors (see also Section 3.1.2).
Vesilind [2006] analysed a similar framework for trading foreign exchange port-
folios aimed at exploiting the forward rate bias. He implemented Rosenberg’s
approach on the G10 currencies on a data set ranging from 1993 to mid-2006,
also rebalancing the portfolio at monthly intervals. The annualised Sharpe ratio
of the portfolio was 0.94 and that of individual currency pairs ranged between
0.38 and 0.95. Vesilind [2006] noted, that more than half of the returns of the
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carry portfolio were achieved by earning the interest rate diﬀerential. The other
part of the portfolio returns came from profitable currency fluctuations. This can
only be the case if, on average, the exchange rates moved in the opposite direction
as predicted by UIP.
Vesilind [2006] also analysed a variation of this simple portfolio strategy which
includes volatility as a risk factor. By computing carry-to-risk ratios, i.e., dividing
the yield diﬀerential by the historical volatility for a set of 14 currency crosses,
the model took a long position on the four currency crosses with the highest
carry-to-risk ratios. The portfolio was rebalanced at a monthly frequency. The
foreign exchange rate universe available to Vesilind’s model was the USD exchange
rate against the EUR, JPY, SEK, CAD, GBP, NOK, AUD, CHF, NZD and the
EUR exchange rate against the JPY, SEK, GBP, NOK and CHF. The annualised
Sharpe ratio of the carry portfolio was 1.53 and that of the individual currency
pairs ranged between 0.60 and 1.67.
A model developed at ABN AMRO (see Mackel [2005]) also uses the risk-
adjusted interest rate diﬀerential as an input to the formulation of a carry strat-
egy. In this model, the 3-month deposit interest rate spread in two countries is
divided by the 3-month actual volatility of the currency pair. The trade is initi-
ated when the risk-adjusted carry is above its 2-year rolling average. The model
signals are updated on a daily basis. The best Sharpe ratio of the strategy was
1.61 on the AUD/USD currency pair.
Taking the approach of including the volatility of currencies in the formulation
of carry trading strategies one step further, correlations between currencies could
provide an additional input to the asset allocation process of a carry strategy. Ellis
and Jiltsov [2004] developed a foreign exchange carry portfolio based on a mean-
variance optimisation algorithm. They calculate the variance-covariance (VCV)
matrix historically and by exponential smoothing. On a portfolio backtest from
1987 to 2003 they report Sharpe ratios ranging between 0.64 and 0.87, depending
on the methodology applied for the VCV matrix estimation.
Hochradl and Wagner [2010] extended the mean-variance approach by setting
constraints on the maximum value-at-risk of the currency portfolio and allow-
ing changes in the portfolio weights only in specific, discrete, amounts. Since
the restrictions on the model mimic restrictions which portfolio managers face in
practical currency management, the performance of this strategy should provide a
good proxy for the returns generated by FX carry trading institutions. Hochradl
and Wagner [2010] tested whether the limits to speculation LSH hypothesis for-
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mulated by Lyons [2006] could have some relevance in explaining the enduring
profitability of the FX carry trade. The LSH hypothesis states that when the ex-
ploitation of a known market ineﬃciency does not promise to deliver risk-adjusted
returns over a specific threshold level, these ineﬃciencies could persist due to a
lack of speculative arbitrage. Sarno et al. [2006] suggested a Sharpe ratio of 0.4 as
the critical threshold which would need to be surpassed by a trading strategy in
order for the LSH hypothesis to be rejected. Hochradl and Wagner [2010] showed
that the FX carry strategy with realistic backtesting assumptions generated a
Sharpe ratio of over 0.4 and thus conclude that in order to accept the LSH as a
possible explanation for the persistence of carry trading profits, the Sharpe ratio
threshold of 0.4 suggested by Sarno et al. [2006] would need to be increased.
4.2 Contributions
The research question we pose in this chapter is twofold.
Firstly, we would like to ascertain how diversification is beneficial to the per-
formance of carry portfolios. To achieve this, we compare the performances of a
set of simple scorecard-based and mean-variance optimised FX carry portfolios.
While similar backtests have been performed in literature, a thorough comparison
of these asset allocation methodologies on a homogeneous data set is, to date,
missing. In order to ensure that these results are not too sensitive on the estima-
tion of the VCV matrix, we perform portfolio backtests based on two diﬀerent
VCV estimators, i.e. a historical VCV matrix estimator and an exponentially-
smoothed (RiskMetrics) VCV matrix estimator.
Secondly, we would like to assess whether alternative ranking criteria for the
construction of scorecard-based currency portfolios are able to generate excess
trading profits. We formulate two alternative ranking criteria which are closely
related to the theme of carry trading.
Research by Chinn and Meredith [2005] has shown that the negative beta
coeﬃcient does not arise in the Fama-regressions (see Equation 4.2) when using
long maturity bonds. These findings suggest that FX carry portfolios ranked by
shorter maturity yields, should achieve better results than portfolios based on
longer yield maturities. Since we would like to study this phenomenon in the
context of currency speculation, the first alternative ranking criterion is to adopt
yields of varying durations for the ranking of the G10 currencies. Specifically, we
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will study the carry trading results of currency portfolios ranked by their 1-week,
1-month, 3-month, 2-year and 10-year yields.
The second alternative ranking criterion we consider is the momentum, or
change, of the G10 currency yields. As discussed in Section 3.3.2, there is sub-
stantial evidence for large exposure to the FX carry trade by financial institutions.
A change in the level of a yield in a specific currency denotes a change of carry-
trade-attractiveness of this currency almost by construction. A lowering (height-
ening) of the interest rates should therefore be followed by sell (buy) pressure
on the respective currency by carry traders, and a depreciation (appreciation) of
the respective currency. We find indications for such buy/sell pressure by carry
traders in research which relates changes in foreign exchange turnover to changes
in measures of carry attractiveness for specific currencies (see Section 3.3.2). We
will test portfolios aimed at exploiting these FX carry portfolio flows by rank-
ing the G10 currencies by their respective yield momentum and taking equally
weighted long (short) positions in the 3 currencies with the highest (lowest) ranks.
Not knowing the precise carry strategies and rebalancing frequencies of all insti-
tutional carry traders, we examine the performance of such carry-flows portfolios
based on the 1-week, 4-week, 8-week, 12-week, 26-week and 52-week momentum
of the 2-year yields.
Pojarliev and Levich [2008] suggested that the return of FX managers should
be benchmarked against the returns of four popular trading styles in the foreign
exchange market (see Section 3.1.3). Since we focus on testing diﬀerent method-
ologies for trading FX carry portfolios, we choose to utilise a simple proxy for the
FX carry factor as the sole benchmark for our FX carry portfolio construction
methodologies. We define our proxy for the FX carry trading-style by simulating
the returns to a currency portfolio which takes equally weighted long positions in
the three highest yielding G10 currencies against equally weighted short positions
in the three lowest yielding currencies. The portfolio is rebalanced at a weekly
frequency (see Appendix A, for a detailed description of the methodology and a
performance analysis of the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio).
Throughout this thesis we measure the relative FX carry trade outperfor-
mance (which we define as carry-alpha), as well as the exposure to the known
FX carry factor (which we define as carry-beta) of the tested trading strategies.
Similarly to popular factor models for modelling stock returns (see Fama and
French [1992] and Carhart [1997]), we determine the loadings on the FX carry
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factor and the relative outperformance by estimating a simple one factor model
regressing the specific carry strategy returns on an intercept term and the re-
turns of our Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio (see Section 4.4.4). We stress that
the aim of our regressions is not to uncover risk factors which might contribute
to explain the returns inherent to the FX carry trade itself. Instead, we address
the question whether a simple implementation of the FX carry trade can be out-
performed by more sophisticated methodologies, and thus whether there is room
for professional currency managers to oﬀer FX carry-related strategies at their
habitual fees, considering the existence of low cost alternatives to gain exposure
to carry-beta.
4.3 Data
4.3.1 The Currency Universe
Throughout this thesis we have chosen to analyse the FX carry trade on the G10
currency universe, which is composed exclusively of currencies from developed
economies.1 At first this choice might seem arbitrary, since the FRB has been
observed on a multitude of currencies including emerging market currencies. E.g.
Bansal and Dahlquist [2000] and Flood and Rose [2002] have found statistically
significant departures from UIP in emerging market currencies. Mayer [2009]
analyses the performance of FX carry strategies in emerging market economies as
well as developed economies. Using a dataset of 38 currencies Mayer [2009] shows
how both classes of currencies exhibit significant speculation returns and thus
discards the limits to speculation hypothesis (see Lyons [2006] and Section 4.1).
Nevertheless, there are reasons for concentrating the research focus on the
G10 currency basket. An important reason is given by the fact that the majority
of studies in literature have been concerned with portfolios of currencies of de-
veloped countries (see Frankel and Poonawala [2006]). Also, the character of the
carry returns of emerging market currency portfolios would merit a distinctively
diﬀerent treatment: Firstly, a speculator who buys emerging market currencies
would find himself exposed to a diﬀerent bouquet of risks and also a somewhat
higher idiosyncracy of risks. For instance, emerging market countries might dis-
play very specific political and regulatory frameworks such as high default risks,
political instability, capital controls or interest rate interventions.
1See Section 2.2 for the components of the G10 currency basket.
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Secondly, implementational issues like data availability, lower liquidity and
thus higher transactions costs, pose significant problems when directly comparing
emerging market FX carry and developed markets FX carry strategies. These
inherent diﬀerences seem to have a direct cause on the returns of the FX carry
strategies. The diﬀerent character of emerging market carry returns has been
pointed out by Frankel and Poonawala [2006] who analysed the returns of carry
trade portfolios of emerging market currencies. Frankel and Poonawala [2006]
found that although the emerging market currencies are arguably riskier than
developed market currencies, the bias in their forward rates, i.e. the potential
return of trading FX carry portfolios, is smaller.
We note that future research should add to the scope of the following empirical
studies by analysing similar methodologies on a broader currency universe.
4.3.2 G10 Foreign Exchange and Yields Data
Throughout this paper we will use foreign exchange spot rates, 1-week interest
rates, 3-month interest rates, 2-year interest rates and 10-year year interest rates
data for the G10 currencies. The data sources are Bloomberg and Datastream
for the foreign exchange rates and the interest rates. The source for the 1-week
interest rate data for Australia, New Zealand and Sweden are the respective
central banks. The data set has a weekly frequency and spans the period from
the 1st of January 1999 to the 5th of March 2010 (584 weekly observations). We
also utilise gold spot rate data (as we later use gold as numeraire good) which we
obtained from Bloomberg.
4.3.3 Yields Momentum Data
In order to simulate the currency portfolios tracking the portfolio flows of FX
carry traders (see Section 4.2), we need to calculate the momentum, i.e. the
change, of the yields for each currency in the G10 universe. The momentum time
series are computed according to:
Y D.MOMC,dt (l) = i
C,d
t − iC,dt−l (4.1)
Where Y D.MOMC,dt (l) denotes the yield-momentum for the currency C with
momentum-length l in time period t and iC,dt denotes the yield for currency C in
period t. The duration of the yields is denoted by d. In our computations we will
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utilise d = 2 (i.e. we compute the momentum of the 2-Year yields).
In the empirical section, we will test FX carry portfolios with diﬀerent pa-
rameters for the momentum lag l, and thus compute the yield momentum time
series for l = 1, 4, 8, 12, 26, 52.
4.3.4 Fama Regressions
To gain a better understanding of our data set, we estimate the Fama regression
(see Section 3.2.3), which allows us to test for the validity of the UIP within our
data set:
∆kst+k = α+ β(FDt,k) + ￿t+k (4.2)
where ∆kst+k = log(St+k)− log(St), and FDt,k = it,k − i∗t,k.
For UIP to hold, the β coeﬃcient should assume a value of unity. If β is zero,
the exchange rate follows a random walk. We perform a two-sided statistical test
with the following hypotheses:
H0 : β = 0 (random walk) (4.3)
H1 : |β| > 0 (no random walk) (4.4)
The Fama-regressions are estimated for the G10 exchange rates against the
Euro on the whole data sample from the 1st of January 1999 to the 5th of March
2010. In addition, we split the data set into two subsamples which are used to
examine the stability of the coeﬃcients and their behaviour during the recent
credit crisis. The first data subsample begins on the 1st of January 1999 and
ends on the 29th of December 2006, the second data subsample begins on the 5th
of January 2007 and ends on the 5th of March 2010.
The regression results for the whole data set exhibit a negative β coeﬃcient in
6 out of 9 cases (see Table 4.1). Only the EUR/AUD, EUR/NZD and EUR/JPY
currency crosses exhibited positive β coeﬃcients. In no instance the null hy-
pothesis of the exchange rate following a random-walk could be discarded at a
statistically significant level.
In the first data subsample the forward rate bias is even stronger since only
2 out of 9 exchange rates exhibit a positive β coeﬃcient (see Table 4.2). The
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negative β coeﬃcient on the EUR/CHF currency cross was even statistically
significant (p-value of 0.02). On average, on these two data samples the forward
discount predicted the exchange rate change in the wrong direction.
Interestingly these results change dramatically when we consider the most
recent data sample which coincides with the credit crisis. In this case, most
of the beta coeﬃcients were positive and over unity (see Table 4.3). Albeit a
statistically significant positive β could only be found in the case of EUR/NZD,
we note that there has been a tendency for the forward discount to underestimate
the subsequent exchange rate changes during the credit crisis.
Our results are in line with previous academic research which finds that the
forward premium systematically predicts changes in the spot exchange rate in
the wrong direction (see Section 3.2.3). From these results we would intuitively
expect carry trading strategies to be profitable within the whole data set, and that
the period of the credit crisis should produce worse carry trading performances
than the first data subsample.
Currency Pair α Pr(> |tα|) β Pr(> |tβ |)
EUR/USD -4e-04 0.49 -2.41 0.22
EUR/JPY -1e-04 0.95 0.46 0.89
EUR/GBP -0.0016 0.08 -4.36 0.13
EUR/CHF 0.0015 0.06 -4.37 0.08
EUR/CAD 1e-04 0.91 -4.35 0.21
EUR/AUD 9e-04 0.62 1.17 0.77
EUR/NZD 0.0034 0.06 5.47 0.06
EUR/NOK 1e-04 0.89 -0.25 0.86
EUR/SEK -1e-04 0.8 -3.44 0.37
Table 4.1: Fama Regression Results for the Data Set from the 1st of January 1999
to the 5th of March 2010.
Currency Pair α Pr(> |tα|) β Pr(> |tβ |)
EUR/USD -7e-04 0.29 -4.43 0.04
EUR/JPY 5e-04 0.84 -1.68 0.71
EUR/GBP -0.0012 0.27 -4.09 0.19
EUR/CHF 0.0023 0.03 -7.27 0.02
EUR/CAD -4e-04 0.58 -6.66 0.09
EUR/AUD 5e-04 0.79 0.33 0.93
EUR/NZD 0.0019 0.29 2.75 0.35
EUR/NOK -2e-04 0.79 -0.93 0.47
EUR/SEK 0 0.95 -3.85 0.23
Table 4.2: Fama Regression Results for the Data Set from the 1st of January 1999
to the 29th of December 2006.
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Currency Pair α Pr(> |tα|) β Pr(> |tβ |)
EUR/USD -4e-04 0.71 5.48 0.27
EUR/JPY -5e-04 0.89 4.39 0.49
EUR/GBP -0.0016 0.37 0.92 0.91
EUR/CHF 0.001 0.49 -1.53 0.74
EUR/CAD 5e-04 0.7 1.23 0.91
EUR/AUD 0.0092 0.37 16.51 0.39
EUR/NZD 0.0126 0.03 19.46 0.02
EUR/NOK 0.0035 0.16 12.45 0.14
EUR/SEK -4e-04 0.7 1.24 0.94
Table 4.3: Fama Regression Results for the Data Set from the 1st of January 2007
to the 5th of March 2010.
4.4 Methodology
In the following we will outline the simple and optimised asset allocation method-
ologies for constructing FX carry portfolios (Section 4.4.1 and Section 4.4.2). The
historical and RiskMetrics estimators for the variance-covariance matrix will be
outlined in Section 4.4.3. Finally, we will introduce statistical regressions for de-
termining the potential of the asset allocation algorithms to generate carry-alpha
(Section 4.4.4).
4.4.1 Simple Scorecard-based Asset Allocation
As described by Rosenberg [2003], the simple scorecard-based asset allocation
algorithm assumes long and short positions in currencies based on the ranking
of specific variables associated with the currencies. In the case of a standard FX
carry portfolio, these variables would be interest rates of the same maturity for
each currency.
After ranking the currencies based on the variable of choice, the algorithm
takes long positions in the highest-ranked N currencies and short positions in
the lowest-ranked N currencies (see Rosenberg [2003]). The portfolio weights
of the resulting N cross-currency positions are equally weighted with w = 1N .
In the following section equally weighted carry portfolio strategies are tested for
N = 1, 2, 3, 4.
4.4.2 Mean-Variance Optimised Asset Allocation
The basic assumption behind the mean-variance optimised currency portfolios is
that exchange rates follow a random walk (see Hochradl and Wagner [2010], Ellis
and Jiltsov [2004]). This assumption is in line with academic literature which
44
finds that the best model for explaining exchange rate movements is indeed the
random-walk model (see Meese and Rogoﬀ [1983a] and Meese and Rogoﬀ [1983b]).
The random walk model for the log-levels is given by Equation 4.5:
st+k = st + ￿t+k (4.5)
Where ￿t+k is a disturbance term with E[￿t+k] = 0. The expected exchange
rate in k periods would then be:
set+k = st (4.6)
Using Equation 4.6 and equation Equation 3.1, the expected excess return
of a foreign exchange position under the random walk assumption is the inter-
est rate diﬀerential between the foreign currency and the home currency (see
Equation 4.7).
ret+k = s
e
t+k − st − (it,k − i∗t,k) (4.7)
= i∗t,k − it,k (4.8)
Following these assumptions, for a euro-based investor, the expected return of
each single currency is thus given by its interest rate diﬀerential to the Euro. In
our G10 currency portfolios the vector of expected returns re is a (10× 1) vector
composed of the interest rate diﬀerential for each G10 currency to the Euro:
re =

reEUR
reUSD
reJPY
reGBP
reCHF
reCAD
reAUD
reNZD
reNOK
reSEK

=

iEUR − iEUR
iUSD − iEUR
iJPY − iEUR
iGBP − iEUR
iCHF − iEUR
iCAD − iEUR
iAUD − iEUR
iNZD − iEUR
iNOK − iEUR
iSEK − iEUR

(4.9)
For a given set of portfolio weights wP , also a (10 × 1) vector, the expected
return of the portfolio rP can be computed according to Equation 4.10.
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rP = w
T re (4.10)
The expected volatility of a portfolio of assets can be computed by Equa-
tion 4.11.
σ2P = w
TΣrrw (4.11)
Where Σrr is the estimated variance-covariance matrix (10×10) of the returns
of the G10 currencies quoted against an auxiliary numeraire good (i.e. gold). We
introduced gold as a numeraire, in order to more elegantly align currency perfor-
mances with the yields in all 10 economies of the G10 currency basket. Moreover,
the introduction of the numeraire allows us to impose homogeneous restrictions
on all currencies, as long as the restriction of wT1 = 0 holds. This restriction
ensures that the performance of the numeraire does not aﬀect the performance
of the FX carry portfolios. If the portfolios were backtested against a base cur-
rency, the sum of the weights would correspond to the negative exposure of the
base currency. In order to treat that base currency like the other 9 currencies at
least two restrictions specifying the upper and the lower bounds of the sum of
the weights (i.e. of the negative exposure to the base currency) would need to be
set, which is arguably a less elegant solution.
The mean-variance portfolio selection algorithm computes the optimal vector
of weights w∗P for a currency portfolio, s.t. the portfolio variance is minimised
given a specific level of portfolio return. Since minimising portfolio variance is
equivalent to minimising the portfolio standard deviation, the algorithm is ef-
fectively maximising the Sharpe ratio of the portfolio. We impose an additional
restriction on the portfolio weights, which states that the sum of the portfolio
weights has to net out to zero. This restriction ensures the typical self-financing
character of foreign exchange positions, since the exposure to the auxiliary nu-
meraire good gold is set to null. This portfolio selection problem can be expressed
mathematically as:
min
w
σ2P = w
TΣrrw , (4.12)
s.t.
rP = w
T re = r˜ , (4.13)
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and
wT1 = 0. (4.14)
We calculate the solution via a quadratic programming solver, as implemented
by Wu¨rtz et al. [2009].
We set r˜ to an arbitrary small and positive value. The value of r˜ in each
period t is set at one tenth the value of the accrued carry of the simple G10 FX
carry portfolio with 3 long and 3 short positions. Now, given this target return
the weights are calculated such that the portfolio variance is minimised according
to Equation 4.12, s.t. Equation 4.13 and Equation 4.14 hold. This is equivalent
to maximising the Sharpe ratio for that given level of return is maximised. The
portfolio weights are subsequently rescaled in order to achieve constant long and
short exposures of 1 (i.e. 100 percent of capital).
Discusion of the Mean-Variance Approach in this Context Although
the mean-variance optimisation techniques implemented by Hochradl and Wag-
ner [2010] and Ellis and Jiltsov [2004] to optimise FX carry portfolios oﬀer a sim-
ple framework to address the question of how to best diversify carry portfolios,
they do also entail several drawbacks when used for practical portfolio manage-
ment. Most prominently, important caveats of the mean-variance methodology
are: High sensitivity to estimation error in the input parameters (see e.g. Black
and Litterman [1992], Michaud [1989]), the fact that the distributional assump-
tion does not match stylized facts of financial returns (see e.g. Jondeau and
Rockinger [2005], Cont [2001]), the objective function which is arguably inappro-
priate (see e.g. Scott and Horvath [1980] and Bernartzi and Thaler [1995]) and
the assumption of a single period model is not realistic (see e.g. Rotando and
Thorp [1992]).
Michaud [1989] noted that wrong estimation of the models inputs (µ and σ)
leads to suboptimal portfolio allocations, and called mean-variance optimisers
error-maximisers. Following Jorion [1986], unconstrained mean-variance port-
folios tend to strongly overweight assets with high expected returns. Michaud
[1989] postulated, that especially those assets with the highest expected returns
exhibit large estimation errors. While also the variance-covariance matrix consti-
tutes a source of estimation error, its impact on the result of the mean variance
optimisation is somewhat smaller than the eﬀect of errors in the expected returns
vector (see Chopra and Ziemba [1993]).
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The predictability of stock market returns has been a challenge to market
practitioners and financial economists for a long time. While numerous stud-
ies have proposed successful financial forecasting methodologies 2, other studies
question these results (see e.g. Nelson and Kim [1993] and Staumbaugh [1999])
and raise doubts on the evidence of predictability of financial returns, since out-
of-sample forecasts have often performed worse than a random walk model (see
Meese and Rogoﬀ [1983a]). Thus, most attempts to predict returns fail to dis-
prove the Eﬃcient Market Hytpothesis EMH.3 As Michaud [1989] stated though,
errors in the estimation of the means will significantly distort the output of the
mean-variance optimisation. A possible remedy to this problem is to completely
renounce to the need of formulating the expected returns as input to the op-
timisation process altogether, by e.g. computing minimum variance portfolios
which require only the variance-covariance matrix as an input (see Amenc and
Martellini [2002]). An alternative solution to this problem is provided by the
Black-Litterman methodology. The Black-Litterman methodology reduces the
impact of erroneous return estimates on the returns vector by setting a stable
prior which is then updated with individual return forecast while accounting for
estimation errors within these (see Black and Litterman [1992]).
In our empirical research, we only implicitly estimate FX returns by setting
the expected return on a currency position equal to its interest rate. This is de
facto equivalent to assuming a random walk for the FX spot rates, an empiri-
cal observation well documented throughout the UIP and FRB literature (see
Section 3.2.3). These return estimates oﬀer intertemporaly stable estimations,
resulting in smooth portfolio weights, reducing turnover and therefore keeping
transactions costs low.
The second essential input to mean variance optimisation consists of the
variance-covariance matrix σ. Diﬃculties in the estimation of this input include
the curse of dimensionality when estimating model parameters and the danger of
getting non-positive semi-definite matrices (see e.g. Engle [2002]). As the num-
ber of assets increases, the number of parameters which have to be estimated
increases at least quadratically (see Engle and Sheppard [2009]). Numerous ap-
2See e.g. Dempster and Jones [2001], Lyons [2006], Zimmermann et al. [2006] and Dunis
et al. [2010], just to name a few.
3The EMH states that in an eﬃcient financial market it is not possible to predict financial
returns with any satisfactory degree of accuracy, since all relevant information is immedeately
reflected in the price of the assets (see also Section 3.2.1).
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proaches for addressing these problems have been proposed in literature.4 A good
overview on the methodologies is provided by e.g. Engle and Sheppard [2009],
Engle and Kroner [1995] and Palandri [2009].
While some studies find economical value in optimizing portfolios with more
complex estimators for the VCV matrix (see Engle and Sheppard [2009]), oth-
ers find that the additional complexity associated with selecting and estimating a
specific multivariate VCV estimator is not remunerated by significantly enhanced
statistical and economic performance. West and Cho [1999] found that GARCH
models did not significantly outperform the equally weighted standard deviation
estimates in out-of-sample forecasts, except for very short time horizons. The
RiskMetrics technical document (see Zangari and Longerstaey [1996]) demon-
strates that the dynamics of the exponential model’s forecasts closely mimic
those produced by the GARCH(1,1) model. Suganuma [2000] applies White’s
Bootstrap Reality Check (see White [2000]) to the problem of selecting the best
volatility model, testing rolling window, EWMA, GARCH and stochastic volatil-
ity models and finds that no model consistently outperforms the benchmark
methodology defined as the exponentially weighted moving average EWMA with
decay factor λ = 0.94 for daily returns.
For our practical investigation of FX carry portfolios we thus decide to limit
our tests to two naive VCV matrix estimators, namely the simple historical VCV
estimator and the EWMA RiskMetrics estimator, which we will outline in the
following section.
4.4.3 Variance-Covariance Matrix Estimators
Having a clearly defined vector of expected returns for the mean-variance optimi-
sation (see Equation 4.9), the question arises whether the estimation methodology
of the variance-covariance matrix has a substantial eﬀect on the profitability of
the optimised carry trading portfolios.
The variance-covariance matrix at time t, Σrr,t, is composed of all variances
σ2ii,t and covariances σ
2
ij,t of returns of the n (in our case n = 10) currencies in the
carry portfolio versus gold:
4E.g. Constant Conditional Correlations and Dynamical Conditional Correlations (see Engle
[2002]), Orthogonal GARCH (see Alexander [2000]), BEKK (see Engle and Kroner [1995])
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Σrr,t =

σ211,t σ
2
12,t · · · σ21n,t
...
...
. . .
...
σ2n1,t σ
2
n2,t · · · σ2nn,t
 (4.15)
We examine the performance of mean-variance optimised carry portfolios
based on two diﬀerent methodologies for the estimation of the variance-covariance
matrix. These methodologies are historical VCV matrix estimation, and exponen-
tial smoothing VCV matrix estimation as advocated by Zangari and Longerstaey
[1996]. Both methodologies are briefly outlined below. We maintain the assump-
tion of the exchange rate following a random walk, thus the mean return can
be omitted from the traditional formulas for the calculation of the variances and
covariances.
The estimation of both VCV matrices is performed on a rolling basis with a
fixed starting point on the 16th of January 1998. The first available data window
starts on the 16th of January 1998 and ends on the 1st of January 1999 (50 weekly
observations). This data window is sequentially expanded in order to include all
available data on each estimation date.
Historical Variance-Covariance Matrix The historical estimation of the
variance σ2ii of the returns r of a currency i is calculated according to the following
formula:
σ2ii(t+1|t,n) =
1
n− 1
n−1￿
k=0
r2i(t−k) (4.16)
The variances of all currencies in the currency portfolio lie on the diagonal of
the variance-covariance matrix. The oﬀ-diagonal elements, which correspond to
the covariances between the returns of two currencies, are calculated according
to Equation 4.17.
σ2ij(t+1|t,n) =
1
n− 1
n−1￿
k=0
ri(t−k)rj(t−k) (4.17)
Conditional Variance-Covariance Matrix: RiskMetrics Exponential
Smoothing A further simple forecasting method which can be applied for the
estimation of the variances and covariances is exponential smoothing. Exponen-
tial smoothing models can be seen as a special case of the GARCH model of
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Bollerslev [1986] with a pre-determined smoothing parameter α. Volatility is
then estimated using the following formula:
σ2ij(t+1|t,α) = ασ
2
(t|t−1) + (1− α) (ri,trj,t) (4.18)
High values of α would generate a more responsive and rougher behaviour
in the volatility estimate and low values of α give less responsive and smoother
volatility estimates. As suggested by Zangari and Longerstaey [1996], we set the
smoothing parameter α to 0.97.
4.4.4 Statistical Test for Carry-Alpha
After simulating the performance of the currency portfolios, we test whether they
exhibit a statistically significant ability to generate carry-alpha (see Section 4.2).
Following recent research on FX hedge funds performance attribution (see Pojar-
liev and Levich [2008]), we estimate a factor model of the form:
Rt = α+ βFt + ￿t (4.19)
where Rt is the excess return generated by the relevant currency portfolio
strategy, Ft is the return generated by the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio, β is a
coeﬃcient or factor loading that measures the sensitivity of the strategy returns
to the FX carry benchmark, α is a measure of return associated purely to the
specific portfolio strategy and ￿ is a random error term. Statistically significant
positive values of the α-intercept would signal the potential of the specific asset
allocation methodology to outperform the FX carry benchmark.
The returns to the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio Ft are computed by simu-
lating the returns of a currency portfolio based on the allocation algorithm of the
Currency Harvest Index by Deutsche Bank (see Section 3.1.2). In Appendix A we
discuss the methodology and performance of our Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio
in more detail.
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4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.1 Discussion of the FX Carry Portfolio Asset Alloca-
tion Performances
In this chapter we simulated the trading performance of three classes of G10
currency portfolios aimed at trading the FX carry theme. With the first set
of currency portfolios we examine the performance of diﬀerent asset allocation
methodologies for implementing FX carry portfolios. With the second set of
currency portfolios we will analyse the results of selecting the currencies according
to yields of diﬀerent durations. Finally, the third set of currency portfolios is
constructed in order to follow the portfolio flows of FX carry traders.
Table 4.4 summarises performance metrics and return attribution measures
for the three diﬀerent classes of currency portfolios. The first column of Ta-
ble 4.4 describes the criterion after which the G10 currencies are ranked (see
Section 4.4.1). In the case of the optimised asset allocation strategies, the ’Cri-
terion’ -column represents the source for the vector of expected returns (see Sec-
tion 4.4.2). The second column (’Allocation’ ) of Table 4.4 describes the utilised
asset allocation methodology (i.e. simple or optimised). In the third and fourth
columns the annualised arithmetic return ra and the Sharpe ratio SR are listed
for each currency portfolio. The last three columns of Table 4.4 allow to identify
the source of the strategy total returns listed in the ra-column: raFX represents the
annualised arithmetic returns generated from FX movements, raY D the annualised
arithmetic return generated from yield pickup and raTC represent the annualised
transactions costs in percent.
Figure 4.1 depicts the cumulative performances of the three classes of currency
portfolios related to the FX carry trade. Table 4.5 summarises the regression
results of the factor model testing for the ability of the portfolio algorithms to
outperform the FX carry trade proxy.
In the following we will discuss the empirical results of backtesting these three
classes of currency portfolios.
1st Set of FX Portfolios: Asset Allocation Algorithms A key result
which emerges from the asset allocation backtests is that FX carry portfolios
benefit from portfolio diversification. This becomes evident when looking at the
Sharpe ratios of the diﬀerent strategies in Table 4.4: The simple strategy with
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Figure 4.1: Cumulative Returns of the Asset Allocation Models based on the FX
Carry Trade (PANEL A: Diﬀerent Asset Allocation Algorithms; PANEL B: Vary-
ing Yield Durations as Allocation Criteria; PANEL C: 2-Year Yield Momentum
as Allocation Criteria)
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Criterion Allocation ra SR raFX r
a
Y D r
a
TC
1-Week Yields Simple 1-1 0.0593 0.38 0.0009 0.0630 -0.0047
1-Week Yields Simple 2-2 0.0595 0.49 0.0109 0.0517 -0.0031
1-Week Yields Simple 3-3 0.0651 0.67 0.0255 0.0426 -0.0030
1-Week Yields Simple 4-4 0.0419 0.52 0.0105 0.0349 -0.0035
1-Week Yields Opt. (Hist.) 0.0284 0.61 0.0052 0.0283 -0.0051
1-Week Yields Opt. (RiskM.) 0.0320 0.73 0.0104 0.0282 -0.0066
1-Week Yields Simple 3-3 0.0651 0.67 0.0255 0.0426 -0.0030
1-Month Yields Simple 3-3 0.0610 0.64 0.0206 0.0426 -0.0021
3-Month Yields Simple 3-3 0.0561 0.60 0.0158 0.0424 -0.0020
2-Year Yields Simple 3-3 0.0532 0.51 0.0148 0.0418 -0.0033
10-Year Yields Simple 3-3 0.0526 0.53 0.0162 0.0402 -0.0037
Yields Mom. (1) Simple 3-3 -0.0389 -0.57 0.0314 -0.0021 -0.0681
Yields Mom. (4) Simple 3-3 -0.0125 -0.17 0.0262 -0.0021 -0.0365
Yields Mom. (8) Simple 3-3 0.0154 0.19 0.0426 -0.0019 -0.0253
Yields Mom. (12) Simple 3-3 0.0108 0.14 0.0320 -0.0011 -0.0201
Yields Mom. (26) Simple 3-3 0.0157 0.18 0.0280 0.0010 -0.0133
Yields Mom. (52) Simple 3-3 0.0247 0.29 0.0291 0.0048 -0.0092
Table 4.4: Performance Metrics of the Asset Allocation Models for FX Carry Port-
folios ( ra: Annualised Arithmetic Return, SR: Sharpe Ratio, raFX : Annualised
Return from FX Movements, raY D: Annualised Return from Yield Diﬀerentials,
raTC : Annualised Return from Transactions Costs)
Criterion Allocation α Pr(> |tα|) β Pr(> |tβ |)
1-Week Yields Simple 1-1 -0.0004 0.4439 1.26 0.0000
1-Week Yields Simple 2-2 -0.0003 0.1883 1.18 0.0000
1-Week Yields Simple 3-3 -0.0000 1.0000 1.00 0.0000
1-Week Yields Simple 4-4 -0.0002 0.2126 0.79 0.0000
1-Week Yields Opt. (Hist.) 0.0001 0.5047 0.33 0.0000
1-Week Yields Opt. (RiskM.) 0.0003 0.1448 0.24 0.0000
1-Week Yields Simple 3-3 -0.0000 1.0000 1.00 0.0000
1-Month Yields Simple 3-3 -0.0000 0.5838 0.97 0.0000
3-Month Yields Simple 3-3 -0.0001 0.4366 0.94 0.0000
2-Year Yields Simple 3-3 -0.0003 0.0908 1.03 0.0000
10-Year Yields Simple 3-3 -0.0002 0.4656 0.94 0.0000
Yields Mom. (1) Simple 3-3 -0.0007 0.0722 -0.03 0.3221
Yields Mom. (4) Simple 3-3 -0.0001 0.8645 -0.14 0.0000
Yields Mom. (8) Simple 3-3 0.0005 0.2249 -0.19 0.0000
Yields Mom. (12) Simple 3-3 0.0004 0.3612 -0.16 0.0000
Yields Mom. (26) Simple 3-3 0.0006 0.2360 -0.22 0.0000
Yields Mom. (52) Simple 3-3 0.0008 0.1135 -0.22 0.0000
Table 4.5: Regression Results for the Factor Model Rt = α + βFt + ￿t (Ft =
Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio Returns, Rt = Portfolio Returns of the Carry
Trade Asset Allocation Strategies).
one long and one short position generates a Sharpe ratio of 0.38; the more di-
versified simple strategy with three long and three short positions generates a
higher Sharpe ratio of 0.67. An explanation for the better risk-adjusted perfor-
mance of the more diversified strategies can be found in Table 4.4. Whereas the
least diversified simple carry portfolios with one and two long and short positions
generate the highest yield pickup (cumulative 6.30% per annum and 5.17% per
annum), their profits from FX movements are relatively small (cumulative 0.09%
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per annum and 1.09% per annum). The higher FX returns generated by the more
diversified strategies compensate for the lower pickup in yield of these strategies.
In addition, the returns of the more diversified carry strategies exhibit a lower
volatility of returns, which is the principal reason behind the higher Sharpe ratios
of these strategies.
A second noteworthy result is that the simple, equally weighted carry portfo-
lios, exhibit higher annualised returns than the optimised carry portfolios. While
the simple strategies generate annualised returns of around 4% per annum to
6.5% per annum, the returns of the optimised portfolios are around 3% per an-
num (see Table 4.4). Nevertheless, the two optimised strategies generate higher
Sharpe ratios (Sharpe ratios of respectively 0.61 and 0.73) than most of the sim-
ple, equally weighted strategies. Only the simple strategy with three long and
three short positions (Sharpe ratio of 0.67) generated a comparable result (see
table Table 4.4).
On the other hand, the results also reveal a negative feature of the optimised
FX carry asset allocation methodologies since they generate higher transactions
costs than the simple carry portfolios (see Table 4.4). These transactions costs
originate in the higher rebalancing frequency inherent to the optimised asset al-
location algorithms.
The results for the regressions testing for the ability of the diﬀerent asset
allocation algorithms to generate carry-alpha are summarised in Table 4.5. The
regressions show that no asset allocation methodology was able to generate carry-
alpha at a statistically significant level, when compared to the benchmark carry
portfolio strategy (see Appendix A). Notably, the RiskMetrics-optimised carry
portfolio strategy was able to produce returns which were unrelated to the carry-
beta, but the intercept could not be regarded statistically significantly diﬀerent
from zero at a lower confidence level than 14.48%.
2nd Set of FX Portfolios: Alternative Yield Maturities In Table 4.4
a general pattern can be recognised for the second set of currency portfolios:
The shorter the yields used for the ranking of the currencies in the simple asset
allocation methodology, the better the FX carry portfolio performance. The
portfolios with the shorter yields as allocation criteria exhibit larger annualised
returns ra, as well as higher Sharpe ratios SR. While the portfolio with the
shortest maturity yields as ranking criterion generated a Sharpe ratio of 0.67,
55
the currency portfolio with the longest maturity yields as allocation criterion
generated a lower Sharpe ratio of 0.53.
Since the return generated by the carry component raY D is fairly constant in
all six portfolios of this group, the better performance of the portfolios based on
the shorter maturity yields can be attributed the returns generated by the FX
component raFX (see Table 4.4).
The regressions testing for carry-alpha reveal that disregarding the maturity of
the yields used for the portfolio construction, the returns are correlated to the FX
carry benchmark; all beta’s are close to unity and highly statistically significant
(see Table 4.5). Also in this case, no portfolio could generate investment-style-
alpha at a statistically significant level.
3rd Set of FX Portfolios: Trading Carry Portfolio Flows The third
set of currency portfolios is computed according to the simple scorecard based
asset allocation methodology described in Section 4.4.1. The allocation criterion
consists in the momentum of the 2-Year yields (see Section 4.3.3) for each of the
currencies in the portfolio. We compare the performance of diﬀerent lag lengths
for computing the 2-Year yields momentum. The diﬀerent lag lengths are: 1
(1-Week yield change), 4 (1-Month yield change), 8 (2-Month yield change), 12
(3-Month yield change), 26 (12 -Year yield change) and 52 (1-Year yield change).
Figure 4.1 reveals the general tendency, that the performance of the currency
portfolios increases as the lags for compting the yield momentum rise. The per-
formance metrics in Table 4.4 confirm this intuition: The annualised returns ra
exhibit their lowest value of −3.89% per annum in the 1-week yield momentum
portfolio and their highest value of 2.47% per annum in the 52-week yield mo-
mentum portfolio. The Sharpe ratios SR behave analogously, since they exhibit
their lowest value of −0.057 in the 1-week yield momentum portfolio and their
highest value of 0.29 in the 52-week yield momentum portfolio.
When we observe the source of the returns to the carry-flows portfolios in
Table 4.4, we gain further insight into the source of the profits associated to
these portfolios. The carry-flows portfolio profits tend to derive mainly from FX
movements while there is no relevant yield pickup associated with these portfo-
lios. All carry-flows portfolios generate returns from the currency fluctuations
raFX ranging between 2.91% per annum and 4.26% per annum, while their carry
return ranges only between −0.21% per annum and 0.48% per annum. The gener-
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ated transactions costs raTC generated by implementing these portfolio strategies
are relatively high (0.92% per annum - 6.81% per annum) and rise as the lag
length for the computation of the yield momentum criterion shortens. In all six
yield-momentum based currency portfolios, the transactions costs significantly
influence the overall profitability of the asset allocation strategy.
The regression tests for carry-alpha are summarised in Table 4.5. A further
important feature of the portfolios aimed at exploiting the portfolio flows of carry
traders is the negative beta they exhibit to the carry trade benchmark (the beta
values range from −0.03 to −0.22 in this group of FX portfolios). Also in this
case the portfolios do not exhibit statistically significant ability for carry-alpha
generation. We note that this may be due solely to the eﬀect of the high trans-
actions costs since the p-values decrease with the length of the carry-momentum,
reaching a low value of 0.11 in the case of the portfolios based on the 52-week
yield change.
4.5.2 Additional Considerations
Comprehensive Risk-Adjustments
The portfolios presented in this chapter aim at improving the performance of
the G10 FX carry trade by alternative asset allocation techniques. Thus, the
appropriate benchmark for our approaches is the performance of a simple FX
carry portfolio. As we discussed in Section 3.1.2, a good number of risk factors
other than carry have been proposed for the FX markets. These other risk factors
are: value, momentum and volatility. Considering these additional risk factors,
the question arises whether our FX carry portfolios are outperforming the vanilla
returns because they are loading on some risk factors and thus earning a risk
premium to do so. In order to evaluate this possibility, we have performed addi-
tional factor-regressions for two representative strategies, namely the RiskMetrics
optimised FX carry portfolio and the frontrunning FX carry portfolio with a lag
parameter of 52. For each portfolio we have performed regressions on three dis-
tinct data-ranges, namely the full data-range (January 1999 - March 2010), a
pre-crisis data-range (January 1999 - May 2007) and a post-crisis data-range
(June 2007 - March 2010).
The regression results for the RiskMetrics optimised portfolio are summarised
in Table 4.6 - Table 4.8. The regression results for the representative frontrunning
portfolio are summarised in Table 4.9 - Table 4.11.
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We now analyse the risk-adjustment regression results for the RiskMetrics FX
carry portfolio. As expected the carry-beta factor is positive and highly statis-
tically significant throughout all three data-ranges. Surprisingly though, other
significant risk-factor loadings can be observed. Throughout all three data-ranges
also the value-beta is significantly positive. Additionally, on the pre-crisis data-
range the momentum risk-factor exhibits a statistically significant negative coef-
ficient. Except on the pre-crisis sample the alpha-intercept is negligibly small,
signifying that the RiskMetrics optimised FX carry portfolio is not able to pro-
duce superior returns, when adjusted for common risk factors in the FX markets.
Similar to the results presented in Section 4.5.1, the comprehensive risk-
adjustment regressions for the frontrunning portfolio with a lag parameter of
52 (Table 4.9 - Table 4.11) display a negative loading on the carry-coeﬃcient.
Some of the positive loading that we observed in Table 4.5 on the alpha-intercept
is now taken over by the risk-factors value and momentum: the momentum fac-
tor receives significantly positive factor loadings in the full and post-crisis data-
ranges; the value factor receives a significantly positive loading in the pre-crisis
data-range and a significantly negative loading in the post-crisis data-range.
The results in this section thus outline that the alpha that could be obtained
by optimising the asset allocation of FX carry portfolios is eroded when compre-
hensive risk adjustments are being performed. Thus, by optimising the FX carry
strategy we have eﬀectively loaded on other risk factors.
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Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Intercept 0.00 0.00 1.36 0.17
Carry 0.27 0.02 14.22 0.00
Momentum -0.03 0.02 -1.57 0.12
Value 0.09 0.01 6.45 0.00
Volatility -0.03 0.04 -0.81 0.42
Table 4.6: Comprehensive Risk-adjustment regression for the RiskMetrics opti-
mised FX carry portfolio (January 1999 - March 2010)
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Intercept 0.00 0.00 2.44 0.01
Carry 0.42 0.03 13.38 0.00
Momentum -0.13 0.02 -5.32 0.00
Value 0.08 0.02 3.95 0.00
Volatility -0.07 0.05 -1.40 0.16
Table 4.7: Comprehensive Risk-adjustment regression for the RiskMetrics opti-
mised FX carry portfolio (January 1999 - May 2007)
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Intercept -0.00 0.00 -1.14 0.25
Carry 0.21 0.03 6.34 0.00
Momentum -0.02 0.04 -0.37 0.71
Value 0.07 0.03 2.67 0.01
Volatility -0.05 0.07 -0.77 0.44
Table 4.8: Comprehensive Risk-adjustment regression for the RiskMetrics opti-
mised FX carry portfolio (June 2007 - March 2010)
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Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Intercept 0.00 0.00 1.25 0.21
Carry -0.18 0.04 -4.69 0.00
Momentum 0.36 0.03 12.54 0.00
Value 0.07 0.04 1.91 0.06
Volatility -0.13 0.08 -1.69 0.09
Table 4.9: Comprehensive Risk-adjustment regression for the frontrunning FX
carry portfolio with lag 52 (January 1999 - March 2010)
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Intercept 0.00 0.00 1.34 0.18
Carry -0.13 0.07 -1.75 0.08
Momentum 0.05 0.04 1.24 0.22
Value 0.18 0.06 3.14 0.00
Volatility -0.21 0.12 -1.79 0.07
Table 4.10: Comprehensive Risk-adjustment regression for the frontrunning FX
carry portfolio with lag 52 (January 1999 - May 2007)
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Intercept 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.66
Carry -0.12 0.05 -2.59 0.01
Momentum 0.54 0.04 14.49 0.00
Value -0.24 0.06 -3.96 0.00
Volatility -0.07 0.09 -0.78 0.43
Table 4.11: Comprehensive Risk-adjustment regression for the frontrunning FX
carry portfolio with lag 52 (June 2007 - March 2010)
Rolling-Window versus Fixed-Window VCV Estimation
A rolling window estimation of the VCV matrices could be better able to gauge
potential structural changes within the data than an expanding window estima-
tion since old and potentially irrelevant data is not included any more in the
modelling. Therefore, we have also tested the performance of the two optimised
FX carry portfolios based on VCV matrices which are estimated on a rolling fixed
window length of 52 periods. In a first step, we estimated the RiskMetrics VCV
matrix and the historical VCV matrix based on a rolling window with a constant
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window length of 52 weeks. As with the fixed window estimation, our first sample
starts on the 16th of January 1998.
The annualised return, standard deviation and Sharpe ratios for the expanding
and rolling window portfolios are summarised below in Table 4.12. The sensitiv-
ity of the results with respect to a rolling or expanding estimation window vary
based on the nature of the chosen VCV matrix estimator. The performance of
the optimised portfolio based on the RiskMetrics VCV matrix is very insensitive
with respect to the decision of whether to expand the window or roll it. The
diﬀerences in performance concerning the annualised return and the annualised
standard deviation are minimal and sharpe ratios are equal at 0.73. Conversely,
we observe a somewhat higher impact on the backtesting results when the VCV
matrix is estimated historically. The returns are slightly higher when the estima-
tion window is rolled (2.87% versus 2.84%) and the standard deviation of returns
is slightly lower when the window is rolled (4.49% versus 4.67%). Consequently
the Sharpe ratio is slightly higher when the estimation window is rolled (0.64
versus 0.61).
These diﬀerences are due to the inherent diﬀerences on how the two method-
ologies weight historical information. Whereas each observed datapoint impacts
the historical variance estimation with an equal weight, the RiskMetrics variance
estimator will quickly decrease the relevance of older observations.
Ann. Return Ann. St.Deviation Sharpe Ratio
Historical (Fixed Window) 0.0284 0.0467 0.61
Historical (Rolling Window) 0.0287 0.0449 0.64
RiskMetrics (Fixed Window) 0.0320 0.0440 0.73
RiskMetrics (Rolling Window) 0.0322 0.0440 0.73
Table 4.12: Annualised return, annualised standard deviation and Sharpe ratios
of the optimised carry portfolios estimated with an expanding window and a
rolling window of 52 periods.
4.6 Conclusion
As outlined in Section 4.1, a possible explanation for the enduring profitability of
the carry trade is the limits to speculation hypothesis LSH, formulated by Lyons
[2006] (see Section 4.1). The main statement of LSH is that market ineﬃciencies
whose risk-adjusted returns do not surpass a specific threshold level, could persist
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because of their limitation in attracting speculative capital. Since 5 out of 6
asset allocation algorithms (see Section 4.5) produced Sharpe ratios over the 0.4
threshold proposed by Sarno et al. [2006], we can discard the applicability of
LSH to the FX carry trade. This finding confirms research results from Hochradl
and Wagner [2010]. This result further proves the practical relevance of FX carry
trade strategies for which we already found indications in literature (see Pojarliev
and Levich [2008] and Section 3.3.2)
Also, we can confirm that diversification is beneficial to the trading perfor-
mance of carry portfolios (see Burnside et al. [2006], Hochradl and Wagner [2010]
and Vesilind [2006]). More specifically, we find that mean-variance optimisa-
tion has the potential of outperforming simple equally weighted asset allocation
methodologies in the case of the FX carry trade. However, we show how the mean-
variance asset allocation algorithms are sensitive to the choice of the variance-
covariance matrix used for the optimisation. The RiskMetrics variance-covariance
matrix produced a better Sharpe ratio than the historical variance-covariance ma-
trix (Sharpe ratios of 0.73 against 0.61). We believe that more sophisticated VCV
estimation methodologies, e.g. orthogonal GARCH (see Alexander [2001]), might
further improve the backtesting results of FX carry portfolios. Nevertheless, even
if on average the optimised FX carry portfolios produced better results than the
simple scorecard-based FX carry portfolios, the higher transactions costs and
the degrees of freedom associated with choosing an appropriate VCV matrix es-
timation methodology and its correspondent parameters, make well diversified,
equally weighted carry portfolios seem the best choice in terms of tradeoﬀ be-
tween diversification, performance and robustness. This intuition is confirmed by
the regression results summarised in Table 4.5 which show that the optimised FX
carry portfolios were not able to generate carry-alpha at a statistically significant
level.
Furthermore, this paper examines two alternative approaches for generating
currency portfolios based on the FX carry trade theme.
The first alternative approach consists in allocating the funds according to
yields of a diﬀerent maturity than the weekly rebalancing frequency. This ap-
proach illustrated that shorter term yields performed best when used for carry
trading. Chinn and Meredith [2005] found that UIP is more likely to be violated
for short maturity bonds than for long maturity bonds. Although our FX carry
portfolios are rebalanced on a weekly basis instead of holding the currencies for
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the whole maturity of the yields used for the ranking algorithm, the findings by
Chinn and Meredith [2005] are reflected in the trading performance of our second
set of FX carry portfolios.
The second alternative FX carry-related asset allocation approach consists in
formulating and testing currency portfolios aimed at following the portfolio flows
caused by FX carry traders in the market. We propose a simple methodology
to implement such a trading strategy by ranking the currencies according to the
momentum of their 2-Year yields and assuming equally weighted long (short)
positions in the highest (lowest) ranked currencies. The assumption behind this
approach is that positive yield changes in a currency tend to attract specula-
tive carry capital, while negative yield changes would encourage carry traders to
sell the respective currency short (see Section 3.3.2). We examined six diﬀer-
ent currency portfolios of this type, each based on a diﬀerent lag length for the
computation of yield momentum (see Section 4.3.3). Contrary to traditional FX
carry portfolios, these yield-momentum based portfolios were not able to gener-
ate significant returns from the yield component while exhibiting positive returns
from exchange rate movements.
We stress that this positive return from foreign exchange rate movements is
inherent to the aggregated positions of the currency portfolios over time. There-
fore, the predictability of single currencies is only given in certain situations when
the criteria for inclusion in the carry-flows portfolios are met. Thus, our finding
of the predictability of foreign exchange rates in the carry-flows portfolio context
does not conflict with the finding by Meese and Rogoﬀ [1983a] and Meese and
Rogoﬀ [1983b], who stated that the random walk model is the best model for
explaining exchange rate movements.
The high transactions costs generated by the carry-flows portfolios, had a
substantial impact on the final performance of the trading strategies. The best
strategy in the third set of currency portfolios exhibited a Sharpe ratio of just
0.29. According to the LSH hypothesis (see Section 4.1) these relatively low risk-
adjusted returns would not attract significant amounts of speculative capital.
This would mean that the returns inherent to strategies following the portfolio-
flows of FX carry traders will not disappear in the future.
Since the returns to the carry-flows portfolio strategies are linked to buy and
sell pressure on currencies exercised by FX carry traders, we assume that there
might be a correlation between the returns inherent to this type of strategy and
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the amount of speculative capital tied to the FX carry trade. In a market envi-
ronment where no one trades the FX carry trade, the profitable FX fluctuations
inherent to the carry-flows portfolios should cease to exist.
From a portfolio management perspective, the carry-flows portfolios based on
the longer lag lengths (i.e. 8−52 periods) for computing the yield momentums (see
Section 4.3.3) could serve as good diversification vehicles for FX carry portfolios,
since they exhibit positive returns while delivering a negative loading on the FX
carry factor in Equation 4.19 (see Table 4.5).
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Chapter 5
Carry Trade Market Timing
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Market Timing
Following Taliaferro [2009], a fund times a market by adjusting its exposure to
the market in advance of significant price action in that market. As an exam-
ple Taliaferro [2009] referred to a fund that times the U.S. equities market by
increasing its market exposure in advance of high aggregate market returns, and
lowering its exposure in advance of low aggregate market returns.
If performed successfully, such market-timing has the potential to earn large
profits. This has been shown, among others, by Shilling [1992] who found that
during the period from 1946 to 1991 speculators could have increased their re-
turns from 11.2% per annum to 19.0% per annum by exiting from the stock
market during the 50 weakest months. Mistakes in market-timing decisions, such
as exiting a profitable market too early may have severe implications as well. As
Brunnermeier and Nagel [2004] showed, hedge funds that did not ride the tech-
nology bubble from 1998 to 2000 suﬀered large capital outflows, forcing some of
them to liquidate.
Theoretical Feasibility of Market Timing The successful implementa-
tion of market-timing constitutes a particularly diﬃcult task, and it is an open
question whether real-money fund managers possess such market-timing ability
(see Taliaferro [2009]). The theoretical discourse on the feasibility of market-
timing in financial speculation is driven by two contrasting financial paradigms:
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The Eﬃcient Market Hypothesis EMH (see also Section 3.2.1) and Behavioural
Finance.
Under the assumptions of the eﬃcient market hypothesis, capital markets are
eﬃcient and investors rational. Prices reflect all information available to market
participants at a specific point in time, and therefore investors should not be
able to use currently available information to select profitable trades. Hence,
according to the EMH, market-timing should not be feasible.
On the other hand, Behavioural Finance explicitly questions the assumptions
set-up by the EMH, recognising that investors are irrational and are subject to
specific behavioural biases such as overconfidence, information overload, herding,
loss avoidance or anchoring (see Shleifer [2000]). By identifying and exploiting
these behavioural biases, an investor has the possibility to generate excess re-
turns from trading financial markets (see Heidorn and Siragusano [2004]). Thus,
unlike the EMH, Behavioural Finance does not exclude the theoretical feasibility
of market-timing.
Empirical Market Timing Literature An examination of the market-
timing literature shows that diﬀerent sets of market-timing-rules have been pre-
sented and tested with varying degrees of success. In this area of financial re-
search, the U.S. equity market is the asset-class which received by far the most
attention.
Starting with Sharpe [1975], many early studies were unable to find rules with
the ability to time the market. This lead Clarke et al. [1989] to suggest that even
people who think that it is possible to beat the market through stock selection
seem to think that successful market-timing is impossible.
On the other hand, more recent studies present market-timing strategies and
indicators which had the ability to outperform the market. For example, Shen
[2002] presented simple market-timing strategies which are able to outperform
a buy-and-hold strategy for the S&P 500 Index. The trading simulations are
based on a dataset ranging from 1970 to 2000. Shen [2002] derived the successful
trading rules from spreads between the earnings-to-price ratio of the S&P 500
Index and short term interest rates. He shows that a strategy which exits from
the equity market when the earnings-to-price ratio to interest rates spread is under
a predefined threshold was able to produce superior returns, even after including
transactions costs. Brooks et al. [2005] expanded on the results presented by Shen
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[2002] by focusing on a very long dataset of the S&P 500 Index and a wider range
of market-timing indicators and rules to derive the market exposure in the S&P
500 Index. Brooks et al. [2005] found that all but one of the suggested approaches
were able to beat the buy-and-hold benchmark in risk-adjusted terms. The best
strategy is based on the spread between the earnings-to-price ratio and short term
treasury yields, confirming the results of Shen [2002].
A further study on market-timing strategies is the paper by Faber [2009].
Faber [2009] presented a quantitative market-timing framework based on simple
moving averages. He applied the same methodology for market-timing on the
United States equity market since 1900, and on other diverse and publicly traded
asset class indices including the Morgan Stanley Capital International EAFE In-
dex, the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index, the National Association of Real
Estate Investment Trusts Index and United States government 10-year Treasury
bonds, since 1973. The market-timing model was able to improve risk-adjusted re-
turns on most tested markets. Utilising a monthly system since 1973, an investor
would have been able to avoid being invested during many of the protracted bear
markets in various asset classes. Avoiding these large losses would have resulted
in equity-like returns with bond-like volatility and drawdown.
Market Timing in Real-World Investing Brooks et al. [2005] posed
the question whether real-money portfolio managers are applying market-timing
techniques for the allocation of their assets. He provides qualitative evidence that
fund managers make significant changes to the composition of their portfolios
when they believe that assets they hold are overvalued and could fall in value.
The yearly Quantitative Analysis of Investor Behaviour study by Dalbar Inc.
Dalbar [2010] provided some quantitative evidence concerning the ability of equity
funds to time the market. The study found, that while the S&P 500 Index has
returned 8.20% per annum over a 20 year period ending in December 2009, the
average equity fund investor has earned only 3.17% per annum. These results
suggest that the market-timing ability of fund managers is limited and that an
investor should invest in a broad market index instead of trying to outperform
the market through market-timing techniques. However, the Dalbar study is
based on a wide range of institutional investors and thus it cannot exclude that
individual portfolio managers might possess market-timing ability.
A further investigation on fund managers’ ability to time the market has been
performed by Bollen and Busse [2001]. He found increased evidence for market-
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timing ability of fund managers when analysing the dataset on a daily frequency
instead of a monthly frequency and concludes that fund managers might possess
a better market-timing ability than previously documented in literature.
More recently, Chen and Liang [2006] analysed a data set consisting of the
returns of 221 mutual funds which adopt market-timing strategies. In his in-
vestigations on the market-timing ability of these funds, he found statistically
significant evidence for market-timing ability at both the aggregate and individ-
ual levels. The results also indicate a higher market-timing ability by the funds
during periods of falling equity prices and high volatility.
Evidence for market-timing ability by FX hedge-funds has been found by
Pojarliev and Levich [2008], a more detailed discussion of which can be found in
the subsequent Section 5.1.2.
5.1.2 Foreign Exchange Investment-Style Timing
In Section 3.1 we discussed new benchmarks for currency managers based on the
FX investment-styles carry, momentum, volatility and valuation. These bench-
marks can be tracked at low cost through e.g. ETF’s (see Section 3.1.2). Accord-
ing to Pojarliev and Levich [2008], such a market environment creates the need
for innovative alpha strategies that produce returns which can not be explained
by popular investment-style proxies.
Pojarliev and Levich [2008] showed that professional currency managers have
the ability to generate ’genuine’ alpha, i.e. returns not explicable by typical FX
investment-styles. Further, he investigates whether the alpha generated by these
FX funds comes from successful market-timing activity in any of the major FX
investment-styles. The results indicate that, out of a data sample of 34 FX hedge
funds from 2001 to 2006, about half of the examined funds possessed statistically
significant market-timing ability in one or more of the four major FX investment-
styles.
More specifically
• 3 out of 34 funds (8.82%) were able to time the carry investment-style,
• 7 out of 34 funds (20.56%) were able to time the trend investment-style,
• 3 out of 34 funds (8.82%) were able to time the valuation investment-style,
• 6 out of 34 funds (17.65%) were able to time the volatility investment-style.
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Pojarliev and Levich [2008] concluded that some FX hedge funds possess
market-timing ability. This result raises the question of how these funds actu-
ally perform the investment-style timing. Empirical literature on market-timing
strategies for FX investment-styles is scarce. The issue has been addressed mainly
by Dunis et.al. in a set of research papers (see Dunis and Miao [2005], Miao and
Dunis [2006] and Dunis and Miao [2007]).
Dunis and Miao [2005] studied the returns inherent to technical trading strate-
gies on a set of currency pairs. The trading strategies are based on the MACD
indicator, a popular indicator in technical analysis. Dunis and Miao [2005] found
that the returns of technical trading strategies for individual currency pairs are
related to the volatility regime of the currency pair. More specifically, the tech-
nical strategies exhibited higher returns in periods of relatively low volatility and
lower, often negative, returns during periods of high market volatility. 1
In a subsequent paper, Miao and Dunis [2006] applied volatility-based trading
filters on the AFX Index 2. In addition to the RiskMetrics methodology, some
alternative procedures for the estimation of the FX volatility are used. The two al-
ternative volatility forecast models used in Miao and Dunis [2006] are the GARCH
model and a stochastic volatility model with Markov switching. Similarly to Du-
nis and Miao [2005], the returns inherent to the FX trend investment-style are
negatively related to FX market volatility. Trading filters based on FX volatility
proxies improve the returns to the AFX Index in risk-adjusted terms. Further,
the results indicate that the alternative volatility models fail to improve the per-
formance of the RiskMetrics volatility model, when used as switching filters for
trading the FX momentum investment-style.
Dunis and Miao [2007] examined the performance of returns to the FX carry
trade during diﬀerent regimes of (RiskMetrics) FX volatility. Dunis and Miao
[2007] found that, similarly to the case of momentum strategies, FX carry trade
returns deteriorate during periods of high FX market volatility. Subsequently,
Dunis and Miao [2007] applied the market-timing methodology proposed in Miao
and Dunis [2006] to the FX carry trade. The results indicate that the addition of
volatility filters for FX carry trading produces better risk-adjusted returns than
trading a long-only carry portfolio: While the long-only carry strategy produced
1Dunis and Miao [2005] calculated the FX volatility proxy via the RiskMetrics methodology
(see Section 4.4.3).
2The AFX Index constitutes a proxy for the momentum investment-style in the FX market
(see Section 3.1.2).
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a sharpe ratio of 1.04 from January 1999 to March 2005, the market-timed carry
strategies produced sharpe ratios of 1.37 in the case of the long-neutral filter, and
1.43 in the case of the long-short filter.
5.1.3 Market Timing Indicators for FX Carry Portfolios
Market-timing rules usually build on empirical findings of the ability of certain
indicators to predict future market performance. The literature has identified
many useful indicators for timing the equities markets. Examples for these in-
dicators are the earnings-to-price ratio, the dividend yield, the dividend-payout
ratio, the maturity spread and the credit spread and the gilt-equity yield ratio
(see Neuhierl and Schlusche [2009]).
Since our purpose is to study the performance of market-timing the FX carry
trade, we would like to utilise market-timing indicators which are more specific
to the FX markets and the FX carry trade. Apart from Dunis and Miao [2005],
Miao and Dunis [2006] and Dunis and Miao [2007], which proposed the use of
RiskMetrics FX market volatility as a timing-indicator for FX investment strate-
gies, we are not aware of any published academic research on the market-timing
of FX trading styles.
Nevertheless, we are able to identify some data categories which could provide
useful market-timing indicators for the FX carry trade. The data categories from
which we will choose the indicators used for the empirical research in Section 5.5
are:
• Volatility
• Liquidity
• FX Yield Diﬀerentials
• Aggregate Risk-Aversion Indicators
In the following, we will briefly discuss these indicator categories. In Sec-
tion 5.3 we will choose and present specific market-timing indicators from these
categories.
Volatility We expect periods of high global volatility to coincide with weak
FX carry trade performances and vice versa. The reason for this is that periods of
high market volatility often occur during periods of financial turmoil (see Whaley
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[2000]). Such market environments are negative for the FX carry trade (see
Section 3.3.3).
We find evidence in literature for volatility as a successful indicator for FX
carry trade returns. Carins and McCauley [2007] found indications for a re-
lationship between increases in the VIX3 and depreciation of the USD against
the JPY, a major carry trading currency pair during the period under examina-
tion. Menkhoﬀ et al. [2009] found a statistically significant negative relationship
between the returns of high yielding currencies and global volatility levels. Simi-
larly, Vistesen [2009] found that low yielding currencies (the JPY and CHF) can
be successfully modelled as a negative function of equity returns and a positive
function of volatility in the market. carry trade strategies would suﬀer from these
scenarios. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 5.1.2, Miao and Dunis [2006] and
Dunis and Miao [2007] have shown that proxies for FX market volatility can serve
as successful market-timing filters for the trend investment-style and the carry
investment-style.
Liquidity We expect FX carry trade performance to deteriorate during pe-
riods of low market liquidity. As in the case of high aggregate market volatility,
periods of low liquidity tend to coincide with financial market turmoil and investor
uncertainty (see Allen and Carletti [2008]), which are bad market conditions for
carry trading strategies.
This rationale is confirmed by Menkhoﬀ et al. [2009], who showed that liq-
uidity risk matters for excess returns to the FX carry trade, although to a lesser
extent than volatility.
FX Yield Diﬀerentials The motivation behind using yield diﬀerentials as
timing factors for FX carry portfolios is based upon the observation that foreign
exchange rate portfolio flows are statistically significantly related to measures of
carry trade attractiveness like e.g. the yield diﬀerentials on currency positions
(see Galati et al. [2007b] or 3.3.2). This observation means that currency investors
would tend to hold larger amounts of currency, as the possibility to generate a
pickup in yields rises. Thus, using yield diﬀerentials as a timing factor for FX
carry trades can constitute a very simplistic model of the observed behavior of
FX portfolio managers which drives foreign exchange rate transactions.
3See Section 5.3.2.
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Market timing FX carry portfolios based on the level of the earned yield diﬀer-
entials aims at frontrunning the empirically observed behavior of FX speculators,
thus opening up the opportunity for capitalising on the price fluctuations induced
by the buying and selling pressures of the FX maket participants. To our knowl-
edge, no research on the profitability of FX carry trade timing with this indicator
has been performed.
Aggregate Risk-Aversion Indicators Several authors have expressed the
idea that constructing indices that track the general risk-aversion in the markets
could be useful for timing FX carry trades (see Rosenberg [2003] or Vesilind
[2006]). Such approaches are also popular in quantitative research publications in
the financial industry, which markets them as profitable market-timing indicators
for FX strategies. For a more extensive discussion of aggregated risk aversion
indicators used in the financial industry we refer to Bundesbank [2005].
Despite the interest shown, we stress that up to this point academia has pro-
vided no evidence for the profitability of rules based on these indicators. Vesilind
[2006] mentioned that his attempts to construct and use an aggregate risk appetite
index for timing the FX carry trade, did not improve the cumulative performance
of the strategy. Vesilind [2006] failed to provide the methodology and empirical
results behind his conclusion.
5.2 Contributions
In the remainder of this chapter we continue our empirical investigation on quan-
titative methodologies for trading FX carry portfolios. The central research ques-
tion which we pose here asks whether market-timing signals based on a variety of
risk factors (see Section 5.1.3) are suitable for actively trading FX carry portfo-
lios. The market-timing signals which determine when to take a long, neutral or
short position in the FX carry trade are computed using a simple signal genera-
tion methodology (see Section 5.4.1) in order to keep the results transparent and
replicable. To our knowledge, except in Dunis and Miao [2007], such a treatment
of the FX carry investment-style as an underlying financial instrument in its own
right has not been performed before. Thus, this chapter contributes to the lim-
ited body of literature on market-timing strategies for FX investment-styles (see
Section 5.1.2).
As Pojarliev and Levich [2008] showed, active trading of FX investment-styles
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is being performed by a good number of FX hedge funds. This is is not surprising,
since the possibility of low-cost replication of FX hedge fund returns makes the
service of professional (and expensive) FX managers seem useless, if they do
not deliver currency alpha as understood by Pojarliev and Levich [2008]. The
research performed in the following sections therefore contributes to the research
on modern FX hedge fund strategies which still have to be uncovered.
Furthermore, our analysis may deliver new insights into the mechanics of the
forward rate bias, which is directly linked to FX carry trade returns. Recent
literature on the drivers of carry trade profits studies the relationship between
risk factors and carry trade returns by fitting linear regressions and searching for
statistically significant coeﬃcients (see Section 3.3.4). In contrast to that line of
research, we choose to assess the relevance of the risk factors for FX carry trade
returns by evaluating the financial performance metrics of market-timed FX carry
portfolios.
The logic behind the construction of the market timed trading rule is analo-
geous to the logic behind the perceptron which constitutes the smalles unit of an
artificial neural network (see e.g. Zimmermann and Rehkugler [1994] and Grimm
[1997]). Like the market timing filter, a perceptron receives a set of inputs and
outputs a transformed version of these inputs. Mostly the output of a percep-
tron consists of binary data which is calculated depending on whether the input
surpasses a given threshold level or not. Perceptrons represent the most basic
version of artificial neural networks, whose strength lies in their capability to
approximate highly dimensional and nonlinear functions. Thus, a successful (i.e.
profit-enhancing) application of a market-timing rule would signal the presence
of a nonlinear relationship between the specific risk factor and the strength of the
forward rate bias. We note that other approaches which are able to model and
capture nonlinear dynamics have been presented in financial research. Exam-
ples for these models are Feedforward and Recurrent Neural Networks, Markov
Switching models, Threshold Autoregression models and Smooth Transition Au-
toregression models, just to name a few. We refer to Mills and Markellos [2008]
for a survey on nonlinear time series analysis in financial economics.
In addition to the financial performance evaluation metrics, we will test the
presented trading-strategies for carry-alpha generation and market-timing ability
(see Section 5.4.2).
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5.3 Data
In order to test the performance of market-timed FX carry portfolios we require
a set of data series specific to the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio, as well as a
set of risk-indicators.
Our data set starts on the 01.01.1999 and ends on the 05.03.2010. Since we lose
50 observations for the calculation of the market-timing signals (see Section 5.4.1),
the backtesting period for the portfolios in this chapter starts on the 10.12.1999
and ends on the 05.03.2010 (534 weekly observations). In the following sections
we describe the relevant datasets for the empirical analyses conducted in this
chapter.
5.3.1 The Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio
The starting point for the analysis of our market-timing algorithms is the Bench-
mark FX Carry Portfolio. Details concerning the raw data sources, the method-
ology and the performance of the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio are outlined in
Appendix A.
The portfolio yield diﬀerentials inherent to the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio
(see Section A.5), as well as the RiskMetrics conditional volatility estimates of this
portfolio (see Section A.5) will serve as inputs to the market-timing methodology
described in Section 5.4.1.
5.3.2 Carry Timing Indicators
In the following paragraphs, we provide an overview of the financial time series
which will be used to construct the market-timing signals for actively trading
the FX carry trade. A visual representation of these time series is given in the
left-hand-side of Figure 5.1.
VIX (CBOE S&P 500 Volatility Index) The VIX is an index of the
expected return volatility of the S&P 500 Index over the next 30 days (see Wha-
ley [2008]). The values of the VIX are calculated in real-time by the Chicago
Board Options Exchange. The quoting methodology is analogous to the pricing
of variance swaps (see CBOE [2009]), using prices from diﬀerent traded options
on the S&P 500 Index to determine the expected return volatility.
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The VIX is sometimes called ’the fear gauge’ by the financial industry, since
it is often used to represent equity market volatility as well as risk aversion (see
Lustig et al. [2008] and Whaley [2000]). As discussed in Section 5.1.3, we would
expect high values of the VIX to signal negative periods for the FX carry trade.
CarryVola (Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio RiskMetrics Volatility)
We compute the RiskMetrics volatility on the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio
(see Section A.5) as a proxy for FX market volatility specific to the FX carry
trade. As shown by Dunis and Miao [2007], we expect high values of FX market
volatility to coincide with periods of negative carry performance.
USSP2 (2-Year U.S. Swap Spread) The 2-Year U.S. Swap Spread de-
notes the diﬀerence between the 2-year swap rate and the yield on a government
bond with 2-year maturity (see Cortes).
Possible interpretations of swap spread dynamics range from an indicator of
systemic risk in the banking sector to an indicator for credit and/or liquidity
risk (see Kobor et al. [2005]). A study by Huang et al. [2002] agreed with the
prevailing view among swap traders that swap spreads are mainly an indicator of
market liquidity risk. Therefore, as discussed in Section 5.1.3, we would expect
high values of the 2-Year U.S. Swap Spread to signal negative periods for the FX
Carrry Trade.
TEDSP (Ted Spread) The Ted Spread is is defined as the interest rate
diﬀerence between 3-month Libor and 3-month T-bill rates (see Menkhoﬀ et al.
[2009]).
Diﬀerences between these rates reflect, among other things, the willingness
of banks to provide funding in the interbank market: When the TED Spread
increases, that is a sign that lenders believe the risk of default on interbank loans
is increasing. Interbank lenders therefore demand a higher rate of interest, or
accept lower returns on safe investments such as T-bills. When the risk of bank
defaults is considered to be decreasing, the TED spread decreases. The TED
Spread can be interpreted as a measure for illiquidity in global money markets
(see Brunnermeier et al. [2008] and Menkhoﬀ et al. [2009]). Again, as discussed
in Section 5.1.3, as with the swap spread we would therefore expect high values
of the TED Spread to signal negative periods for the carry trade.
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CarryYield (Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio Yield Diﬀerential) The
overall yield diﬀerential of the FX positions in the Benchmark FX Carry Portfo-
lio (see Section A.5) is used to proxy the attractiveness of setting up diversified
carry trades, as far as the pure carry component is concerned. We expect high
interest rate diﬀerentials to be beneficial to carry trading strategies, since they
allow for larger FX drawdowns before generating an overall loss to the FX carry
Portfolio.4
5.4 Methodology
In the following sections the methodology for the derivation of market-timing
rules and statistical tests for market-timing ability are presented.
5.4.1 Market-Timing Rules
We employ and compare 3 diﬀerent sets of market-timing rules:
• Simple An approach based on the methodologies proposed by Brooks et al.
[2005] and Dunis and Miao [2007], utilising the risk indicators described
above.
• Average An approach based on the average market-timing signal derived
from the first approach.
• Majority An approach based on the majority vote market-timing signal
derived from the first approach.
In the following paragraphs these methodologies for market-timing rule cre-
ation are presented in more detail.
Simple The simple market-timing algorithm, is derived from the method-
ologies proposed by Brooks et al. [2005] and Dunis and Miao [2007].
Brooks et al. [2005] exited the market, when the relevant risk indicator value
is over its historical 90th percentile. Instead of calculating the value of the 90th
percentile in each week, we have chosen to calculate the p-values φI of the specific
4Note that in the subsequent analyses we invert the value of the CarryYield indicator to
be congruent with the other indicators (s.t. high values have a negative influence on FX carry
trades).
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risk indicator I. The p-value indicates the percentage of values which historically
have been smaller than the actual value of a specific time series. As an example,
a p-value of 0.65, indicates that on that particular week the specific indicator
is larger than 65% of its historical realisations. The rolling p-values for all risk
indicators used in this chapter are depicted in Figure 5.1.
Analogous to Dunis and Miao [2007] we test 2 diﬀerent filter rule settings,
i.e. long-neutral and long-short. In the long-neutral setting, the possible market
positions for the FX carry trade Strategy are either long or neutral. In the
long-short setting, long as well as short positions in the FX carry trade can be
assumed. Computationally we specify [long/neutral/short ] positions with the
identifiers [1/0/− 1].
In order to calculate a simple market-timing signal, the following parameters
have to be set once:
• Select the relevant risk indicator I (e.g., I = V IX)
• Set the p-value φI threshold level L (e.g., L = 0.7)
• Set the filter-rule setting (long-neutral or long-short)
Subsequently, the following calculations have to be performed each week (t =
50, ...., T ) on a rolling basis, to ensure the real-time character of the trading
simulations. Note that the first data window contains 50 observations. Each week
the dataset on which the p-value calculations are based will expand to include
every observation starting from the 01.01.1999 and ending on the respective date
in the rolling procedure.
1. Calculate the actual p-value pIt
2. Calculate the actual market position MP It :
MP It =

1, if φIt <= L
0, if φIt > L and long-neutral setting
−1, if φIt > L and long-short setting
(5.1)
Throughout the calculations, we arbitrarily set the threshold L to 0.7. A test
of multiple threshold values has been intentionally omitted, in order to avoid the
problem of data-mining.
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Average The average market-timing signal consists of a weighted average of
all computed simple market-timing signals. The steps involved in the calculation
of the average market-timing signal in a specific week t are:
1. Calculate the simple market-timing signals for all available risk indicators.
2. Compute the average of all market-timing signals.
Also the average market-timing signal will be tested for the long-neutral and
long-short strategy settings.
Majority Similar to the average market-timing signal, themajority market-
timing signal considers all simple market-timing signals. Here, the market-timing
signal which is exhibited by the majority of the simple market-timing, will be
chosen. The steps involved in the calculation of the majority market-timing
signal in a specific week t are:
1. Calculate the simple market-timing signals for all available risk indicators.
2. Select the market-timing signal which is most prevalent amongst all simple
market-timing rules.
Figure 5.1 depicts the raw risk indicators (left-hand-side) and the correspond-
ing rolling p-values φ with the chosen threshold level L (right-hand-side). Fig-
ure 5.2 depicts the market positions MP for all market-timing rules in the long-
neutral setting (left-hand-side) and the long-short setting (right-hand-side).
5.4.2 Statistical Test for Market-Timing Ability
After simulating the performance of the market-timed FX carry portfolios, we
want to test whether the market-timing rules exhibit statistically significant
market-timing ability.
We follow the approach proposed by Treynor and Mazuy [1966], who were
among the first to propose a dynamic measure of active management. To detect
market-timing skills, Treynor and Mazuy [1966] augmented the linear framework
presented in Section 4.4.4 with a quadratic term. Thus, in order to test for
the ability of the market timing rules to generate abnormal returns, we perfrom
regressions of the following form:
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Figure 5.1: Risk Factors (left-hand-side) and Market-Timing-Signal Construction
Methodology (right-hand-side).
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Figure 5.2: Long-Neutral (left-hand-side) and Long-Short (right-hand-side)
Market-Timing Signals.
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Rt = α+ βFt + γF
2
t + ￿t (5.2)
where Rt is the excess return generated by the market-timed Benchmark FX
Carry Portfolio in week t, Ft is the excess return generated by Benchmark FX
Carry Portfolio in week t, F 2t the squared excess return generated by Benchmark
FX Carry Portfolio in week t, α (the intercept) is a measure of active trading
rule skill, β is the coeﬃcient for the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio factor, γ is
the coeﬃcient for the squared Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio factor and ￿ is a
random error term.
A statistically significant positive γ coeﬃcient would signal market-timing
ability of the specific market-timing rule.
We note that a good number of alternative approaches to test for market
timing ability have been presented in literature.5 Our choice for the particu-
lar approach in Equation 5.2 follows the methodology of Pojarliev and Levich
[2008], whose contribution on active FX management performance attribution is
of central importance to our research on the FX carry trade.
5.5 Empirical Results
5.5.1 Discussion of the FX Carry Portfolio Market-Timing
Performances
In this chapter we tested the performance of trading FX carry portfolios with
market-timing signals based on risk indicators. We utilised diﬀerent risk indi-
cators and analysed long-neutral and long-short trading filters for the FX carry
trade. We will now interpret the eﬀects of market-timing FX carry portfolios, by
examining the results in Table 5.1, Table 5.2, Table 5.3 and Figure 5.3.
Table 5.1 summarises performance metrics and return attribution measures for
the market-timed FX carry portfolios. The first column of Table 5.1 describes the
allowed positions which are used for the market-timing experiments. The allowed
positions are long-neutral and long-short. The second column (’Indicator’ ) of
Table 5.1 describes the chosen risk indicator for the computation of the market-
timing signal. In the third and fourth columns the annualised arithmetic return
5See e.g. the Henriksson/Merton test (see Merton [1981b] and Merton [1981a]), the Con-
nor/Korajczyk model (see Connor and Korajczyk [1991]) and the Bhattacharya/Pfleiderer
model (see Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer [1983]).
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ra and the Sharpe ratio SR are listed for each currency portfolio. The last
three columns of Table 5.1 allow us to identify the source of the strategy total
returns listed in the ra-column: raFX represents the annualised arithmetic returns
generated from FX movements, raY D the annualised arithmetic return generated
from yield pickup and raTC represent the annualised transactions costs in percent.
Figure 5.3 depicts the cumulative performance of the market-timed FX carry
portfolios. Table 5.2 summarises the regression results of the factor model testing
for the ability of the market-timing signals to generate carry-alpha. Table 5.3
summarises the regression tests for market-timing ability of the market-timing
signals.
Timing Indicator ra SR raFX r
a
Y D r
a
TC
Long-Only - 0.0639 0.64 0.0242 0.0425 -0.0028
Long-Neutral VIX 0.0433 0.69 0.0204 0.0301 -0.0071
Long-Neutral USSP2 0.0780 1.16 0.0510 0.0308 -0.0038
Long-Neutral TEDSP 0.0603 0.97 0.0351 0.0298 -0.0045
Long-Neutral YDDIFF 0.0321 0.38 0.0025 0.0337 -0.0041
Long-Neutral RISKM 0.0469 0.81 0.0220 0.0286 -0.0037
Long-Neutral MAJVOTE 0.0619 0.99 0.0349 0.0324 -0.0053
Long-Neutral AVGSIGNAL 0.0512 0.91 0.0251 0.0306 -0.0044
Long-Short VIX 0.0204 0.20 0.0166 0.0170 -0.0132
Long-Short USSP2 0.0900 0.91 0.0779 0.0186 -0.0063
Long-Short TEDSP 0.0547 0.55 0.0460 0.0165 -0.0078
Long-Short YDDIFF -0.0032 -0.03 -0.0192 0.0243 -0.0083
Long-Short RISKM 0.0276 0.28 0.0199 0.0140 -0.0062
Long-Short MAJVOTE 0.0579 0.58 0.0456 0.0217 -0.0093
Long-Short AVGSIGNAL 0.0378 0.57 0.0260 0.0184 -0.0066
Table 5.1: Performance Metrics of the Market-Timed FX Carry Portfolios ( ra:
Annualised Arithmetic Return, SR: Sharpe Ratio, raFX : Annualised Return from
FX movements, raY D: Annualised Return from Yield Diﬀerentials, r
a
TC : Annu-
alised Return from Transactions Costs)
Market-Timed FX Carry Portfolios (Long-Neutral Setting) Analysing
the performance metrics in Table 5.1 we see that the long-neutral market-timed
FX carry portfolios outperformed the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio in 6 out of
7 cases: The Sharpe Ratios of the 6 top-performing market-timing signals range
between 0.69 and 1.16, while the long-only Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio gen-
erated a Sharpe Ratio of 0.64 during the relevant data period (see Section 5.3).
The best simple market-timing signals are based on the time series which proxy
liquidity risk. Timing the carry trade with these signals generated high absolute
Sharpe ratios of 1.16 in the case of the 2-Year U.S. Swap Spread (USSP2) and 0.97
in the case of Ted Spread (TEDSP) as a liquidity proxy. The simple volatility-
based timing signals also performed well, generating a Sharpe ratio of 0.81 in the
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Figure 5.3: Cumulative Returns for Long-Neutral (PANEL A) and Long-Short
(PANEL B) Market-Timed FX Carry Portfolios.
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Timing Indicator α Pr(> |tα|) β Pr(> |tβ |)
Long-Neutral VIX 0.0003 0.24 0.39 0.00
Long-Neutral USSP2 0.0009 0.00 0.46 0.00
Long-Neutral TEDSP 0.0007 0.02 0.39 0.00
Long-Neutral YDDIFF -0.0003 0.27 0.74 0.00
Long-Neutral RISKM 0.0005 0.09 0.34 0.00
Long-Neutral MAJVOTE 0.0007 0.02 0.39 0.00
Long-Neutral AVGSIGNAL 0.0004 0.03 0.46 0.00
Long-Short VIX 0.0007 0.27 -0.21 0.00
Long-Short USSP2 0.0018 0.00 -0.08 0.05
Long-Short TEDSP 0.0013 0.02 -0.23 0.00
Long-Short YDDIFF -0.0006 0.22 0.48 0.00
Long-Short RISKM 0.0009 0.11 -0.32 0.00
Long-Short MAJVOTE 0.0014 0.02 -0.22 0.00
Long-Short AVGSIGNAL 0.0008 0.04 -0.08 0.01
Table 5.2: Regression Results for the Factor Model Rt = α + βFt + ￿t (Ft =
Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio Returns, Rt = Market Timed Carry Portfolio
Returns).
Timing Indicator α Pr(> |tα|) β Pr(> |tβ |) γ Pr(> |tγ |)
Long-Neutral VIX -0.0000 0.72 0.43 0.00 2.18 0.00
Long-Neutral USSP2 0.0000 0.53 0.52 0.00 3.53 0.00
Long-Neutral TEDSP 0.0000 0.63 0.43 0.00 2.55 0.00
Long-Neutral YDDIFF 0.0000 0.20 0.69 0.00 -3.03 0.00
Long-Neutral RISKM 0.0000 0.52 0.36 0.00 1.38 0.00
Long-Neutral MAJVOTE 0.0000 0.59 0.43 0.00 2.59 0.00
Long-Neutral AVGSIGNAL 0.0000 0.43 0.48 0.00 1.22 0.00
Long-Short VIX -0.0000 0.68 -0.14 0.00 4.32 0.00
Long-Short USSP2 0.0000 0.57 0.03 0.48 7.03 0.00
Long-Short TEDSP 0.0000 0.67 -0.14 0.00 5.07 0.00
Long-Short YDDIFF 0.0000 0.24 0.38 0.00 -6.05 0.00
Long-Short RISKM 0.0000 0.56 -0.28 0.00 2.73 0.01
Long-Short MAJVOTE 0.0000 0.62 -0.14 0.00 5.14 0.00
Long-Short AVGSIGNAL 0.0000 0.45 -0.04 0.17 2.41 0.00
Table 5.3: Regression Results for the Factor Model Rt = α+ βFt + γF 2t + ￿t (Ft
= Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio Returns, Rt = Market Timed Carry Portfolio
Returns).
case of the RiskMetrics carry portfolio Volatility based timing signal (RISKM),
and 0.69 in the case of the S&P 500 Volatility Index based timing signal (VIX).
The market-timing signal that exhibited the worst backtesting performance was
based on the Yield Diﬀerentials (or the carry) time series inherent to the Bench-
mark FX Carry Portfolios (YDDIFF). This strategy generated a relatively low
Sharpe ratio of 0.38 and was the only one that failed to improve the long-only
carry strategy in the long-neutral setting. The two aggregated market-timing sig-
nals generated performances which are comparable to the performances achieved
by the best simple market-timing signals: The Sharpe ratio of the average timing
signal (AVGSIGNAL) was 0.91 and the Sharpe ratio of the majority-vote timing
signal (MAJVOTE) was 0.99.
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The return attribution measures in the right-hand-side of Table 5.1 show that
all long-neutral timed carry portfolios generated good returns from the yield com-
ponent. These returns range between 2.98% per annum and 3.37% per annum
during the relevant data period. Since in this setting we never assume short po-
sitions in the carry strategy, the return from yield has to be positive by construc-
tion. A feature shared by the top three performing long-neutral market-timed FX
carry portfolios is that they were able to generate higher returns from FX fluctu-
ations than from the yield pickup. The 2-Year U.S. Swap Spread (USSP2) based
timing signal generated a return of a 5.10% per annum from currency movements
against a return of 3.08% per annum from yield diﬀerentials, the Ted Spread
(TEDSP) based timing signal generated return of 3.51% per annum from cur-
rency movements and a return of 2.98% per annum from yield diﬀerentials, and
the Majority-Vote (MAJVOTE) timing signal generated a return of 3.49% per
annum from currency movements and a return of 3.24% per annum from yield
diﬀerentials. Thus, the strength of the most profitable long-neutral market-timing
strategies is their ability to selectively assume positions in the carry trade when
the risk of incurring drawdowns from currency fluctuations is relatively small. On
the other hand, the worst performing long-neutral timed carry portfolio gener-
ated practically no return from fluctuations in exchange rates: While generating
the highest return from interest rate diﬀerentials amongst the long-neutral timed
carry portfolios (3.37% per annum), the return from FX fluctuation of the Yield-
Diﬀerentials based (YDDIFF) timing signal was only 0.25% per annum.
The results for the regressions testing for the ability of the diﬀerent long-
neutral market-timing signals to generate carry-alpha are summarised in Ta-
ble 5.2. The regressions show that all but one tested market-timing signals
were able to generate positive carry-alpha. The carry-alpha of 4 long-neutral
market-timing strategies was positive at a statistically significant level (these sig-
nals were USSP2, TEDSP, AVGSIGNAL, MAJVOTE). The only long-neutral
market-timing signal which generated a negative carry-alpha parameter in the
regression was the signal based on the yield-diﬀerentials time series (YDDIFF).
With a p-value of 0.27, the negative alpha coeﬃcient was not statistically signif-
icant. The carry-beta parameters exhibit statistically significant positive values
for all long-neutral market-timing signals (see β-column in Table 5.2).
When we extend the factor model in Equation 4.19 for a market-timing term
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γF 2t (see Equation 5.2), the statistically significant alpha coeﬃcients dissappear,
since the carry outperformance is now captured by the market-timing term (see
Table 5.3). The market-timing coeﬃcient γ is positive with a high statistical
significance for VIX, USSP2, TEDSP, RISKM, MAJVOTE and AVGSIGNAL.
Only in the case of the YDDIFF-indicator does the market-timing coeﬃcient
assume a statistically significantly negative value.
Market-Timed FX Carry Portfolios (Long-Short Setting) The per-
formance metrics listed in Table 5.1 show that when the market-timing signals
are allowed to generate long and short positions in the FX carry trade, the re-
sults deteriorate with respect to the long-neutral market-timing strategies. In
the long-short setting only 1 out of 7 market-timing signals could outperform the
long-only Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio. This market-timing signal is based
on the 2-Year U.S. Swap Spread (USSP2), which already performed best in the
long-neutral setting.
As in the long-neutral setting, the simple market-timing signals which gener-
ated the best results in terms of Sharpe ratio, are based on the liquidity-related
risk factors: The 2-Year U.S. Swap Spread based timing signal (USSP2) pro-
duced a Sharpe ratio of 0.91 and the Ted Spread based timing signal (TEDSP)
produced a sharpe ratio of 0.55. The volatility-based timing signals still gener-
ated positive Sharpe ratios of 0.20 in the case of the S&P 500 Volatility Index
based timing signal (VIX) and 0.28 in the case of the RiskMetrics carry portfolio
Volatility based timing signal (RISKM), but these are substantially lower than
the long-only Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio which exhibited a Sharpe ratio
of 0.64. The Sharpe ratio of the Yield-Diﬀerentials based indicator (YDDIFF)
assumed a negative value of -0.03.
As in the long-neutral setting, the composed market-timing signals produced
results which were comparable to the best single market-timing signals. The
Majority-Vote based timing signal (MAJVOTE) produced a Sharpe ratio of 0.58
and the Average-Signal based timing signal (AVGSIGNAL) a Sharpe ratio of
0.57.
The four best performing timing signals in terms of Sharpe ratio were the ones
able to produce a substantial amount of their return from currency fluctuations.
These foreign exchange returns even exceed those generated by the long-neutral
timed FX carry portfolios (compare the ’raFX ’ -column values in Table 5.1). The
2-Year U.S. Swap Spread based timing signal (USSP2) generated a higher FX
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related return of 2.69% per annum in the long-short setting than in the long-
neutral setting; the Ted Spread based timing signal (TEDSP) generated a higher
FX related return of 1.09% per annum in the long-short setting than in the long-
neutral setting; the Majority-Vote based timing signal (MAJVOTE) generated
a higher FX related return of 1.07% per annum in the long-short setting than
in the long-neutral setting; and the Average-Signal timing signal (AVGSIGNAL)
generated a higher FX related return of 0.09% per annum in the long-short setting
than in the long-neutral setting.
The long-short market timed carry strategies generated yield pickup between
1.40% per annum and 2.43% per annum during the relevant data period. This
is substantially lower than in the long-neutral setting, since now positions which
assume short trades in the carry trade are allowed. These positions generate a
negative yield by construction. A further reason for the worse performance of
the long-short market timing strategies is given by the higher transactions costs
they generate relatively to the long-neutral market-timing strategies. While the
overall level of transactions costs paid in the case of the long-neutral timed FX
carry portfolios ranged between 0.37% per annum and 0.71% per annum during
the whole backtesting period, the long-short strategies generated higher transac-
tions costs ranging from 0.62% per annum and 1.32% per annum.
The results for the regressions testing for the ability of the diﬀerent long-short
market-timing signals to generate carry-alpha are summarised in Table 5.2. As in
the long-neutral setting, the regressions show that all but one of the market-timing
signals we tested were able to generate positive carry-alpha. The carry-alpha of
4 long-neutral market-timing strategies were positive at a statistically significant
level (these signals were USSP2, TEDSP, AVGSIGNAL, MAJVOTE). The only
long-neutral market-timing signal which generated a negative carry-alpha param-
eter in the regression was the signal based on the yield-diﬀerentials time series
(YDDIFF). Except for the market-timing signal based on the YDDIFF-indicator,
the carry-beta coeﬃcients exhibited statistically significant negative values for the
long-short market timed FX carry portfolios (see β-column in Table 5.2).
As in the long-neutral setting, when we extend the factor model in Equa-
tion 4.19 for a market-timing term γF 2t (see Equation 5.2), the statistically sig-
nificant alpha coeﬃcients disappear, since the carry outperformance is now cap-
tured by the market-timing term (see Table 5.3). The market-timing coeﬃcient γ
is positive with a high statistical significance for VIX, USSP2, TEDSP, RISKM,
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MAJVOTE and AVGSIGNAL. The market-timing coeﬃcient assumes a statisti-
cally significantly negative value only in the case of the YDDIFF-indicator.
5.5.2 Additional Considerations
Comprehensive Risk-Adjustments
The portfolios presented in this chapter aim at improving the performance of the
G10 FX carry trade by market-timing a simple FX carry trade portfolio. Thus,
the appropriate benchmark for our approaches is the performance of a simple FX
carry portfolio. As we discussed in Section 3.1.2, a good number of risk factors
other than carry have been proposed for the FX markets. These other risk factors
are: value, momentum and volatility. Considering these additional risk factors,
the question arises whether our FX carry portfolios are outperforming the vanilla
returns because they are loading on some risk factors and thus earning a risk
premium to do so.
In order to evaluate this possibility, we have performed additional factor-
regressions for two representative strategies, namely the long-neutral Majority-
Vote market timing rule and the long-short Majority-Vote market timing rule.
For each portfolio we have performed regressions on three distinct data-ranges,
namely the full data-range (January 1999 - March 2010), a pre-crisis data-range
(January 1999 - May 2007) and a post-crisis data-range (June 2007 - March 2010).
The regression results for the long-neutral Majority-Vote market timing rule
are summarised in Table 5.4 - Table 5.6. The regression results for the long-short
Majority-Vote market timing rule are summarised in Table 5.7 - Table 5.9.
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Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Intercept 0.00 0.00 1.63 0.10
Carry 0.40 0.02 19.12 0.00
Momentum 0.18 0.02 11.11 0.00
Value 0.23 0.02 10.56 0.00
Volatility 0.12 0.04 2.56 0.01
Table 5.4: Comprehensive Risk-adjustment regression for the long-neutral market
timed FX carry portfolio with the Majority-vote timing signal (January 1999 -
March 2010)
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Intercept -0.00 0.00 -0.34 0.73
Carry 0.97 0.02 62.98 0.00
Momentum 0.03 0.01 3.05 0.00
Value -0.03 0.01 -2.36 0.02
Volatility -0.09 0.03 -3.12 0.00
Table 5.5: Comprehensive Risk-adjustment regression for the long-neutral market
timed FX carry portfolio with the Majority-vote timing signal (January 1999 -
May 2007)
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Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Intercept 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.74
Carry 0.20 0.03 6.12 0.00
Momentum 0.13 0.03 5.13 0.00
Value 0.05 0.04 1.31 0.19
Volatility 0.02 0.07 0.27 0.79
Table 5.6: Comprehensive Risk-adjustment regression for the long-neutral market
timed FX carry portfolio with the Majority-vote timing signal (June 2007 - March
2010)
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Intercept 0.00 0.00 1.55 0.12
Carry -0.19 0.04 -4.61 0.00
Momentum 0.37 0.03 11.07 0.00
Value 0.46 0.04 10.51 0.00
Volatility 0.23 0.09 2.54 0.01
Table 5.7: Comprehensive Risk-adjustment regression for the long-short market
timed FX carry portfolio with the Majority-vote timing signal (January 1999 -
March 2010)
We now analyse the risk-adjustment regression results for the long-neutral
Majority-vote market timing rule for the FX carry portfolio. Contrary to the
regression which considered only the FX carry factor as explanatory variable (see
Table 5.2), we observe a negligible alpha coeﬃcient which is not statistically sig-
nificant throughout all three datasets. The loadings on the FX carry factor are
significantly positive throughout all three datasets. Somewhat surprisingly, the
loading on the FX momenum factor are statistically significantly positive as well
throughout all three datasets. The loadings on the value and volatility factors do
not behave homogeneously on the three diﬀerent datasets: While they are both
statistically significantly positive on the full data sample, they are significantly
negative when only the dataset ranging from January 1999 to May 2007 is con-
sidered. During the post-crisis dataset ranging from June 2007 to March 2010,
these two factors are not statistically significant.
The comprehensive risk-adjustment regressions for the long-short Majority-
vote market timing rule produce similar results to the long-neutral Majority vote
timing rule described above (see Table 5.7 - Table 5.9). The market timed FX
carry portfolios exhibit significantly positive loadings on the FX momentum factor
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Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Intercept -0.00 0.00 -0.40 0.69
Carry 0.94 0.03 30.27 0.00
Momentum 0.06 0.02 2.98 0.00
Value -0.06 0.03 -2.40 0.02
Volatility -0.18 0.06 -3.12 0.00
Table 5.8: Comprehensive Risk-adjustment regression for the long-short market
timed FX carry portfolio with the Majority-vote timing signal (January 1999 -
May 2007)
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Intercept 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.81
Carry -0.60 0.07 -9.02 0.00
Momentum 0.26 0.05 5.11 0.00
Value 0.11 0.08 1.29 0.20
Volatility 0.03 0.13 0.26 0.80
Table 5.9: Comprehensive Risk-adjustment regression for the long-short market
timed FX carry portfolio with the Majority-vote timing signal (June 2007 - March
2010)
on all three datasets. Also, the signs and significance of the factor loadings on the
value and volatility factors still exhibit diﬀerent behavior on all three datasets.
The major diﬀerence between the long-neutral and the long-short market timing
rules, is that the FX carry factor loadings exhibit mixed signs in the regressions
for the long-short Majority-vote timing rule. In fact the loadings on the FX carry
factor are negative both during the full data sample (January 1999 - March 2010)
and during the post-crisis data sample (June 2007 - March 2010).
We have to note that as in Chapter 4, where we tested various asset alloca-
tion strategies for FX carry portfolios, the significant regression coeﬃcients in
Table 5.4 - Table 5.9 could be of a spurious nature. The risk factors could be
picking up the part of the returns which should be attributed to market timing.
In order to exclude this, we perform two additional regressions on the full data
range. These additional regressions have all four FX return factors (i.e. carry,
momentum, value and volatility) and additionally a market timing term as ex-
planatory variables. As discussed in Section 5.4.2, the market timing term still
consists of the squared FX carry returns. These additional regressions are sum-
marised in Table 5.10 (for the long-neutral Majority-vote rule) and in Table 5.11
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(for the long-short Majority-vote rule).
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Intercept 0.00 0.00 1.41 0.16
Carry 0.40 0.02 18.82 0.00
Carry Squared 0.16 0.47 0.33 0.74
Momentum 0.18 0.02 10.82 0.00
Value 0.23 0.02 10.26 0.00
Volatility 0.11 0.05 2.27 0.02
Table 5.10: Comprehensive Risk-adjustment with market-timing term (Carry
Squared) regression for the long-neutral market timed FX carry portfolio with
the Majority-vote timing signal (January 1999 - March 2010)
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Intercept 0.00 0.00 1.35 0.18
Carry -0.19 0.04 -4.47 0.00
Carry Squared 0.28 0.94 0.30 0.76
Momentum 0.36 0.03 10.79 0.00
Value 0.46 0.04 10.22 0.00
Volatility 0.22 0.10 2.27 0.02
Table 5.11: Comprehensive Risk-adjustment with market-timing term (Carry
Squared) regression for the long-short market timed FX carry portfolio with the
Majority-vote timing signal (January 1999 - March 2010)
The regression results summarised in Table 5.10 and Table 5.11 display sta-
tistically significant loadings on all four FX risk factors. Except for the case of
the FX carry factor in the long-short setting, all these factor loadings are strictly
positive. Most importantly though, the loading on the squared FX carry returns
are not significant in both regressions. Thus, the market timing rules de-facto
seem to generate exposure to the alternative risk factors momentum, volatility
and value, instead of generating genuine alpha returns. The results in this section
thus outline that the alpha that could be obtained by market timing FX carry
portfolios is eroded when comprehensive risk adjustments are being performed.
Thus, by timing the FX carry strategy we have eﬀectively loaded on other risk
factors.
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Senitivities to Rolling and Parameter Choice
In order to obtain a deeper insight into the sensitivities of our backtesting results
to the choice of the rolling procedure and the threshold parameter, we perform a
set of backtests which cover a wide range of parameter choices. More specifically,
we tested the results for
• all market timing signals used in this chapter,
• long-neutral and long-short market timing rules,
• rolling and fixed window parameter estimation and
• threshold levels ranging from 0.50 to 0.90.
The Sharpe-ratios for the 140 backtested FX carry portfolios are summarised
in Table 5.12 - Table 5.15.
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0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90
VIX 0.86 0.71 0.69 0.81 0.81
Ted Spread 0.75 0.99 0.97 1.11 1.23
2 Yr. Swap Spread 1.32 1.19 1.16 1.04 1.11
Yield Diﬀ. 0.08 0.27 0.38 0.34 0.34
Risk Metrics 0.68 0.73 0.81 0.93 0.49
Majority Vote 0.95 0.79 0.93 0.91 1.02
Avg. Signal 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.96 0.90
Table 5.12: Performance sensitivity analysis: Sharpe Ratios for various thresh-
old levels for the long-neutral market timing rule estimated with a fixed and
expanding window.
0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90
VIX 0.27 0.19 0.20 0.41 0.53
Ted Spread 0.15 0.50 0.55 0.82 1.16
2 Yr. Swap Spread 0.85 0.83 0.91 0.85 1.06
Yield Diﬀ. -0.56 -0.23 -0.03 -0.08 -0.06
Risk Metrics -0.04 0.14 0.28 0.46 0.07
Majority Vote 0.30 0.54 0.63 0.73 0.50
Avg. Signal 0.26 0.48 0.61 0.77 0.88
Table 5.13: Performance sensitivity analysis: Sharpe Ratios for various threshold
levels for the long-short market timing rule estimated with a fixed and expanding
window.
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0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90
VIX 0.47 0.72 0.83 0.90 0.95
Ted Spread 0.38 0.38 0.60 0.67 0.68
2 Yr. Swap Spread 1.05 1.11 1.01 1.13 0.94
Yield Diﬀ. 0.28 0.16 0.23 0.34 0.32
Risk Metrics 0.72 0.75 0.77 0.83 0.59
Majority Vote 0.75 0.54 0.73 0.49 0.59
Avg. Signal 0.73 0.76 0.81 0.90 0.79
Table 5.14: Performance sensitivity analysis: Sharpe Ratios for various threshold
levels for the long-neutral market timing rule estimated with a rolling window
with a constant length of 52 weeks.
0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90
VIX 0.47 0.72 0.83 0.90 0.95
Ted Spread 0.38 0.38 0.60 0.67 0.68
2 Yr. Swap Spread 1.05 1.11 1.01 1.13 0.94
Yield Diﬀ. 0.28 0.16 0.23 0.34 0.32
Risk Metrics 0.72 0.75 0.77 0.83 0.59
Majority Vote 0.80 0.57 0.54 0.70 0.66
Avg. Signal 0.73 0.76 0.81 0.90 0.79
Table 5.15: Performance sensitivity analysis: Sharpe Ratios for various threshold
levels for the long-short market timing rule estimated with a rolling window with
a constant length of 52 weeks.
Analysing the Sharpe ratios for all permutations of parameters in Table 5.12
- Table 5.15, we do not detect a particular structure or a drastic breakdown in
performance for a change in the parameters. Thus, we consider our analyses
based on a fixed window estimation of the timing rules and a threshold level of
0.70, as robust.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we developed market-timing signals using a series of risk indicators
and backtested the performance of trading FX carry portfolios with these signals.
At first glance, our results suggest that the scepticism about the feasibility of
market-timing proclaimed by eﬃcient market theorists (see Section 5.1.1) might
be misplaced, since without permitting our analysis to turn into a data-mining
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exercise 6 out of 7 market-timing signals were able to outperform the Benchmark
FX Carry Portfolio in the long-neutral setting.
On the other hand only 1 out of 7 market-timing signals was able to outper-
form the long-only benchmark when allowing long as well as short positions in
the FX carry portfolio. In fact, all market-timing signals exhibited a better risk-
adjusted performance in terms of Sharpe ratio in the long-neutral setting than
in the long-short setting. An intuitive explanation for this is that in the long-
short setting the strategies accept to pay a riskless negative yield diﬀerential (or
carry), in order to potentially improve the performance on the volatile FX return
component. The precision of the timing of the FX return component would have
to be even better than our indicators were able to achieve in order to successfully
take long as well as short positions in the FX carry trade.
As far as the interpretation of the quality of specific risk factors for FX carry
market-timing is concerned, we were able to identify the liquidity related indi-
cators as the most profitable during our backtesting period. Contrary to our
expectations (see Section 5.1.3), the novel yield diﬀerentials based timing indica-
tor (YDDIFF) performed very poorly. This means that periods of relatively low
interest rate diﬀerentials, i.e. periods which oﬀer low yield-pickup in FX carry
portfolios, are not necessarily bad for the carry trade performance and vice versa.
We partially confirm the results obtained by Dunis and Miao [2007] who
showed that trading filters based on volatility proxies could improve the perfor-
mance of FX carry strategies. The VIX and RISKM based timing signals pro-
duced enhanced trading results in terms of their Sharpe ratio in the long-neutral
setting. Unlike Dunis and Miao [2007] we find that timing FX carry trades in
a long-short setting produces poor results compared to the long-only benchmark
and the long-neutral timed FX carry portfolios.
The aggregated market-timing signals (AVGSIGNAL and MAJVOTE) were
shown to produce stable results. The performance of the aggregated timing sig-
nals were comparable to the best performing single indicators and did not suﬀer
excessively from the inclusion of poorly performing timing indicators (e.g., YD-
DIFF). These results provide some justification for eﬀorts undertaken by the
industry to construct aggregated risk indicators for foreign exchange market tim-
ing (see Section 5.1.3). As such, our findings contradict those of Vesilind [2006],
who stated that timing the FX carry trade with aggregated risk indicators does
not produce enhanced trading results.
A visual analysis of the market-timing signals (see Figure 5.3) clarifies that
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the major performance improvement comes from successfully timing the FX carry
drawdown associated with the recent credit crisis. In our dataset, the drawdowns
incurred by the FX carry trade before the credit crisis would have been very
small. Thus, we have to question whether our market-timing strategies would
have been used in practice, since the performance of the long-neutral FX carry
portfolio would have been diﬃcult to beat during the period from 1999 to 2007.
Also, including liquidity related risk factors (such as the Ted spread TEDSP and
the 2 year swap spread USSP2 ) for timing the FX carry trade is a much easier
decision today than it was before the credit crisis.
We conclude that timing the FX carry trade in a long-neutral setting promises
to enhance FX carry trade performance and that market-timing signals based on
aggregated risk factors produce robust results which are comparable to the best
single risk factors. Nevertheless we notice a lookback bias in our selection of
risk factors, since before the credit crisis we would probably have put a greater
emphasis on volatility related time series at the cost of the liquidity proxies. To
overcome the risk of considering inappropriate risk indicators in the future, we ad-
vocate a broader diversification of risk proxies when constructing the aggregated
market-timing signals.
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Chapter 6
Carry Trade Money Management
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will study how diﬀerent models for determining leverage levels
aﬀect the performance of the FX carry trade. Such a study is relevant since it has
been shown that FX traders typically execute the FX carry trade with leverage
(see Section 6.1.1). Since the seminal work by Kelly [1956] financial practitioners
and gamblers have become aware of the important eﬀect that leverage has on
the final performance of trading and gambling strategies (see Section 6.1.3). In
the following sections, we aim at providing an overview of existing literature on
leveraged FX carry trades and money management methodologies (i.e. optimal
leverage models). Subsequently, with our empirical analyses we contribute to the
very limited empirical research available on optimal leverage models for trading
systems. We will show how the choice of the leverage model substantially aﬀects
the final performance of FX carry portfolios. Also, we expose the weaknesses of
the Sharpe-ratio as a performance metric, when it comes to assessing the capital
growth of leveraged trading strategies. In order to address the shortcomings of the
Sharpe-ratio, a novel performance metric will be introduced (see Section 6.4.4).
6.1.1 The Carry Trade and Leverage
Literature provides indications that FX carry trades are often executed with
leverage (see Gagnon and Chaboud [2007] and Galati et al. [2007b]). Motivated
by this evidence Darvas [2009] analysed the impact of diﬀerent levels of leverage on
the performance of FX carry trading strategies on a monthly dataset from January
1976 to April 2008. Darvas [2009] found that the risk adjusted performance of
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FX carry strategies decreases with increasing levels of leverage. Most FX carry
strategies went bankrupt when large leverage levels were applied. Darvas [2009]
concluded that the forward rate bias ineﬃciency (see Section 3.2.3) is dependent
on the selection of the level of leverage by the investor.
We do not agree with this conclusion reached by Darvas [2009]. The fact
that excessive leverage can cause bankruptcy is a well known consequence of
overinvesting (i.e. bad money management) and is independent of the underlying
return process.
6.1.2 Empirical Applications of Kelly Criterion in Finance
Despite the good theoretical treatment of the Kelly criterion in literature, we find
few empirical studies which analyse the eﬀects of money management techniques
on the profitability of trading strategies.
Wetzer [2003] applied various money management methodologies for calcu-
lating the position sizes of trading systems based on technical trading rules and
ARIMA forecasts. By analysing the profits and losses of 280 trading systems
Wetzer [2003] showed that money management has the potential to alter the
profitability of trading systems more than a market-timing signal. Wetzer [2003]
concluded that money management should play a bigger role in finance and quan-
titative trading systems development.
Anderson and Faﬀ [2004] tested the performance of a simple technical trading
rule on five futures markets. The position sizes were computed via the optimal f
methodology proposed by Vince [1990]. 1 Similarly to Wetzer [2003], Anderson
and Faﬀ [2004] found that the performance of the trading strategy is dramati-
cally influenced by the money management strategies. Anderson and Faﬀ [2004]
concluded that money management plays a more important role in trading rule
profitability than previously considered.
6.1.3 The Kelly Criterion
Money Management is concerned with the determination of the optimal amount
of capital to invest in trading situations with positive expected returns. In his
seminal paper, Kelly [1956] presented a criterion for optimising the betting size
1 The optimal-f money management technique consists in numerically optimising the fraction
of capital to risk in a given trade, such that the unconditional expected geometric return of the
trading strategy is maximised (see Vince [1990]).
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when gambling with an informational advantage over the bookmaker. Kelly’s
concepts have been understood very quickly by the gambling community. The
first published system for beating the casino game of Blackjack (see Thorp [1962])
was based on a combination of card counting techniques and a variable bet sizing
methodology based on Kelly’s criterion.2
Kelly recognised that a gambler should address two main objectives when
determining the optimal amount of capital to place on a specific bet. These ob-
jectives are expected return maximisation on one hand, and capital preservation
on the other hand. Both objectives represent a tradeoﬀ. The expected return of
a bet with positive expectancy is maximised by betting the maximum possible
amount. But betting a too large amount would almost surely cause the gamblers
ruin since, no matter how large his edge might be, in the long run he would lose
his entire capital during a sequence of losing bets. The Kelly criterion (see Kelly
[1956]) solves the return-security tradeoﬀ by determining the optimal amount of
capital to put at stake such that the long term capital growth is maximised.3
The wealth distribution generated by sizing bets according of the Kelly cri-
terion has been shown to possess positive characteristics. MacLean et al. [1992]
proved that the expected wealth generated by the Kelly strategy is superior to the
wealth produced by any other money management system, Hakansson and Miller
[1975] showed that the Kelly strategy never risks ruin, and Algoet and Cover
[1988] showed that the Kelly strategy minimises the expected time to achieve a
given investment objective.
On the other hand, managing position sizes according to the Kelly criterion
also entails some drawbacks for real-world investment situations. Following Thorp
[2006], the Kelly strategy can be very risky in the short term. Several studies (see
e.g. Kahneman and Tversky [1979], Ert and Erev [2008] and Kahneman et al.
[1990]) have demonstrated that the human brain associates a larger relevance
to the experience of losses versus the experience of gains. Thus, the high level
of risk inherent to Kelly position sizing models, would cause investors to prefer
other investment opportunities trading some of the expected wealth generated by
the Kelly strategy against more security. The utility function that leads to the
Kelly criterion would only be suitable for investors with an absolutely risk-neutral
2Poundstone [2005] contains a popular treatment of the application of the Kelly criterion in
gambling and finance.
3The focus on long term performance diﬀerentiates the Kelly criterion fromModern Portfolio
Theory MPT, which is based on optimal one-period investment decisions (see Markowitz [1952]).
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attitude to risk, and is thus not appropriate for most subjects.
Moreover, MacLean and Ziemba [1999] noted that the optimal position sizes
computed by the Kelly strategy are sensitive to estimation errors in the model
inputs, and that investing more than the optimal amount lowers the expected
capital growth while increasing risk.
A practical solution to the danger of overinvesting and the high volatility
inherent to the Kelly strategy, would be to trade growth for security through
investing only a fraction of the optimal Kelly position size. Some authors propose
to invest half of the optimal Kelly-amount, while others even advocate to size the
position down to one fourth of the optimal Kelly position size (see McDonnell
[2008] and Thorp [2006]).
Formalizing the Kelly Criterion In the following we will formalise the
intuition behind the Kelly criterion. Firstly, we define a random variable Ht as
the percentage of the current amount of capital Ct relative to the previos period
capital Ct−1. Furthermore, the return on the capital in period t is modeled as the
position size f multiplied with a random variable Rt, whose distribution will not
be specified here.
Ht =
Ct
Ct−1
= 1 + fRt (6.1)
If in t = 0 an investor had a given amount of capital C0, and was to play
this investment game a given number of periods T while reinvesting the previous
periods winnings, his final capital CT would amount to:
CT = C0
T￿
t=1
Ht (6.2)
The objective of the Kelly criterion is to maximise the long-run rate of capital
growth. By rearranging CT = C0eTGT , we define the exponential rate of growth
of the capital GT as:
GT =
1
T
log(
CT
C0
) (6.3)
By inserting Equation 6.2 into Equation 6.3, we get:
GT =
1
T
T￿
i=t
log(Ht) (6.4)
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If we assume that the random variables Ht=1,..,T form a sequence of indepen-
dent and identically distributed random variables, we can apply the law of large
numbers and find:
lim
T→∞
GT = E[log(H)] (6.5)
Thus, in order to maximise the growth function
g(f) = E[log(H(f))] (6.6)
with respect to f , we set
dg
df
= 0. (6.7)
Solving this term for f yields the optimal fraction of capital f ∗ to put at risk.
The Traditional Kelly Formula The first Kelly formulas for determining
growth-optimal betting sizes f ∗ were presented by Kelly [1956] and, in a more
general way, Thorp [1969]. These ’traditional’ Kelly formulas are suitable for bets
with two distinct outcomes (WIN and LOSE), known probabilities for these
outcomes (pWIN and pLOSE = 1− pWIN) and a fixed payout ratio B, defined as
the ratio of the amount won in case of a successful bet to the amount wagered
for that bet. In that case the random variable Rt (see Equation 6.1) is:
Rt = (1 +B)Xt − 1 (6.8)
where P (X = 1) = pWIN and P (X = 0) = pLOSE. The corresponding growth
function is given by (see Thorp [1969]):
g(f) = pWIN ln(1 + fB) + (1− pWIN)ln(1− f). (6.9)
We can easily compute dgdf by applying the chain rule. Solving
dg
df = 0 for f
yields the well known Kelly formula:
f ∗ = pWIN − 1− pWIN
B
(6.10)
In his original paper, Kelly [1956] presented the derivation for the special case
where the payoﬀs of winning and losing are equal (i..e B = 1): The solution to
this case is nested in the more general Equation 6.10:
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f ∗ = pWIN − pLOSS (6.11)
The Kelly Formula for Gaussian Return Distributions In the finan-
cial markets, an investment typically has many potential outcomes rather than
just a few.4 Thus, the popular Kelly formulas presented above (Equation 6.10
and Equation 6.11) are not ideally suited for the domain of securities trading.
This leads to the use of continuous instead of discrete probability distributions.
Thorp [2006] derived a solution for the Kelly formula which assumes normally
distributed securities returns and accounts for a risk free interest rate i. The
random variable H in a specific period t would then be modelled as:
Ht = 1 + (1− f)it + fRt, (6.12)
where it is the available risk free interest rate at time t and Rt ∼ N (µt, σ2t ).
Following Thorp [2006], the growth function for such a process can be approxi-
mated by:
g(f) = i+ f ∗ (µ− i)− σ
2f 2
2
(6.13)
The growth-optimal position size f ∗ can then be computed by solving
dg
df
= µ− i− σ2f = 0, (6.14)
i.e.:
f ∗ =
µ− i
σ2
(6.15)
6.2 Contributions
According to Ziemba [2003], the two central aspects of an investment strategy are
a) when to invest (i.e. signal generation) and b) how much to invest (i.e. money
management). Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 focused on optimal ways to implement
FX carry trades and thus address the signal generation aspect of the strategy.
In the remainder of this chapter we will examine the eﬀect of diﬀerent money
management methodologies on the profitability of FX carry portfolios.
4An exception being the trading of derivatives with a binary payout, e.g. digital options.
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The first part of our empirical analysis consists in testing the performance
of FX carry portfolios traded with constant leverage levels ranging from 0.5 to
10, a methodology similar to the one adopted by Darvas [2009]. We will select
three constantly-leveraged FX carry portfolios and use them as benchmarks to
assess adaptive time-varying leverage models based on the Kelly criterion (see
Section 6.4.2). Furthermore, the sequential backtest of constantly leveraged FX
carry portfolios will serve as an illustration of the eﬀects that leverage can have
on trading performance.
The following empirical research adds to the limited body of research quan-
tifying the impact of money management strategies on trading strategy perfor-
mance. Furthermore, this research expands on research initiated by Darvas [2009]
on the eﬀects of leverage on the returns generated by professional FX managers.
The performance of leveraged FX carry strategies during the recent credit crisis
should oﬀer new insights into the maximum leverage which FX carry portfolios
can withstand during periods with high drawdowns.
In Section 6.4.2 we propose extensions to the Kelly formula for gaussian return
processes. The extensions allow for a practical management of the problems of
overinvesting and high short-term risk inherent to the Kelly strategy.
6.3 Data
We perform simulations of leveraged FX carry portfolios on a weekly data set
from 10.12.1999 to 05.03.2010. In the following, we briefly outline the data base
for the research in this chapter.
6.3.1 The Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio
The starting point for the analyses of our dynamical position sizing algorithms
is the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio. Details concerning the raw data sources,
the methodology and the performance of the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio are
outlined in Appendix A.
The portfolio yield diﬀerentials inherent to the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio
(see Section A.5), as well as the RiskMetrics conditional volatility estimates of this
portfolio (see Section A.5) will serve as central inputs for the money management
methodology outlined in Section 6.4.2.
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6.3.2 Risk Indicators
The risk indicators 2-Year U.S. Swap Spread (USSP2), Ted Spread (TEDSP) and
CBOE S&P 500 Volatility Index (VIX) will serve as inputs for the construction
of confidence measures for FX carry trade profitability (see Section 6.4.3). For a
detailed description of these time series we refer to Section 5.3.2.
6.4 Methodology
6.4.1 Constant Leverage Levels for FX Carry Trading
We will compute the performance of FX carry portfolios with constant leverage
levels ranging from 0.5 to 10 in 0.5 increments. Thus, we apply the method-
ology proposed by Darvas [2009] on the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio (see
Appendix A). The portfolio weights to these leveraged FX carry strategies will
be computed according to:
wBMCPt,f = f ∗wBMCPt (6.16)
Where wBMCPt,f denotes the current vector of portfolio weights for a given
leverage level f (f = 0.5, 1, 1.5, ..., 10), and wBMCPt denotes the current portfolio
weights vector of the simple Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio (see Section A.2).
The leveraged FX carry portfolio performance will then be computed according
to the methodology described in Section A.3 and Appendix B.
6.4.2 A Time-varying Leverage Model based on the Kelly
Formula
We propose a time-varying leverage model based on the Kelly formula for contin-
uous gaussian return processes (see Equation 6.15). Since FX carry portfolios are
fully self financed, we can omit the risk free interest rate it from Equation 6.15
and get:
f ∗t =
µt
σ2t
(6.17)
Since we keep the assumption of the spot exchange rates following a random
walk, the expected FX carry portfolio returns µˆt consist of the yield diﬀerentials of
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the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio in each week t (see Section A.5). We estimate
the FX carry portfolio variances σˆ2t by the RiskMetrics exponential smoothing
methodology (see Section A.5).
In order to allow for a more conservative strategy than the Kelly criterion,
we extend the money management formula to allow for fractional Kelly position
sizing, as advocated by some authors in literature (see Section 6.1.3). This is
achieved by multiplying the f ∗t ’s by a constant risk appetite factor c (0 ≤ c ≤ 1).
Errors in the estimation of the input parameters of the Kelly formula can lead
to overinvesting (see Section 6.1.3). We address this problem by weighting the
expected returns for the FX carry portfolio µˆt by the confidence measures κI,t,
with 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1. These confidence measures will assume small values when the
FX carry portfolio is expected to perform badly, and large values when the FX
carry portfolio is expected to perform well. We will discuss our choice for the κ
factors in Section 6.4.3.
Thus, the extended money management formula based on the Kelly criterion
becomes:
f ∗t (I, c) =
µˆtκI,t
σˆ2t
c (6.18)
We test 15 time-varying leverage models for all combinations of c = (14 ,
1
2 , 1)
and I = (NAIV E,USSP2, TEDSP, V IX,AV G) on the Benchmark FX Carry
Portfolio. The portfolio weights of the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio will be
multiplied by the leverage levels computed by Equation 6.18:
wBMCPt (I, c) = f
∗
t (I, c) ∗wBMCPt (6.19)
The leveraged FX carry portfolio performance will then be computed accord-
ing to the methodology described in Section A.3 and Appendix B.
Figure 6.1 depicts the optimal time-varying leverage levels for all confidence
measures and c = 1.
The Normality Assumption in Dynamical Leverage Models The
assumption of normally distributed returns for financial market data is typically
not confirmed by empirical financial data. Stylised facts about financial returns
which are not accurately described by a gaussian distribution include heavy tails,
gain/loss asymmetries and volatility clustering (see e.g. Cont [2001]).
So how can the application of Equation 6.18 for determining growth-optimal
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Figure 6.1: Time-varying Leverage Levels computed according to f ∗t (I, c) =
µˆtκI,t
σˆ2t
c with the Parameters I = NAIV E and c = 1 (PANEL A); I = USSP2
and c = 1 (PANEL B); I = TEDSP and c = 1 (PANEL C); I = V IX and c = 1
(PANEL D); I = AV G and c = 1 (PANEL E).
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leverage sizes be justified, given that it originates from the assumption of normally
distributed returns?
As we have outlined in Section 6.1.3, Thorp [2006] derived the analytical
solution to the Kelly criterion for normally distributed returns. 5
Thus, the main advantage in assuming normally distributed returns, is that
this assumption allows for an elegant analytical solution to the Kelly criterion.
The closed form solution to the Kelly formula for gaussian returns allows us
to empirically test and analyse conditional optimal leverage techniques instead
of relying on historical unconditional data, thereby contributing to the limited
empirical literature on the subject.
Nevertheless, we argue that as conditional dynamic leverage models become
more established in literature, future research should aim at studying these tech-
niques based on returns distributions which more appropriately describe asset
price returns. An interesting approach on the Kelly criterion with alternative
returns distributions has been presented by Osorio [2008], who investigated the
eﬀect of fat-tails and investor risk aversion on optimal leverage levels. Osorio
[2008] developed a procedure for determining the optimal Kelly-leverage for t-
distributed returns, since the t-distribution matches empirical properties of fi-
nancial time series such as positive excess kurtosis, a power-law tail behavior,
and near-normal behavior in the central part of the probability distribution func-
tion. In his numerical experiments Osorio [2008] finds that the optimal leverage
levels of the Kelly model are lower when the tails of the distribution are fatter or
the investors level of risk aversion increases. Nevertheless, Osorio [2008] does not
provide trading strategy simulations based on his optimal conditional leverage
model.
6.4.3 Confidence Measures for FX Carry Trade Profitabil-
ity based on Risk Factors
In the following we describe how we construct the confidence measures which will
be used as κ inputs to the time varying money management formula Equation 6.18
(see Section 6.4.2).
The three risk indicators (see Section 6.3.2) are processed into rolling p-values
5As other popular models used in mathematical finance are often based on the assump-
tion of normally distributed returns for analogeous reasons (e.g. Modern Portfolio Theory
(Markowitz [1952]), the Black-Scholes options pricing model (Black and Scholes [1973]) or the
Black-Litterman portolio optimisation model (Black and Litterman [1992]).
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φ according to the methodology described in Section 5.4.1. In order to represent a
suitable confidence measure for the profitability of FX carry trades κ, we perform
the following computations:
κI,t = 1− φI,t (6.20)
Where I indicates the risk indicator (USSP2,TEDSP or V IX) and t is the
actual time-period. Furthermore, we compute an aggregated confidence measure
κAV G by taking the average confidence measure of the three risk indicators:
κAV G,t =
κUSSP2,t + κTEDSP,t + κV IX,t
3
(6.21)
Also, we define a naive confidence measure (I = NAIV E) which will assume
a constant value of 1:
κNAIV E,t = 1 (6.22)
The values of the confidence measures κ are by construction bounded between
zero and unity. We expect low values in the confidence measures to coincide with
periods of FX carry trade underperformance. Conversely high confidence measure
values should coincide with positive FX carry returns.6
For this piece of research we have chosen to utilise confidence measures based
on the risk factors used for the carry timing analyses performed in Chapter 5.
The test results which were discussed in Chapter 5 (see Section 5.5) showed, that
most of the risk indicators were able to outperform the long-only FX carry portfo-
lio. In order to mantain a coherent framework we thus integrate these indicators
as heuristic confidence measures in this chapter. We note that probabilistic fore-
casting models7 would be formally more adequate since they are able to directly
model the probability of the FX carry trade perfroming well in the next period.
We thus point out that such models should be considered for further research and
in extensions of our proposed approach.
6For a discussion on the expected relationship between the risk indicators and FX carry
trade returns we refer to Section 5.1.3.
7E.g. Logit/Probit Models (see Hosmer and Lemeshow [2000]), Nearest Neigbour Models
(see Bishop [2006]) and Artificial Neural Networks (see Zimmermann and Rehkugler [1994]).
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6.4.4 A Performance Measure for evaluating Capital Growth
with respect to Risk
In this section we aim to introduce a novel performance metric which addresses
some of the shortcomings of the Sharpe ratio (see Section B.3). The Sharpe ratio
constitutes a standard risk-adjusted performance measure for trading strategies.
Since its computation is based on arithmetic mean returns, it is not suitable
for assessing the long term growth potential of trading strategies. The Sharpe
ratio performs a risk adjustment by dividing the excess returns by the standard
deviation of returns. Arguably, the standard deviation does not consititute an
appropriate measure of risk for trading strategies since asset returns have been
shown not to follow a gaussian distribution (see Cont [2001]).
We postulate that an enhanced performance metric should be able to as-
sess the performance of alternative position sizing methodologies by considering
capital growth (i.e. the geometric mean return) as well as adjusting for risk in
order to reflect the risk-aversion ordinarily displayed by speculators (see Kahne-
man et al. [1990]). Naturally, we would expect the performance measure to be
increasing with respect to the capital growth. Also, the performance measure
should decrease with respect to capital losses and risk. Following prospect theory
(see Kahneman and Tversky [1979]), the utility function that speculators pos-
sess with regards to capital losses is convex. To embody this feature, the second
derivative of the performance measure with respect to losses should be strictly
positive.
Moreover, the same underlying trading strategy should display diﬀerent per-
formance metrics for changing constant leverage levels, since the absolute level
of leverage aﬀects the properties of a given trading strategies wealth distribution
(see e.g. Darvas [2009]). As we will confirm in the empirical results throughout
the following sections, the Sharpe ratio fails to satisfy this requirement, since
leverage aﬀects the arithmetic return and the standard deviation linearly and
with the same multiplier.
As a proxy for the risk of a trading strategy we choose the maximum drawdown
measure (see Section B.5). The maximum drawdown measure constitutes an
arguably better risk measure than the standard deviation, since it does not suﬀer
from the drawbacks associated with the stylised facts observed in financial data
as the non-normality of asset returns and potential serial correlation within those
returns (see e.g. Alexander and Baptista [2006]). We consider the maximum
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drawdown measure as particularly appropriate since it accurately measures how
much capital has been lost by a trading strategy during its the worst losing streak.
Also, the maximum drawdown is capped at unity. When a trading strategy
exhibits a maximum drawdown of unity, the maximum capital that was lost by
that trading strategy was 100%. In such a case the strategy went bankrupt and
the performance measure should discard the trading strategy.
In order to assess the performance of the leveraged FX carry portfolios under
consideration of their growth potential and their risk as measured by the maxi-
mum drawdown while satisfying all of the features described above, we define a
novel performance measure drawdown-adjusted-growth (DAG) as:
DAG = max(−log(MAX.DD) ∗ rg, 0) (6.23)
Where rg is the annualised geometric return of the strategy and MAX.DD
denotes the maximum drawdown in percent.8 The performance measure in Equa-
tion 6.23 has the following desirable properties:
• DAG rises as the geometric return rg rises, i.e.
dDAG
drg > 0 ∀rg >= 0.
• DAG falls as the maximum drawdown rises, i.e.
dDAG
dMAX.DD < 0.
• The second derivative of the DAG with respect to losses is strictly positive
d2DAG
dMAX.DD2 > 0.
• DAG assumes a zero-value when the strategy leads to bankruptcy, i.e.
DAG(MAX.DD = 1.00) = 0.
• DAG assumes a zero-value when the strategy exhibits a negative capital
growth, i.e.
DAG(rg <= 0) = 0.
• DAG approaches infinity if the growth is positive and the maximum draw-
down approaches zero, i.e.
limMAX.DD→0DAG(GR > 0,MAX.DD) =∞.
8See Appendix B for the methodology behind the computation of the geometric return and
the maximum drawdown metrics.
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TheDAG performance measure severely penalises large drawdowns and volatil-
ity while rewarding capital growth. Thus, the DAG represents a methodology
for evaluating trading strategies according to risk-adjusted-growth. DAG values
of zero indicate that the strategy will invariably lead to bankruptcy in the long
run and should therefore not be implemented in practice.
6.4.5 Statistical Tests for Carry-Alpha andMarket-Timing
Ability
Analogeous to the methodology adopted in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we will
benchmark the diﬀerent money management methodologies against the Bench-
mark FX carry portfolio (see Appendix A). In order to test for the existence
of carry-alpha, we will run regressions of the form Rt = α + βFt + ￿t, outlined
in Section 4.4.4. Furthermore, we will test for the existence of a market-timing
eﬀect in the money management models by estimating regressions of the form:
Rt = α+ βFt + γF 2t + ￿t, outlined in Section 5.4.2.
6.5 Empirical Results
6.5.1 Constant Leverage Levels
In this section we will present the results of sequentially backtesting FX carry
portfolios with diﬀerent constant leverage levels.
Figure 6.2 depicts the development of 100 EUR starting capital invested in
the constantly leveraged FX carry portfolios. Figure 6.2 visualises the eﬀect that
overleveraging can have on the equity curve of a trading strategy: During periods
of stable and positive returns, highly leveraged strategies will generate very high
absolute returns. The FX carry strategy with a constant leverage of 10 reached
a maximum equity of 20, 900.50 EUR on the 20th of July 2007. On the other
hand overinvesting will, in the long run, cause large equity drawdowns and in the
worst case bankruptcy. We already ascertained that the FX carry trade suﬀered
a high drawdown phase during the credit crisis (see Section 4.6 and Section A.3).
Figure 6.2 visualises the dramatic eﬀect of this drawdown phase on the equity of
the highly leveraged FX carry strategies. At the end of our backtesting period
on the 05th of March 2010 the equity of the FX carry portfolio with a constant
leverage level of 10 was only at 15 EUR (i.e. the strategy lost 99.93% from its
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peak on the 20th of July 2007).
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Figure 6.2: Capital Growth of 100 EUR for FX Carry Portfolios with Constant
Leverage Levels f=0.50, 1.00, 1.50, ..., 10.00.
Figure 6.3 depicts the annualised geometric returns GR (PANEL A), the
maximum drawdown measures MAX.DD (PANEL B) and the DAG measures
(PANEL C) of the constantly leveraged FX carry portfolios. The performance
metrics in Figure 6.3 quantify the eﬀect that diﬀerent leverage levels had on the
FX carry portfolios performance during our backtesting period from. The high-
est capital growth would have been generated by the FX carry portfolio with a
constant leverage level of 5.5 (see Figure 6.3, PANEL A). Portfolios with a higher
leverage than 5.5 would have produced a smaller capital growth at a higher risk
than the portfolios with a lower leverage than 5.5. Leverage levels over 9 would
have generated a negative capital growth, even though the unleveraged FX carry
portfolio strategy exhibited a positive mean return. PANEL B of Figure 6.3 de-
picts the maximum drawdowns for the diﬀerent leverage levels. As visualised
by the equity lines in Figure 6.2, the drawdowns increase as the leverage in-
creases. The highest leverage levels generate maximum drawdown levels very
near to unity (which would signify total loss of capital). In PANEL C of Fig-
ure 6.3, the risk-adjusted performance measure drawdown-adjusted-growth DAG
(see Section 6.4.4) is depicted in relation to the applied leverage levels. We find
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the maximum value of the DAG at a constant leverage level of 1.5.
This sequence of backtests thus exemplifies the reason behind the propaga-
tion of fractional Kelly approaches by various authors (see Section 6.1.3). The
parabolic form of the growth function g(f) in PANEL A of Figure 6.3 oﬀers an
intuitive understanding of the Kelly criterion: A positive expectancy strategy has
a specific optimal fraction f ∗ which generates maximum wealth over time. Over-
leveraging would be highly ineﬃcient, since a) a lower geometric return will be
achieved (see PANEL A in Figure 6.3) and b) this lower return could be achieved
by adopting a lower risk (see PANEL A and PANEL C in Figure 6.3). The risk-
adjusted DAG measure provides a methodology for selecting portfolios with high
growth rates and low risk as measured by the maximum drawdown metric.
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Figure 6.3: Performance Metrics for the FX Carry Portfolios with Constant Lever-
age Levels (PANEL A: Annualised Geometric Return GR; PANEL B: Maximum
Drawdown MAX.DD; PANEL C: Drawdown Adjusted Growth DAG).
We select three constantly leveraged FX carry portfolios for further compar-
ison with the time-varying leverage models (see Section 6.5.2). These portfolios
have constant leverage levels of:
• 1.0 : This is the standard leverage level used in the previous chapters of
this research.
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• 1.5 : This is the constant leverage level with the highest DAG measure.
• 5.5 : This is the constant leverage level with the highest growth rate as
measured by the annualised geometric return.
We stress that the leverage levels 1.5 and 5.5 are selected with hindsight.
Nevertheless we will use them as benchmarks to assess the time-varying leverage
models.
6.5.2 Time-varying Leverage Levels
Table 6.1 summarises the average leverage level fAV G and the performance metrics
annualised geometric return GR, maximum drawdown MAX.DD, drawdown-
adjusted-growth DAG and Sharpe ratio SR inherent to the FX carry portfo-
lios traded with the time-varying leverage model and 3 constant leverage money
management models. The equity lines resulting from applying the time-varying
leverage levels to the FX carry portfolio are depicted in Figure 6.4.
An analysis of the performance metrics in Table 6.1 reveals that the Kelly
based money management models performed better than the FX carry portfo-
lios with constant leverage levels. Most Kelly based money management models
generated higher annualised geometric returns than the constant leverage mod-
els. An assessment of the money management strategies according to the risk
adjusted performance measures drawdown-adjusted-growth DAG and Sharpe ra-
tio SR results in an even clearer outperformance of the Kelly based strategies
versus the constant leverage models. The best Kelly based money management
strategy in terms of the DAG metric is the one with the parameter combination
(I = USSP2, c = 1.00) with a DAG value of 0.2968 and a corresponding Sharpe
ratio of 1.18. In contrast, the best constantly leveraged FX carry portfolio is the
model with a constant leverage level of 1.5. This portfolio exhibited a DAG value
of 0.0726 and a Sharpe ratio of 0.64.
The results summarised in Table 6.1 also illustrate the high level of risk asso-
ciated to the full Kelly strategy with the non-informative confidence measure (i.e.
I = NAIV E and c = 1.00). The high maximum drawdown of 94.01% is respon-
sible for a very low DAG value of 0.0143. Thus, despite the decent Sharpe ratio
of 0.72, we would not recommend this type of strategy in multi period investment
situations. Similar results are generated by the full Kelly strategy with the con-
fidence measure based on the CBOE S&P 500 Volatility Index (i.e. c = 1.00 and
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I = V IX). While the strategy generates a good Sharpe ratio of 0.75 and a high
capital growth of 23.60% per annum, the high maximum drawdown of 76.62%
and the low DAG value of 0.0628 indicate the excessive risk inherent to the full
Kelly strategy with I = V IX. As the risk appetite factor c assumes lower values,
the risk-adjusted performance metrics of these strategies improve. We observe
that the most profitable strategies assume their maximum DAG value at higher
values of c than the more volatile and less profitable strategies. Since future
strategy performances are not known, we would suggest to set the risk appetite
coeﬃcient at a conservative level (i.e., c < 1).
Overall, weighting the expected return estimate µˆ with confidence measures
based on risk factors enhances the risk-adjusted performance metrics of the time-
varying leverage strategies. For all levels of risk appetite c, the Kelly strategies
weighted with confidence measures based on risk factors (I=USSP2, TEDSP ,
V IX, AV G) outperform the non-informative confidence measure (I = NAIV E)
in terms of drawdown-adjusted-growth DAG and Sharpe ratio SR. As far as the
suitability of specific risk factors as confidence measures for FX carry portfolios is
concerned, we find that the best results were generated by the 2-Year U.S. Swap
Spread risk factor (USSP2). The average confidence measure (AV G) produced
good and robust results (only second to I = USSP2 in therms of the Sharpe
ratio SR).
Leverage Parameter fAVG rg MAX.DD DAG SR
Constant 1.0 1.00 0.0589 0.2983 0.0712 0.64
Constant 1.5 1.50 0.0845 0.4234 0.0726 0.64
Constant 5.5 5.50 0.1854 0.9332 0.0128 0.64
Time-varying I=NAIVE,c=1.00 7.50 0.2315 0.9401 0.0143 0.72
Time-varying I=USSP2,c=1.00 4.49 0.3830 0.4608 0.2968 1.18
Time-varying I=TEDSP,c=1.00 4.09 0.2503 0.4381 0.2066 0.89
Time-varying I=VIX,c=1.00 5.09 0.2360 0.7662 0.0628 0.75
Time-varying I=AVG,c=1.00 4.56 0.3073 0.5422 0.1881 1.00
Time-varying I=NAIVE,c=0.50 3.75 0.1753 0.6680 0.0707 0.72
Time-varying I=USSP2,c=0.50 2.25 0.2109 0.2464 0.2954 1.18
Time-varying I=TEDSP,c=0.50 2.05 0.1415 0.2339 0.2055 0.89
Time-varying I=VIX,c=0.50 2.54 0.1483 0.4824 0.1081 0.75
Time-varying I=AVG,c=0.50 2.28 0.1729 0.3092 0.2029 1.00
Time-varying I=NAIVE,c=0.25 1.88 0.1011 0.3883 0.0956 0.72
Time-varying I=USSP2,c=0.25 1.12 0.1102 0.1271 0.2272 1.18
Time-varying I=TEDSP,c=0.25 1.02 0.0747 0.1206 0.1580 0.89
Time-varying I=VIX,c=0.25 1.27 0.0813 0.2700 0.1065 0.75
Time-varying I=AVG,c=0.25 1.14 0.0911 0.1648 0.1643 1.00
Table 6.1: Performance Metrics of Constant and Time-varying Leverage Mod-
els for FX Carry Portfolio Money Management (fAV G: Average Leverage Level,
rg: Annualized Geometric Return, MAX.DD=Maximum Drawdown, DAG:
Drawdown-Adjusted-Growth Measure, SR: Sharpe Ratio)
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Figure 6.4: Capital Growth of 100 EUR for FX Carry Portfolios with Time-
varying Leverage Levels computed according to f ∗t (I, c) =
µˆtκI,t
σˆ2t
c with the Pa-
rameters I = NAIV E,USSP2, TEDSP, V IX,AV G and c = 1.00 (PANEL A);
c = 0.50 (PANEL B); c = 0.25 (PANEL C)
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The results of the regressions for carry-alpha and market-timing ability of the
money management models are summarised in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3.
The constantly leveraged FX carry portfolios by construction exhibit no carry-
alpha, and a carry-beta equal to the constant leverage level inherent to the specific
portfolio (see Table 6.2 and Table 6.3). Similarly, the Kelly-based money man-
agement strategies, exhibit α and β coeﬃcients which increase proportionally to
the value of the risk appetite factor c. All Kelly strategies exhibit positive beta
coeﬃcients, with the Kelly strategy weighted by the non-informative confidence
measure (I = NAIV E) displaying the highest beta estimates (respectively 1.26,
2.51 and 5.02 for settings of c of 0.25, 0.50 and 1.00).
The Kelly strategies with confidence measures based on the risk factors USSP2,
TEDSP and AV G exhibit a statistically significant positive α coeﬃcient at a
significance level of 5%. Also the Kelly strategies weighted with the confidence
measures NAIV E and V IX exhibit a positive alpha coeﬃcient, albeit not at a
statistically significant level.
By examining the results in Table 6.3, we find that these statistically signifi-
cant positive carry-alpha coeﬃcients disappear when the regressions are extended
with a market-timing term γF 2t . The carry-alpha produced by the Kelly-based
money management strategies is now captured by the market-timing coeﬃcient
γ, which is now statistically significantly positive for Kelly strategies with the
confidence measures I = USSP2, TEDSP, V IX,AV G. The non-informative
confidence measure (I = NAIV E) retains a relatively high alpha value, albeit
not statistically significant, while being the only one that exhibits a negative
market-timing term (also at a non significant level).
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we examined the eﬀect of various money management strategies
on the equity of FX carry portfolios.
In a first step, we tested the performance of trading the Benchmark FX Carry
Portfolio (see Appendix A) with constant leverage levels ranging from 0.5 to 10.
During the analysed data period, we find that a constant leverage level of 5.5
would have produced the highest capital growth, while a constant leverage level
of 1.5 would have been optimal according to the risk-adjusted performance crite-
rion DAG (see Section 6.5.1). Still, we would not advocate to select the leverage
level for FX carry trades according to this methodology. Firstly, the leverage
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Leverage Parameter α Pr(> |tα|) β Pr(> |tβ |)
Constant 1.0 -0.0000 1.00 1.00 0.00
Constant 1.5 0.0000 0.56 1.50 0.00
Constant 5.0 0.0000 0.01 5.50 0.00
Time-varying I=NAIVE,c=1.00 0.0026 0.28 5.02 0.00
Time-varying I=USSP2,c=1.00 0.0061 0.00 2.22 0.00
Time-varying I=TEDSP,c=1.00 0.0036 0.04 2.01 0.00
Time-varying I=VIX,c=1.00 0.0036 0.13 2.63 0.00
Time-varying I=AVG,c=1.00 0.0046 0.01 2.29 0.00
Time-varying I=NAIVE,c=0.50 0.0013 0.28 2.51 0.00
Time-varying I=USSP2,c=0.50 0.0031 0.00 1.11 0.00
Time-varying I=TEDSP,c=0.50 0.0018 0.04 1.00 0.00
Time-varying I=VIX,c=0.50 0.0018 0.13 1.32 0.00
Time-varying I=AVG,c=0.50 0.0023 0.01 1.14 0.00
Time-varying I=NAIVE,c=0.25 0.0006 0.28 1.26 0.00
Time-varying I=USSP2,c=0.25 0.0015 0.00 0.56 0.00
Time-varying I=TEDSP,c=0.25 0.0009 0.04 0.50 0.00
Time-varying I=VIX,c=0.25 0.0009 0.13 0.66 0.00
Time-varying I=AVG,c=0.25 0.0011 0.01 0.57 0.00
Table 6.2: Regression Results for the Factor Model Rt = α + βFt + ￿t (Ft =
Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio Returns, Rt = Money Managed Carry Portfolio
Returns).
Leverage Parameter α Pr(> |tα|) β Pr(> |tβ |) γ Pr(> |tγ |)
Constant 1.0 -0.0000 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.37
Constant 1.5 0.0000 0.58 1.50 0.00 -0.00 0.62
Constant 5.5 0.0000 0.01 5.50 0.00 -0.00 0.10
Time-varying I=NAIVE,c=1.00 0.0039 0.12 4.92 0.00 -6.28 0.13
Time-varying I=USSP2,c=1.00 0.0030 0.14 2.46 0.00 14.84 0.00
Time-varying I=TEDSP,c=1.00 0.0009 0.63 2.21 0.00 12.70 0.00
Time-varying I=VIX,c=1.00 -0.0000 0.99 2.91 0.00 16.98 0.00
Time-varying I=AVG,c=1.00 0.0014 0.46 2.53 0.00 14.81 0.00
Time-varying I=NAIVE,c=0.50 0.0020 0.12 2.46 0.00 -3.14 0.13
Time-varying I=USSP2,c=0.50 0.0015 0.14 1.23 0.00 7.42 0.00
Time-varying I=TEDSP,c=0.50 0.0004 0.63 1.11 0.00 6.35 0.00
Time-varying I=VIX,c=0.50 -0.0000 0.99 1.46 0.00 8.49 0.00
Time-varying I=AVG,c=0.50 0.0007 0.46 1.26 0.00 7.40 0.00
Time-varying I=NAIVE,c=0.25 0.0010 0.12 1.23 0.00 -1.57 0.13
Time-varying I=USSP2,c=0.25 0.0007 0.14 0.62 0.00 3.71 0.00
Time-varying I=TEDSP,c=0.25 0.0002 0.63 0.55 0.00 3.17 0.00
Time-varying I=VIX,c=0.25 -0.0000 0.99 0.73 0.00 4.25 0.00
Time-varying I=AVG,c=0.25 0.0004 0.46 0.63 0.00 3.70 0.00
Table 6.3: Regression Results for the Factor Model Rt = α+βFt+γF 2t +￿t (Ft =
Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio Returns, Rt = Money Managed Carry Portfolio
Returns).
levels of 5.5 and 1.5 are selected with hindsight after having analysed the perfor-
mance of 20 diﬀerent leverage levels. Secondly, the drawdowns associated with
these historically optimal constant leverage levels are very large (42.34% with a
leverage of 1.5 and 93.32% with a leverage of 5.5). In addition, Figure 6.2 pro-
vides an intuitive visualisation of how a historical optimisation of leverage levels
could have drawn an investor to select an excessive leverage level in the period
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preceding the credit crisis: Before the credit crisis, the maximum growth level
would have been generated at a leverage level far above 10 (the maximum growth
would be located in a leverage region outside the margins of Figure 6.2). Thus
a reliance on the historically optimal constant leverage level would have caused
highly leveraged speculators to go bankrupt during the large FX carry trade
drawdown inherent to the credit crisis. By referring to an interview with an FX
hedge fund manager held in April 2009 (see Appendix C), we posit that some FX
hedge funds may have committed the mistake of optimising their leverage levels
for the FX carry trade historically, and thus were forced to liquidate after having
incurred amplified drawdowns during the credit crisis.
In our second empirical analyses in this chapter we focused on the perfor-
mance of time-varying leverage models based on the Kelly criterion. Notorious
weaknesses of the Kelly criterion for determining optimal leverage levels are
• the high short-term risk associated with the Kelly strategy, and
• the danger of overleveraging due to erroneous estimation of the input pa-
rameters return µˆ and variance σˆ2 (see Section 6.1.3).
In Section 6.4.2 we suggested extensions to the Kelly formula that address
these issues. We computed and tested various time-varying leverage levels based
on diﬀerent parameters for the extended Kelly formula. Our results suggest that
applying the time-varying leverage model produces enhanced results over the
constant leverage models in terms of geometric return and drawdown-adjusted
geometric return (see Section 6.5.2). The risk-adjusted performances of the worst
time-varying leverage models improve, as the risk appetite factor c assumes lower
values (see Section 6.4.2). Thus, we confirm the validity of the heuristic proposed
by e.g., Thorp [2006] and Ziemba [2003] of reducing risk by trading fractions of
the Kelly position size.
Weighting the estimate of the return to the FX carry portfolio by confidence
measures derived from risk factors (see Section 6.4.3) also contributes to improve
the performance of the carry portfolios. Similarly to the market-timing study in
Chapter 5, we find that the 2-Year U.S. Swap Spread (USSP2) based indicator
generated the best FX carry trading performance during the period of interest.
The confidence measure based on the average of the single confidence measures
(AV G), produced second best results across all levels of risk appetite c. Thus, we
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confirm that aggregating individual risk factors for trading FX carry portfolios
generates stable results (see Chapter 5).
In the regressions for carry-alpha and market-timing ability summarised in
Table 6.2 and Table 6.3, we find explanations for the improved performance of
weighting the estimated FX carry portfolio return µˆ with a confidence measure
based on risk factors: The statistically significant positive alpha for the strategies
weighted with the confidence measures with I = USSP2, TEDSP,AV G disap-
pears as we extend the form of the equation to include a market-timing term
(see Equation 5.2). In contrast, the market-timing coeﬃcient γ becomes statisti-
cally significantly positive for I = USSP2, TEDSP, V IX,AV G. Thus, a flexible
money management methodology has the ability to address both the aspect of
optimal position sizing and market-timing through variation of the leverage levels.
Pojarliev and Levich [2008] showed that some FX hedge funds exhibit positive
market-timing ability by performing regressions of the form of Equation 5.2. Our
results do not exclude that these money managers might instead adopt time-
varying leverage techniques, similar to the one proposed in Section 6.4.2. Money
managers who rely on simple market-timing techniques without considering lever-
age are not trading optimally with respect to multi-period (risk adjusted) capital
growth.
Finally, our analyses on dynamic leverage models for FX carry portfolios
strongly questions the validity of the conclusions reached by Darvas [2009]. Dar-
vas [2009] finds that the Sharpe ratio of FX carry trades degenerates with in-
creasing leverage levels. Thus, following Darvas [2009], the UIP puzzle would
exist mostly in the data and FX traders can not capitalise on it because of their
high leverage. Firstly, while Galati et al. [2007b] state that FX carry trades are
executed with leverage, there is no evidence whether these leverage levels are par-
ticularly high or just moderate. Secondly, as we show in our analyses, the Sharpe
ratio proves to be not appropriate for measuring risk adjusted capital growth.
Thus, we postulate that the conclusions reached by Darvas [2009] is drawn upon
wrong assumptions and interpretations of results.
Moreover, we show how optimising leverage levels based on historical returns
series can lead to strong overleveraging, and consequently to bancrupcy. Dy-
namic, conditional optimal leverage models are more reactive and as Thorp [2006]
points out, theoretically sound. Our results, show how most of the conditional
leverage models could outperform the constant leverage models with respect to
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our novel performance measure (DAG).
122
Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis we analysed the return characteristics inherent to advanced FX
carry trade strategies. The FX carry trade is of major practical relevance since
it represents a significant investment-style implemented by professional FX man-
agers (see Pojarliev and Levich [2008]). Pojarliev and Levich [2008] argued that
FX managers should not be remunerated for naive replication of FX carry returns
since the returns inherent to the FX carry trade can be generated in an easy and
systematic manner. As a solution Pojarliev and Levich [2008] suggested that FX
managers performance should be assessed according to new benchmarks which
entail proxies to the major investment-styles for the FX market. An industry-
wide acceptance of such benchmarks would force professional FX managers to
develop new trading strategies or to enhance existing ones (see Section 3.1).
The FX carry trade is relevant also from the theoretical perspective of finan-
cial economics, since its profitability stems from the well documented empirical
failure of uncovered interest rate parity (see Section 3.2). Since the FX carry
trade has been identified as a main driver of increases in FX market turnover (see
Galati and Melvin [2004]), an acknowledgement of the carry trade phenomenon
is indispensable for understanding current FX market dynamics. Throughout
the thesis we discussed literature which analysed various aspects of the FX carry
Trade phenomenon. Among others, Rosenberg [2003] and Vesilind [2006] studied
the performance of FX carry portfolios and reported the existence of diversifica-
tion benefits when implementing FX carry trades. Hochradl and Wagner [2010]
simulated the returns to a carry portfolio strategy and conclude that the risk
adjusted returns to carry trading are too high to be ignored by professional spec-
ulators. Christiansen et al. [2009] and Menkhoﬀ et al. [2009] analysed which risk
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factors contribute in explaining the returns inherent to the carry trade and found
significant negative relationships between changes in proxies for global volatility
and liquidity and carry trade returns. Dunis and Miao [2007] deployed volatility-
based filters for market-timing the FX carry trade and finds improved Sharpe
ratios over a long-only carry trade benchmark. Darvas [2009] analysed the eﬀect
of constant leverage levels on carry trade performance and finds that risk-adjusted
carry trading performances deteriorate as the leverage levels increase.
In the following we will briefly summarise the main findings from our three
empirical chapters.
Asset Allocation Since carry trading involves buying high yielding cur-
rencies while selling low yielding currencies, an FX carry trade should involve a
minimum amount of two currencies. The maximum number of currencies in a
FX carry portfolio however, is not limited. Rosenberg [2003] and Vesilind [2006]
showed that diversified FX carry portfolios generated higher risk-adjusted returns
than FX carry trades involving only two currencies. By analysing the performance
of three diﬀerent sets of currency portfolios, in Chapter 4 we contribute to lit-
erature analysing the eﬀect of asset allocation methodologies on FX carry trade
profitability.
Within the first set of currency portfolios we implement diﬀerent algorithms
for computing the portfolio weights of diversified FX carry trade portfolios. We
find that diversification improves the Sharpe ratio of FX carry portfolios and
thereby confirm the validity of the findings by Rosenberg [2003] and Vesilind
[2006] in our own empirical results. Moreover, we find that mean-variance as-
set allocation strategies exhibit better financial performance metrics than the
simple asset allocation strategies. Nevertheless, mean-variance asset allocation
strategies fail to significantly outperform a simple scorecard-based asset alloca-
tion methodology. Also, we attribute a higher robustness to the simple asset
allocation algorithms, since they do not require an additional estimation of the
variance-covariance matrix. Thus, we do not regard mean-variance optimisation
as the better asset allocation procedure for FX carry portfolios and concentrate
our research eﬀorts on a simple Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio, diversified ac-
cording to a simple scorecard-based weighting scheme (see Appendix A).
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Secondly, we test alternative FX carry portfolios by establishing currency ex-
posures based on diﬀerent yield maturities. We find that the best performances
were achieved by ranking the currencies according to the yields with the shortest
maturity (i.e. 1-week yields). Nevertheless, the utilisation of longer maturity
yields does not significantly underperform portfolios based on shorter yield dura-
tions.
The third set of currency portfolios tested in Chapter 4 establish currency
positions according to relative changes in measures of carry trade attractiveness.
These currency portfolios mimic the portfolio flows generated by carry traders in
the FX market.
Contrary to the first two sets of currency portfolios, we find that these ’carry-
flows’ portfolios generate stable positive returns from the FX rate component
while generating no exceptional return from the yield component. We posit that
these positive FX returns are due to sustained buying (selling) pressure of FX
traders on currencies which are gaining (losing) carry trade attractiveness.
Although the carry-flows currency portfolios generate high returns from FX
fluctuations, the total returns to the portfolios are relatively low, since high trans-
actions costs erode large parts of the profits generated by the strategies. Following
Lyons [2006] and Sarno et al. [2006], the low Sharpe ratios associated to the carry-
flows portfolios should not attract significant speculative capital. Thus, according
to the limits of speculation hypothesis (see Section 4.1) the positive FX rate re-
turns inherent to carry-flows strategies could persist in the future. Nevertheless,
we posit that carry-flows portfolio strategies constitute a good diversification ve-
hicle for FX carry portfolios, since they exhibit positive returns and consistently
negative correlations to the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio.
Market Timing Pojarliev and Levich [2008] found that about half of the
examined FX hedge funds successfully perform market-timing in one or more
investment-styles (see Section 5.1.2). In order to gain some insights into the
strategies adopted by modern FX hedge funds and contribute to literature re-
lating FX carry trade returns to global risk factors, in Chapter 5 we analysed
the performance of market-timing the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio through
market-timing signals based on various risk factors.
We constructed simple market-timing signals based on proxies for global liq-
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uidity, volatility and interest rate diﬀerentials. We find that while long-neutral
market-timing strategies could outperform the long-only FX carry trade bench-
mark, long-short market-timing strategies consistently underperformed the long
only FX carry benchmark. On the basis of these results, we would not rec-
ommend assuming short positions in the carry trade. Moreover, we find that
the best trading performances were achieved by the market-timing signals based
on proxies for global liquidity (i.e. the Ted Spread and the U.S. 2-Year Swap
Spread). Composed risk aversion indicators, as disseminated by several financial
institutions, produced stable trading performances which were comparable to the
performances of the best single indicators.
By fixing the threshold parameter for the generation of the market-timing
signals to 0.7 from the start, we avoided allowing our analysis to degenerate into
a data-mining exercise. Still, we find our results aﬀected by a lookback bias: The
enhanced profitability of the market-timed carry trade strategies is grounded in
the successful timing of the credit crisis. We strongly question whether carry
traders would have chosen the right (liquidity-based) risk indicators for timing
the carry trade before the credit crisis.
Since we do not know ex-ante which risk indicator will perform well within
future periods of carry trade losses, we advocate careful consideration of both
positive and negative market scenarios when developing market-timing indica-
tors. For practical market-timing applications, we would advocate the use of
aggregated risk indicators, which have been shown to produce robust trading re-
sults.
Money Management FX carry trades are typically executed with leverage
(see Gagnon and Chaboud [2007] and Galati et al. [2007b]). In a recent publi-
cation, Darvas [2009] analysed the eﬀect of leverage on the profitability of FX
carry trades. Darvas [2009] found that risk-adjusted trading performances of FX
carry strategies decrease as leverage levels rise. This finding led Darvas [2009]
to conclude that FX markets might be more speculative eﬃcient than previously
reported, since leveraged FX carry traders generated worse trading results than
unleveraged FX carry strategies which are typically analysed in the carry trade
literature.
In Chapter 6 we examine the eﬀect that leverage has on FX carry trades
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by replicating and extending the research initiated by Darvas [2009]. In the
theoretical part of Chapter 6 (see Section 6.1) we discuss the implications of
using the Kelly criterion for determining optimal leverage levels. In Section 6.4 we
propose a novel performance metric (Drawdown-adjusted-Growth DAG) which
permits the evaluation of trading strategies with respect to capital growth and
security. We posit that the DAG is more appropriate for assessing multi period
investment performance than standard risk-adjusted performance measures like
the Sharpe ratio. Moreover, we propose extensions to the Kelly formula for
determining optimal leverage levels.
In the first part of our empirical analysis on leveraged FX carry trades we
simulate the trading performance of FX carry portfolios executed with diﬀerent
fixed leverage factors. We find that when trading the Benchmark FX Carry
Portfolio (see Appendix A), a leverage level of 5.5 would have produced the
highest capital growth, while a leverage level of 1.5 would have produced the
highest risk-adjusted capital growth (as measured by the DAG).
Moreover, we show that carry traders who determined their leverage level by
selecting the historically growth-optimal constant leverage level would have found
themselves overleveraged during the period of the credit crisis. As a result, their
portfolios would have incurred substantial losses.
In the second part of the empirical research in Chapter 6 we analyse the
performance of trading the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio with a time-varying
leverage model based on the Kelly criterion. We find that the time-varying lever-
age models perform better than the optimised constant leverage levels, which
were selected with hindsight on their performance.
Our trading experiments in Chapter 6 document the large eﬀects that lever-
age has on the capital growth and the drawdowns of FX carry trade portfolios.
We posit that the large and sudden unwinding of carry trade positions during
drawdown phases, might be the result of forced liquidations of positions by over-
leveraged carry traders.
Outlook To recapitulate, in this thesis we focused on analysing the popular
FX carry trade. Reviewing recent carry trade literature, we showed that an ac-
knowledgement of the practical relevance of the FX carry trade is important for
an improved understanding of current FX market dynamics. We also conclude
that modern FX managers will have to develop enhanced methodologies for im-
plementing FX carry trades in order to compete with low cost index products
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which replicate popular investment-styles like the FX carry trade. In addition,
we find that there might be a feedback eﬀect between the failure of uncovered
interest rate parity and the trading activity of FX carry traders.
Further, through the empirical analyses performed within the thesis, we showed
that:
• Diversification is beneficial to FX carry portfolio performance;
• Mean-variance optimisation does not significantly outperform the bench-
mark FX carry strategies;
• The FX market oﬀers pockets of predictability facilitated by sustained buy-
ing and selling pressure on specific currencies by FX carry traders;
• Long-neutral market-timing can deliver improved risk-adjusted FX carry
performances, while long-short market-timing generates considerably lower
trading performances;
• Robust, aggregated market-timing indicators should be preferred to histori-
cally optimal indicators, in order to avoid overoptimisation and a lookback-
bias;
• Historical optimisation of leverage levels bears risks of overleveraging and
low flexibility to adapt in volatile market environments;
• Time-varying leverage levels based on Kelly produce enhanced results over
constant leverage levels;
• Performance measurement for multi-period trading strategies where lever-
age is allowed, is achieved better by the DAG (see Section 6.4.4) than by
conventional risk-adjusted performance metrics like e.g., the Sharpe ratio.
An interview with a FX hedge fund manager held in April 2009, following the
major FX carry trade losses incurred during the period of the credit crisis (see
Appendix C), provides a confirmation on the wide implementation of FX carry
strategies by FX hedge funds; the ability of some FX managers to market-time the
FX carry trade; and the failure of some FX managers to adopt eﬀective money-
and risk management procedures. We stress the importance of this point, since
some FX hedge funds were forced to liquidate following the large losses incurred
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during the credit crisis.
We conclude that since the determination of the leverage levels for FX carry
trades constitutes the major factor in the final performance of FX carry trade
strategies, professional FX managers should put a greater focus on implementing
money management techniques for determining optimal leverage levels. Further
work in this area should focus on the optimal computation of the inputs to the
Kelly formula and on the development of solutions to the Kelly criterion for return
distributions which model the negative skewness and leptokurtosis inherent to FX
carry trade returns in a better way than the normal distribution.
Also, we stress the relevance of the findings that FX carry trade portfolio flows
can signal pockets of predictability in the movements of G10 exchange rates. Fur-
ther work in this area should deal with a refinement of a measure for determining
the change in FX carry trade attractiveness, the analysis of diversification bene-
fits gained by the inclusion of carry-flows portfolios in an FX carry portfolio, and
the interdependence of returns to the FX carry trade and carry-flows portfolios.
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Appendix A
The Benchmark FX Carry
Portfolio
In the following the we will outline the backtesting procedure and performance
metrics for the carry portfolio used as the simple proxy for carry trade returns
throughout this thesis. The computation of all currency portfolios in the thesis
is performed according to the methodology outlined in the following sections.
A.1 Defining the Currency Universe
The currency universe for the benchmark carry portfolio is denoted by the G10
currencies, i.e. the EUR, USD, JPY , GBP , CHF , CAD, AUD, NZD, NOK,
SEK (see Section 2.2).
A.2 Computing the Portfolio Weights
The portfolio weights for the benchmark carry portfolio are computed accord-
ing to the simple scorecard-based approach outlined in Section 4.4.1. Equally
weighted long positions are established with the three highest yielding currencies
and equally weighted short positions are established with the three lowest yield-
ing currencies. Figure A.1 depicts the resulting cumulative portfolio weights from
the 1st of January 1999 to the 5th of March 2010 of the Benchmark FX Carry
Portfolio.
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Figure A.1: Cumulative Portfolio Weights of the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio
A.3 Simulating the Returns
The total returns to the currency portfolios are composed of three components.
These components are the return from FX rate movements, the return from yield
diﬀerentials and the transactions costs.
The FX return component rPFX,t of a currency portfolio is calculated via Equa-
tion A.1:
rPFX,t =
10￿
c=1
wct−1 ∗ log(
Sct
Sct−1
) (A.1)
Where c denotes the identifier for a specific currency in the G10 universe (see
Section A.1), wct−1 denotes the portfolio weight for currency c in period t− 1 and
log( S
c
t
Sct−1
) denotes the percentage change of the exchange rate of currency c to the
Euro EUR from period t− 1 to period t.
The yields return component rPY D,t of the currency portfolio is calculated via
Equation A.2:
rPY D,t =
10￿
i=1
wct−1 ∗ (
ict−1
52
+ sign(wct−1) ∗
η
2
) (A.2)
Where ict−1 denotes the 1-week interest rate for currency c in period t− 1 and
η denotes the bid-ask spread for the 1-week yields. In order to determine the
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yield pickup for our weekly holding period, we divide the 1-week yields by 52
(the number of weeks in one year). Throughout the thesis we set the value of η
to 0.05% (i.e. 5 basis points) for all G10 currencies.
The transactions costs component rPTC,t of the currency portfolio is calculated
via Equation A.2:
rPTC,t =
10￿
i=1
−|wct − wct−1| ∗ (κ+ ζ) (A.3)
Where κ denotes the transactions costs in percent for a one-way foreign ex-
change transaction and ζ denotes the slippage in percent for a one-way foreign
exchange transaction. We set κ to 0.03% and ζ to 0.02% throughout the thesis.
Thus, the total return rPTOT,t generated by a currency portfolio P in a specific
period t can be computed via Equation A.4:
rPTOT,t = r
P
FX,t + r
P
Y D,t + r
P
TC,t (A.4)
The PANEL A of Figure A.2 depicts the cumulative total returns inherent
to the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio as well as the cumulative single returns
components discussed above (i.e. FX, yields and transactions costs). The PANEL
A of Figure A.2 visualises how the largest contribution to the total returns of the
Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio is given by the yield component. The PANEL
B of Figure A.2 depicts the histogram of the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio
total returns. The histogram visualises the existence of a few large (negative)
outliers in the total returns of the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio. An analysis
of the cumulative returns depicted in PANEL A of Figure A.2 reveals that, within
our data set, the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio incurred its largest drawdown
during the period of the credit crisis.
A.4 Performance Analysis
The performance metrics for the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio are summarised
in Table A.1. The computation of these performance measures is outlined in
Appendix B.
The portfolio generated a return of 6.51% per annum with a standard devia-
tion of the returns of 9.71%. This yields a Sharpe ratio of 0.67. The maximum
drawdown of the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio was 30%.
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Figure A.2: PANEL A: Cumulative Returns of the Benchmark FX Carry Port-
folio. PANEL B: Returns Histogram of the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio
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ra σa SR rg MAX.DD DAG
0.0651 0.0971 0.67 0.0604 0.30 0.0727
Table A.1: Performance Metrics for the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio (ra: An-
nualised Arithmetic Return, σa: Annualised Standard Deviation of Returns, SR:
Sharpe Ratio, rg: Annualised Geometric Return, MAX.DD: Maximum Draw-
down, DAG: Drawdown Adjusted Growth)
A.5 Timeseries derived from the Benchmark FX
Carry Portfolio
The yield diﬀerentials (carry) and the RiskMetrics volatility inherent to the
Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio are used as risk indicators in Chapter 5 and
Chapter 6 of the thesis. The computation of these time series is outlined in the
following paragraphs.
Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio ’Carry’ We compute the time series of
interest rate diﬀerentials (carry) inherent to the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio
according to Equation A.5:
CBMCPt =
10￿
i=1
wct ∗ ict (A.5)
Where CBMCPt denotes the actual yield diﬀerential inherent to the Benchmark
FX Carry Portfolio positions, wct denotes the current portfolio weight of currency
c in the carry portfolio and ict denotes the current 1-week interest rate for currency
c. We compute the yield diﬀerentials for all periods of our weekly data set ranging
from the 1st of January 1999 to the 5th of March 2010.
Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio RiskMetrics-Volatility In order to
compute the time series of RiskMetrics volatility inherent to the Benchmark FX
Carry Portfolio, we need to calculate the portfolio weights wBMCP of the Bench-
mark FX Carry Portfolio as well as the RiskMetrics variance-covariance matrix
Σrr for the G10 currencies. The calculation of the portfolio weights is outlined in
Section A.2 while the methodology for the calculation of the RiskMetrics variance-
covariance matrix is outlined in Section 4.4.3. After having computed these two
inputs we can compute the time series of RiskMetrics volatility inherent to the
Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio according to Equation A.6:
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V BMCPt =
￿
52 ∗wBMCP ￿t ∗Σrr,t ∗wBMCPt (A.6)
Where V BMCPt denotes the actual RiskMetrics-volatility inherent to the Bench-
mark FX Carry Portfolio, wBMCPt denotes the (10 × 1) vector of weights of the
Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio in period t and Σrr,t denotes the (10× 10) Risk-
Metrics variance-covariance matrix of the G10 currencies in period t. The stan-
dard deviation measure is annualised through multiplication with the square root
of 52 (number of weeks in one year).
Figure A.3 depicts the Carry and RiskMetrics-Volatility time series inherent
to the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio.
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Figure A.3: Yield Diﬀerentials (PANEL A) and RiskMetrics Volatility (PANEL
B) of the Benchmark FX Carry Portfolio
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Appendix B
Performance Metrics
Throughout the thesis we utilise a set of performance metrics to evaluate the
currency portfolios from a portfolio managers perspective. These performance
metrics are:
• Annualised Arithmetic Return
• Annualised Standard Deviation
• Sharpe Ratio
• Annualised Geometric Return
• Maximum Drawdown
• Drawdown Adjusted Growth
In the following sections we will outline the computation of these performance
metrics.
B.1 Annualised Arithmetic Return
We compute the arithmetic mean return for a trading strategy by calculating the
average return for a period:
rˆ =
1
T
T￿
t=1
rPTOT,t (B.1)
Where rPTOT,t denotes the total return generated by a currency portfolio P in
a specific period t.
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Since our currency portfolios are traded on a weekly basis, we annualise the
mean return by multiplying it with the factor 52 (number of weeks in a year):
ra = 52 ∗ rˆ (B.2)
B.2 Annualised Return Standard Deviation
We calculate the weekly standard deviation of returns via Equation B.3:
σˆ =
￿￿￿￿ 1
T − 1
T￿
t=1
(rPTOT,t − rˆ)2 (B.3)
Subsequently we annualise the standard deviation by multiplying the weekly
standard deviation by the factor
√
52:
σa =
√
52 ∗ σˆ (B.4)
B.3 Sharpe Ratio
The Sharpe ratio is a very popular risk-adjusted performance metric. We calcu-
late the Sharpe ratio SR by dividing the strategy return over the riskfree rate
(ra− rrf ) by the annualised standard deviation of returns σa. We set the riskless
interest rate rrf in Equation B.5 to zero, since the currency portfolios are fully
self financed.
SR =
ra − rrf
σa
(B.5)
B.4 Annualised Geometric Return
When measuring the performance of an investment strategy over several periods
the arithmetic mean return ra, does not provide a realistic measure of investment
performance since it does not take into account the compounding of returns over
time. The geometric mean return rg denotes the average return to a trading
strategy under consideration of reinvestment of returns. The annualised geometric
return is computed via Equation B.6:
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rg = 52 ∗ (
T￿
t=1
(1 + rPTOT,t)
1
T
− 1) (B.6)
B.5 Maximum Drawdown
The maximum drawdown metric MAX.DD measures the biggest historical price
decline in the equity of a trading strategy. If X(t) is a random process [X(0) =
0, t ≥ 0], the drawdown DD(T ) at any time T is defined as:
DD(T ) =Max[0,Maxt∈(0,T )X(t)−X(T )] (B.7)
The maximum drawdown MAX.DD up to time T is the maximum of the
drawdown over the history of the variable. More formally,
MAX.DD(T ) =Maxτ∈(0,T )[Maxt∈(0,τ)X(t)−X(τ)] (B.8)
B.6 Drawdown Adjusted Growth
Within this thesis we propose a novel performance measure which we term Draw-
down Adjusted Growth. The performance measure is suitable for evaluating geo-
metric capital growth while penalising for large drawdowns. The DAG is calcu-
lated via Equation B.9:
DAG = max(−log(MAX.DD) ∗ rg, 0) (B.9)
A more detailed discussion of the DAG performance metric can be found in
Section 6.4.4.
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Appendix C
Interview with a FX Hedge Fund
Manager
Transcript of an interview between the author (LB) and Dr. Christian von Stra-
chwitz (CVS). Christian von Strachwitz is the CEO of Frankfurt based Quaesta
Capital, a FX hedge fund specialising in managed accounts using a systematic
trading method employing genetic algorithms.
The interview was carried out in April 2009, following the large carry trade
drawdown during the period of the credit crisis. We omit parts of the interview
which are irrelevant to the thesis.
LB Do you trade carry strategies in your fund?
CVS Not directly. Since we specialise in genetic algorithms for determining
short-term FX trades, we do not focus on developing carry strategies at the
moment. This will not change in the near future, especially since the reputation
of the carry trade suﬀered a lot recently. Nevertheless, we can not exclude an
exposure to the carry trade within the fund-of-funds product that we oﬀer to our
clients.
LB What is your general view on the carry trade?
CVS Nobody wants to hear anything about the carry trade at the moment.
Everyone traded it and thus during the credit crisis many investors incurred large
losses. Some fund managers traded the carry trade with high levels of leverage
and no eﬀective stop-loss- or risk-management mechanisms. At the moment the
140
industry is moving away from the carry trade and we do not intend to be the first
institution to move against this trend.
LB How do you know these facts?
CVS In order to optimise our fund-of-funds product, we maintain and anal-
yse a large data base of FX hedge funds performances. During the credit crisis,
several funds disappeared from our database. Large losses forced them to liqui-
date. Also, many FX hedge funds are abandoning the carry trade. We know this
by interpreting regression coeﬃcients of FX hedge fund returns on e.g. proxies
for carry trade returns. We find that the factor loadings on our carry trade proxy
are declining for most FX hedge funds which survived the credit crisis.
LB Do you think that market-timing could enhance carry trade returns?
CVS We tested market-timing signals for FX carry trades based on sim-
ple risk factors. In our backtests the market-timing signals improved the risk-
adjusted performance of the carry trade. Still, it is not our main interest to
engage in carry trading activities at the moment.
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